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Hume’s first work, A Treatise of Human Nature, has traditionally received the
lion’s share of scholarly attention, at the expense of his later and more polished
texts. The tide has started to shift in recent years, with the result that Hume’s
two Enquiries—his mature investigations of the understanding and morals—are
now recognised as important works in their own right (though most commentators
still continue to prefer the Treatise). With regard to Hume’s work on the passions,
however, Book 2 of the Treatise still commands all of the attention.
In this thesis, I defend two important claims. The first is that Hume has
a mature philosophy of emotion, significantly different—indeed, significantly im-
proved—from that of the Treatise. Most strikingly, it is anti-egoist and anti-
hedonist about motivation, where the Treatise had espoused a Lockean hedonism
and egoism. In parts it is also more cognitivist, and although Hume remains as
opposed to moral rationalism as he ever was, his arguments in support of this
opposition are very different.
The second claim is that Hume’s mature philosophy of emotion is to be
found, not in the Dissertation on the Passions, but rather in the full set of Four
Dissertations in which this work first appeared, including also the Natural History
of Religion, Of Tragedy, and Of the Standard of Taste. The passions, I argue,
form the unifying theme of this collection, which is in effect Hume’s Enquiry
concerning the Passions. I maintain that they are profitably studied together on




References to Hume’s texts throughout use the following abbreviations, followed
by Book, part, section, and paragraph numbers (as appropriate):
T A Treatise of Human Nature
L A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh
E An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
M An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals
D Dialogues concerning Natural Religion
N The Natural History of Religion
P A Dissertation on the Passions
Tr Of Tragedy
ST Of the Standard of Taste
Other essays are abbreviated in a similar fashion, but only after they have been
introduced by name, so that it will be obvious which essay is being cited. Page
numbers are to the editions that most Hume scholars would now expect (Selby-
Bigge’s editions of the Treatise and Enquiries, Miller’s edition of the Essays);
full references are in the bibliography of primary sources at the end. The quo-
tations themselves are taken from the editions, prepared by Peter Millican and
me, available at http://www.davidhume.org/. I adopt the same referencing and
abbreviation conventions as are used on that site.
vii
Quotations and references from other primary sources are from the editions
listed in the bibliography. The page numbers are from modern editions, wherever
these were easily available, but I cite these works using the original publication
year, since I consider it desirable to be able to see at a glance when the thing in
question was first said. The works often went through several editions in their
authors’ lifetimes, receiving additions and revisions in the process. My rule is to
use the date of the earliest edition in which the quoted passage appeared. This
has the effect that the same work is sometimes referred to with a different year.
Butler’s Sermons, for example, are typically referred to as “Butler (1726)”; but
when I am quoting from Butler’s preface, which was first added in the second
edition, I use “Butler (1729)”. A glance at the bibliography of primary sources
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Introduction
0.1. An enquiry concerning the passions
In 1739 and 1740, Hume published the three Books of his Treatise of Human
Nature, the first on the understanding, the second on the passions, and the third
on morals. Although it is now widely considered a philosophical masterpiece, and
is the primary source of Hume’s present reputation, it was not well received by
his contemporaries, and Hume himself was very dissatisfied with it. Having had
greater success with a subsequent set of Essays, Moral and Political (1741-42),
Hume later returned to the subject matter of Books 1 and 3 of the Treatise,
publishing the first edition of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding in
1748, and the first edition of his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals in
1751.1
This naturally prompts the question of what happened to Book 2. Where, we
might ask, is Hume’s Enquiry concerning the Passions? Hume never published a
work with this title, but the standard view, in so far as there is one, would seem
to be that the work standing in the appropriate relations is his Dissertation on
the Passions, first published in 1757.2
1This is a slight (but harmless) simplification. The necessary qualifications are (i) that the
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding—or “first” Enquiry, as it is usually called for short—
was initially published under the title of Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding,
and renamed only after publication of the “moral” or “second” Enquiry (second in time, that
is, but not in name); and (ii) that section 8 of the first Enquiry, Of Liberty and Necessity, has
its origins in Book 2 of the Treatise (T 2.3.1-2, pp. 399-412), rather than Book 1.
2The analogy was made explicitly by L. A. Selby-Bigge in the introduction to his edition of
the two Enquiries (1893/1975, p. viii), and has not been contradicted since. I have previously
endorsed this view myself (Merivale 2009, p. 185); I will recant presently.
1
2If Books 1 and 3 of the Treatise have generally overshadowed their Enquiry
successors, Book 2 has positively eclipsed the Dissertation on the Passions. Nor
is it hard to see why: while the two Enquiries immediately strike the reader as
quite substantial reworkings of their Treatise predecessors, containing much that
is different and new, the Dissertation can easily look like nothing more than, in
Selby-Bigge’s words, “verbatim extracts from Bk. II of the Treatise, with some
trifling verbal alterations”.3 And so, while Hume’s mature investigations of the
understanding and of morals have recently started to emerge from the shadow of
the Treatise as subjects worthy of independent study,4 Hume’s mature philosophy
of emotion continues to languish in the dark.5 This thesis is an attempt to bring
it into the light.
Part of my case for thinking that Hume’s mature philosophy of the passions
is worthy of study in its own right, is that Selby-Bigge was wrong about the
Dissertation. It is true that a lot of this later work is accurately described as
Selby-Bigge describes the whole, but it is my view that not all of the alterations
are trifling or merely verbal. More than this, however, I will also be urging that
the initial premise—concerning the textual source of Hume’s mature thought on
this topic—is mistaken. The true successor to Book 2 of the Treatise is not
the truncated Dissertation on the Passions, but rather the complete set of Four
Dissertations in which this work first appeared, including also the Natural History
of Religion, Of Tragedy, and Of the Standard of Taste.6
That the Four Dissertations can be viewed as Hume’s Enquiry concerning
the Passions is thus the central claim of this thesis. It is shorthand for two closely
3Selby-Bigge (1893/1975, pp. xx-xxi).
4See Peter Millican on the first Enquiry (2002a,b, 2006), and Jacqueline Taylor on the moral
Enquiry (2002, 2009, forthcoming).
5For example, of the 126 articles published in Hume Studies between 2001 and 2010 (volumes
27-36), 52 quote from Book 2 of the Treatise, while only 3 quote from the Dissertation on the
Passions. The first of these quotes just six words in a footnote (Cunningham 2005, p. 251, n1);
the second quotes a couple of short clauses alongside parallel Treatise passages (Postema 2005,
pp. 266-7); the third is my own article (Merivale 2009).
6With this in mind, an addendum to note 5 is in order: from the same 126-article sample,
I count only 14 quoting any one of Hume’s Four Dissertations. Most of these quotations are
from Of the Standard of Taste, easily the best known of the four.
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related proposals, which I will term the Unity Thesis and the Difference Thesis
respectively:
The Unity Thesis The Four Dissertations form a unified set, and are profitably
studied as such; what unifies them, in particular, is the subject matter of
the passions.
The Difference Thesis The philosophy of emotion contained in these works is
substantially and importantly different from Hume’s earlier view, as pre-
sented in Book 2 of the Treatise.
In the remainder of this introduction I will put a little flesh on the bones of these
two claims: the Unity Thesis in §§0.2 and 0.3, and the Difference Thesis in §§0.4
and 0.5.
0.2. Four/three/five/four dissertations
The Four Dissertations came into being only after a couple of false starts. The
story here is of interest in its own right, and also has a bearing on my Unity
Thesis. Hume recounted the main particulars in a letter to his publisher William
Strahan, dated the 25th January, 1772:7
I am told by a Friend, that Dr Millar said to him, there was a Bookseller in
London, who had advertised a new Book, containing, among other things,
two of my suppress’d Essays. These I suppose are two Essays of mine, one
on Suicide another on the Immortality of the Soul, which were printed by
Andrew Millar about seventeen Years ago, and which from my abundant
Prudence I suppress’d and woud not now wish to have revived. I know not
if you were acquainted with this Transaction. It was this: I intended to
print four Dissertations, the natural History of Religion, on the Passions,
on Tragedy, and on the metaphysical Principles of Geometry. I sent them
7For an interesting, if somewhat speculative, reconstruction of the full story that Hume here
alludes to, see E. C. Mossner (1950). For a more cautious account, see Tom L. Beauchamp
(2007, pp. xxii-xxiv).
4up to Mr Millar, but before the last was printed, I happend to meet with
Lord Stanhope, who was in this Country, and he convincd me, that either
there was some Defect in the Argument or in its perspicuity; I forget which;
and I wrote to Mr Millar, that I would not print that Essay; but upon his
remonstrating that the other Essays woud not make a Volume, I sent him
up these two, which I had never intended to have publishd. They were
printed; but it was no sooner done than I repented; and Mr Millar and I
agreed to suppress them at common Charges, and I wrote a new Essay on
the Standard of Taste, to supply their place. (HL 2, pp. 252-3)
Having thus brought these four works together, at least in part for pragmatic
reasons, Hume then quickly separated them in the next edition of his Essays
and Treatises on Several Subjects (1758). In this edition, Of Tragedy and Of
the Standard of Taste were appended to part 1 of the Essays, Moral, Political,
and Literary, while the Dissertation on the Passions and the Natural History
of Religion were placed following the first and second Enquiries respectively, a
rearrangement that persisted in all subsequent collections.
From this short history of these four works, one might be tempted to infer
that they never really belonged together in Hume’s mind, and hence that my
Unity Thesis is simply wrong-footed from the start. Fortunately, however, this
inference does not hold up under scrutiny. First, it is only Of the Standard of
Taste that was a late addition, and nothing suggests that Hume didn’t initially
conceive the other three as a set. Nor is there anything to suggest that, faced
with the need for a new fourth, Hume didn’t then compose this late addition
precisely with the other three in mind.8
8The same cannot be said of Hume’s first choices for filling the gap, Of Suicide and Of
the Immortality of the Soul. These two suppressed essays were written some time earlier, and
were presumably offered for inclusion simply because something was needed, and they were
to hand. Their irreligious content chimes with the Natural History in that one very general
respect, and the defence of suicide would have struck a note of accord with the dedication that
was ultimately prefixed to (some copies of) the Four Dissertations, which praised John Home’s
tragedy Douglas, itself highly controversial for its sympathetic or even positive portrayal of the
suicide of its main character. Home’s play did not premie`re until 1756, however, after Hume
had thought of including the scandalous essay in the set. In all, the specially written essay on
taste is—or so I will argue—a much better fit with the other three.
0.2. FOUR/THREE/FIVE/FOUR DISSERTATIONS 5
Secondly, Hume’s subsequent separation of these works can be explained by
other factors, without supposing it was only pragmatism that brought them to-
gether in the first place. Shortly after publication of the Four Dissertations, Hume
sent a copy to an acquaintance in Germany, writing in a cover letter that “[s]ome
of these Dissertations are Attempts to throw Light upon the most profound Phi-
losophy: Others contain a greater Mixture of polite Literature, & are wrote in
a more easy Style & Manner.”9 There is only one plausible way of reading this:
the Natural History and the Dissertation contain the profound philosophy, while
Of Tragedy and Of the Standard of Taste contain the greater mixture of polite
literature.
Thus it would have made sense to Hume, when considering how these works
might be incorporated into his Essays and Treatises (with the core structure
of that collection already in place), to include the “profound” works alongside
the two Enquiries, with the other two being included with the Essays, Moral,
Political, and Literary. Add to this the simple point about the respective lengths
of these works (which, however trivial, must surely have been a factor), and there
is a compelling case for the separation, one that does not depend on anything
internal pushing the Four Dissertations apart.
Perhaps less plausible, but still to my mind well within the realms of possibil-
ity, is that the subject of the passions was intended to be the common theme even
according to the original plan, which featured a concluding dissertation on the
metaphysical principles of geometry, before this was replaced by Of the Standard
of Taste. This abandoned work sadly does not survive, but presumably it was
at least in part a revision of Treatise Book 1, part 2 (Of the ideas of space and
time, pp. 26-68), a topic which hardly features in the first Enquiry, save for three
paragraphs in the context of a discussion of scepticism about abstract reasoning
(E 12.18-20, pp. 156-8).
9This letter is in the Lilly Library of Indiana University. I have not read it, and owe my
knowledge of its existence, and this quotation, to Immerwahr (1994, pp. 237-8). The distinction
that Hume had in mind here was likely that between “accurate” and “easy” philosophy, as drawn
in section 1 of the first Enquiry ; the phrase “easy style and manner” is taken straight from this
section (E 1.5, p. 8).
6One might have thought it safe to assume that geometry would have no
bearing on Hume’s thought about the passions, but perhaps surprisingly this
assumption is in fact false. There are two quite substantial sections in Book 2
of the Treatise devoted to discussing the effects on the passions of distance and
contiguity in space and time (T 2.3.7-8, pp. 427-38). In the Dissertation on the
Passions, these two sections are reduced to just a single sentence, which merely
states one of the main observations: “What is distant, either in place or time, has
not equal influence with what is near and contiguous” (P 6.18, p. 29). It seems to
me entirely possible that the abandoned dissertation on geometry combined the
exclusively metaphysical discussion of Book 1 with the psychological discussion
of Book 2 that the Dissertation on the Passions itself almost entirely omits. At
least, if this had been the case, the original four would have hung together very
nicely; while if Hume had not discussed the relationship between geometry and
the passions in this last dissertation, it is difficult to imagine what else could have
saved it from sticking out like a sore thumb. (This point is all the more striking
when we consider how very clearly the first three dissertations are connected; see
§0.3 below.)
My Unity Thesis holds that Hume’s Four Dissertations are in fact unified
by the subject matter of the passions, whether by accident or by design. It also
maintains that they are profitably studied together on this basis. This second
claim, of course, stands or falls with the thesis as a whole. The proof of the
pudding, as they say, is in the eating. In order to whet the appetite, however,
I shall argue in the next section for deliberate unity in the construction of this
short-lived set.
0.3. Editing the Treatise
When we look at the third and final part of Treatise Book 2 (Of the will and direct
passions), and how Hume edited and reordered this material for the Dissertation
on the Passions, we find very clear evidence that Hume himself initially conceived
of the Four Dissertations—or at least the first three of them—as a unified set.
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The beginnings of this argument have already been made by John Immerwahr,10
but as we will see he seems to have understated the case.
There are ten sections in part 3 of Book 2 of the Treatise. The first two are
on liberty and necessity. This being a particularly important topic, and closely
related to causation, Hume understandably revisited it as soon as possible, in
section 8 of his first Enquiry, immediately following the section 7 discussion of
necessary connection.11 The third section of part 3, Of the influencing motives
of the will, contains Hume’s famous discussion of the relationship between reason
and passion, a discussion that reappears in section 5 of the Dissertation on the
Passions (albeit with some substantial cuts; see §10.5). It is the remaining seven
sections that matter for the present argument.
The first thing to note (and this is the point Immerwahr makes) is that
Hume reorders the material from these seven sections, moving his discussion of
hope and fear from the end of Treatise Book 2 (T 2.3.9, pp. 438-48) to the start
of the Dissertation (P 1, pp. 3-6), leaving the Dissertation to end instead with a
discussion of the causes of the violent emotions (P 6, pp. 26-9; formerly T 2.3.4,
pp. 418-22). In particular, this latter discussion focuses almost exclusively on
(what is now widely known as) Hume’s conversion principle. The substance of
this principle does not matter for now (I examine it in chapters 11 and 12). What
matters is simply to point out that it is the very principle Hume goes on to apply,
in Of Tragedy, to the puzzling phenomenon of the pleasure that we take in tragic
drama. In a similar way, hope and fear are the main emotions that connect the
Dissertation on the Passions to the Natural History of Religion, since they are
at the heart of Hume’s account of the origin of religious belief (see chapter 7).
Given these two clear links, there is an obvious explanation for Hume’s re-
arrangement, if we assume that he was thinking of the Four Dissertations as a
10Immerwahr (1994).
11The link between Hume’s treatments of causation and of free-will is surely obvious. It has
been insisted on particularly forcefully by Millican (2007a, 2009a, 2011), in opposition to the
sceptical realist interpretation of Hume on causation (Millican argues that Hume’s defence of
compatibalism depends crucially on a “thin” account of necessity).
8unified set. For in this set, the Dissertation on the Passions is sandwiched in
between the Natural History of Religion and Of Tragedy. There is thus a natural
progression of ideas from the first of these dissertations to the second (via hope
and fear), and from the second to the third (via the conversion principle). It is
difficult to imagine what else could have motivated Hume’s rearrangement, if not
an awareness of precisely these connections.
This reordering of material from Book 2, part 3 is not the only thing that
points to deliberate unity. There are also some very telling facts regarding what
Hume left out from his earlier work (which Immerwahr does not mention). As
well as shifting the penultimate section of Book 2, which included the account
of hope and fear, to the start of the Dissertation on the Passions, Hume also
removed altogether the final section, Of curiosity, or the love of truth (T 2.3.10,
pp. 448-54). I can find no evidence that Hume came in later life to doubt his
account of curiosity, and accordingly assume that he omitted it merely so as to
keep things relatively short. But there is a particular reason why this section
should have marked itself out as a suitable candidate for dropping, should such a
candidate be needed, and it is also to be found in the Natural History of Religion.
In the second section of this dissertation, Hume writes:
It must necessarily, indeed, be allowed, that, in order to carry men’s atten-
tion beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference
concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some pas-
sion, which prompts their thought and reflection; some motive, which urges
their first enquiry. But what passion shall we here have recourse to, for
explaining an effect of such mighty consequence? Not speculative curiosity
surely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for such gross
apprehensions; and would lead men into enquiries concerning the frame of
nature, a subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities.
No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but
the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness,
the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the
appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this
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nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the
course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of hu-
man life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and
astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity. (N 2.5, pp. 38-9;
my emphases)
Here, Hume not only places hope and fear at the centre of his account of the origin
of religious belief, but also explicitly discounts the love of truth. It is understand-
able, then, that when he came to rework this material in the Dissertation on the
Passions he chose to begin with the former passions, and cut out the section on
the latter altogether.
A similar point can be made with regard to the connection between the
second and third dissertations. Section 6 of the Dissertation on the Passions,
containing Hume’s mature discussion of the causes of the violent emotions, derives
from sections 4-8 of Treatise Book 2, part 3. From this original, Hume reproduces
almost all of section 4, which contains his extended treatment of the conversion
principle. The single paragraph reproduced from section 5, meanwhile, is the
sole paragraph from that section that concerns this same principle (T 2.3.5.2,
pp. 422-3). As for sections 6-8, these provide only the last six of the Dissertation
section’s eighteen paragraphs (P 6.13-18, pp. 28-9), five of which are just one or
two sentences long, among the shortest in the whole work (and the sixth isn’t
much longer).12
As with his account of curiosity, I can find no evidence that Hume was
dissatisfied with the abandoned material from sections 5-8, and accordingly I
presume that these cuts were made largely in the interests of space. Assuming
that brevity was a general consideration, however, there is still the particular
question of why he chose this material to cut. At least a part of the answer
to this question now seems obvious: the reason for focusing on the conversion
12The Dissertation on the Passions ends with a concluding paragraph, which Beauchamp
counts as number 19 of the final section in his critical edition (2007); for ease of cross-reference,
Millican and I have done the same with our on-line edition. But it is clear that this is not
intended as the final paragraph of section 6, but as a conclusion to the whole dissertation, for
which reason I count only 18 paragraphs in this section.
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principle, at the expense of all the other material, is surely the importance of this
principle in Hume’s account of tragic pleasure given in the following dissertation.
I suggest, however, that there may also have been a second consideration in play.
Sections 7 and 8 of Book 2, part 3, are the two sections concerning the influence
of space and time on the passions. In line with my speculation in the previous
section, it seems at least possible that this material was cut from the Dissertation
on the Passions because it appeared instead in the original fourth dissertation
on the metaphysical principles of geometry.
However plausible this last speculation may be, the known facts are these:
Hume made significant cuts from Treatise Book 2, part 3, preserving in the Dis-
sertation on the Passions only the material that was relevant to the Natural
History of Religion and Of Tragedy, while at the same time moving this material
so that it appeared immediately following and preceding these other two disserta-
tions respectively. When we see the Four Dissertations as a deliberately unified
set, with the passions as the unifying theme, all of this makes perfect sense. If
we do not, there is no other obvious motivation for these edits.
0.4. Epicureans, Stoics, Platonists, ...
I move now from my Unity Thesis to my Difference Thesis. While the former is
relatively self-explanatory, the latter naturally prompts the question, what differ-
ences? There are several, in my view, and rather than merely list them all, I will
attempt instead to sum up the thrust of the most important ones. In order to do
this, meanwhile, it is necessary to introduce my preferred framework for viewing
the early modern debate in which Hume was participating. It is well in any case
to have an excuse to introduce this framework, since it will inform much of the
discussion to follow.
The philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be grouped
and labelled in all sorts of ways, for all sorts of different purposes. For understand-
ing Hume, however, at least as regards the passions and morals, one framework
stands out as particularly helpful, since it is one that he himself adopts. In The
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Epicurean, the first of his four essays on happiness, Hume announces his inten-
tion to “deliver the sentiments of sects, that naturally form themselves in the
world, and entertain different ideas of human life and of happiness”, giving to
each “the name of the philosophical sect, to which it bears the greatest affinity”
(Ep n1, p. 138). The ancient schools chosen are Epicureanism, Stoicism, Pla-
tonism, and Scepticism. While nothing like these schools and their card-carrying
representatives still existed in the eighteenth century, of course, Hume and his
contemporaries were familiar with (and often made reference to) the classical
background to their own views and debates, and there is a legitimate sense in
which we can think of these four traditions as still very much alive at that time.13
In chapter 1, when introducing the British debate in the hundred or so years
leading up to Hume, I will divide the key players into egoists (Hobbes, Locke,
Mandeville), sentimentalists (Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson), and rationalists
(Clarke, Wollaston, Burnet). In chapter 10, extending my gaze overseas, I will
add Malebranche to the list of rationalists; and we might reasonably include
Descartes in this camp as well. These three groups, I submit, correspond to the
Epicureans, Stoics, and Platonists respectively, as presented by Hume in his four
essays on happiness.
The classical Epicureans were hedonists, who held that pleasure was our chief
or sole good. In the early modern period, this manifested itself in the popular
doctrine of psychological egoism, the view that all motivation is reducible to self-
love, the desire for personal happiness. Typically this took a hedonist form, with
happiness being understood as pleasure and the absence of pain. In matters of
religion, meanwhile, the Epicureans were frequently branded as atheists, because
of their materialism and their denial of providence and intelligent design. Hobbes
was (at least perceived to be) an Epicurean in all of these senses. Locke defies such
easy classification, since his metaphysical and moral Epicureanism was combined
with a more orthodox (and Platonic) attitude to religion.
13For a recent study of Epicureanism in the early modern period, see Wilson (2008); for
Stoicism, see Brooke (2012); for Platonism, see Hedley and Hutton (2008); and for Scepticism,
see Popkin (2003).
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The classical Stoics, by contrast, held that virtue was our main or only good.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this became the doctrine of senti-
mentalism or psychological altruism, defended vigorously in opposition to Hobbes
and the other Epicureans. We have genuinely benevolent sentiments, according
to this view, and happiness and virtue coincide in the exercising of them. The
Stoics, both ancient and modern, also emphasised the beauty and order of the
universe, and in religion were keen proponents of the argument for intelligent
design. Given their emphasis on order, however, they were generally hostile to
the idea of miracles and particular providence, and at the more freethinking end
of the spectrum (i.e. Shaftesbury) were thus attracted to deism.
At some level of abstraction, the Stoics and the Platonists of the early modern
period belong together, united by the common cause of refuting what they took
to be the irreligious and immoral principles of Epicurus and his followers. With
Hume, however, if not before, the difference between these two traditions becomes
increasingly important. For while Hume had a great respect for Stoic thought
even when he disagreed with it (and he agreed with several aspects of it too),
the Platonists stood for everything that he hated. He saw the Stoics as moderate
empiricists, with an interest in the open-minded study of human nature and
the natural world, where the Platonists were dogmatic rationalists and religious
mystics.
Where the Epicureans placed pleasure at the heart of their moral and mo-
tivational philosophy, and the Stoics placed virtue, the early modern Platonists
had instead an Augustinian God (corresponding to Plato’s form of the good).
God was for them our sole good and the author of all our happiness. This tra-
dition also had at its heart Descartes’ real distinction between mind and body,
and a belief in the absolute superiority—both metaphysical and moral—of the
former over the latter. With Malebranche, as we will see in chapter 10, Cartesian
philosophy received a further injection of Augustine’s neo-Platonism in the form
of the doctrine of Original Sin, and an increased aversion to the body and its
lustful passions, which turn us away from God and our one true good.
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The Platonists were also rationalists, with a firm conviction in the powers
of a priori reason both to establish the existence of God, and to regulate our
base and bodily passions in the service of our creator. Their favourite proofs
for the existence of God were ontological or cosmological, whereas the Stoics, as
already noted, preferred the a posteriori design argument based on the observable
order and beauty of the universe. Accordingly, the Platonists were not averse
to the idea of miracles and of a particular providence interrupting the natural
order of events; indeed, they often saw these as proofs of divine authority that
paved the way to revelation. In terms of the distinction that Hume sets up in
his essay Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, Platonism tends towards superstition,
while Stoicism tends towards enthusiasm. As I will argue in chapter 7 (chiefly
§7.2), Hume was openly hostile to Platonic superstition, but considerably more
amenable to Stoic enthusiasm.
Hume’s opposition to the Platonist tradition was with him from the start,
and is a consistent and unambiguous feature of his earlier and later philosophy.
What is less clear, however, is whether he leans more towards Epicureanism
or more towards Stoicism in his positive views. Norman Kemp Smith famously
championed the Stoical interpretation, insisting particularly strongly on the influ-
ence of Hutcheson. James Moore vigorously opposed this reading, placing Hume
instead in the Epicurean tradition and naming Hobbes as a much more impor-
tant influence.14 I believe that there is an element of truth—and of falsehood—on
both sides of this argument, as I will now explain.
0.5. ... and Sceptics
Central to my understanding of Hume is the identification of him first and fore-
most with neither the Epicureans nor the Stoics, but the Sceptics. Hume himself
explicitly associates with this group, for example when he describes the phi-
losophy of the Treatise as “very sceptical” (A 27, p. 657), when he endorses a
14Kemp Smith (1941/2005), Moore (1995).
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“mitigated scepticism” in the conclusion of the first Enquiry (E 12.25-6, pp. 162-
3), or when he famously offers a “sceptical solution” to his “sceptical doubts”
about induction (titles to E 4 and E 5, pp. 25, 40). He also implicitly sides
with the Sceptics in the aforementioned essays on happiness, by giving them the
last and (by far) the longest word, and having them endorse some recognisably
Humean ideas; perhaps most notably the sceptical principle that I will discuss in
chapter 13, that “there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or
hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise from the particular
constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection” (Sc 8, p. 162).
Further evidence of Hume’s Sceptical credentials comes from his fondness for
the Roman Sceptic, Cicero.15 The four essays on happiness themselves, indeed,
must have been written with Cicero’s De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum in mind.
In this latter work, an Epicurean, a Stoic, and a Peripatetic (i.e. an Aristotelian)
converse and argue about happiness or the ultimate goal of life, while Cicero
narrates and takes on the role of the Sceptic, criticising all three. There are
certainly differences here: Hume wrote four separate monologues, rather than
a dialogue; Cicero’s Peripatetic is replaced by a Platonist in Hume’s set; and
Hume has his Sceptic present substantial positive views—albeit in a suitably
undogmatic spirit—where Cicero, on behalf of that school, plays a purely critical
role in his discussion. But the structural parallels are nevertheless clear and surely
deliberate.16
Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion also have a Ciceronian model,
namely De Natura Deorum, a dialogue in which an Epicurean, a Stoic, and a
Sceptic debate the nature of the gods. Here the Sceptical side of the argument
15In his autobiographical My Own Life, Hume admits that it was Cicero he was secretly
reading when his family thought he was studying to become a lawyer (MOL 3, p. xxxiii). For
more on Hume’s Ciceronian influences, see Jones (1982).
16The replacement of Cicero’s Peripatetic with a Platonist in Hume’s set calls for some
explanation, but it is not hard to find one. Descartes and the other instigators of early modern
philosophy were motivated in a large part by a rejection of Aristotle and the Aristotelianism
that had dominated the preceding centuries. By the time Hume came on the scene, therefore,
the Peripatetic philosophy was essentially dead (certainly as far as Hume was concerned), while
the Platonic tradition—thanks to Descartes and his followers—was still very much alive.
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is held up by Cotta, with Cicero himself represented as an impartial observer;
though Velleius (the Epicurean) remarks early on that Cotta and Cicero are both
disciples of Philo, and have learnt from him to be sure of nothing. Philo was a
Sceptic, and the last head of Plato’s Academy before its destruction in the first
century BC.17 He is of course the namesake of the Sceptic in Hume’s Dialogues,
and while it is controversial whether Hume agrees with everything this character
says, there is no doubt that this is where his sympathies lie, at least broadly
speaking. This is further confirmation of his strong ties to this group.
The other two characters in Hume’s Dialogues, Cleanthes and Demea, rep-
resent the Stoical and Platonist traditions respectively. Cleanthes is named after
Zeno’s successor as head of the Stoic school in Athens. According to Mossner’s
plausible hypothesis, the modern Stoic, Butler, was the model for Hume’s char-
acter.18 There is no obvious real-life candidate for Demea to be named after.
Dorothy Coleman suggests etymology as a likelier inspiration: “Demea” comes
from the Greek “demos”, meaning people, and Hume’s character, Demea, rep-
resents popular religion at the time.19 For the modern counterpart, meanwhile,
Mossner suggests Clarke, who certainly seems as good a candidate as any;20
though Malebranche strikes me as the better model for the Platonist in the es-
says on happiness, and it may be noted that Demea also quotes Malebranche in
support of his mysticism (D 2.2, pp. 141-2).
In current Hume scholarship, the question of whether or in what sense Hume
was a Sceptic—notably with regard to his famous argument about induction—
is a hot topic, with several people now favouring non-sceptical readings.21 As
it happens, I favour a more sceptical reading myself,22 but my identification of
17For the second half of its existence, the Academy had been run predominantly by Sceptics,
hence the synonymy of “academical” and “sceptical” philosophy, as in, for example, the title of
Hume’s first Enquiry, section 12.
18Mossner (1936).
19Coleman (2007, p. xi).
20Mossner (1936).
21Garrett (1997), Noonan (1999), Owen (1999), Beebee (2006).
22In line with Millican (2007c, 2009b, 2012).
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Hume with the Sceptics here is not intended to foreclose that debate. It is per-
fectly consistent to suppose that Hume was a Sceptic in the present sense—i.e.
an inheritor of the Sceptical tradition of Philo and his pupil Cicero—while deny-
ing that he was a Sceptic about induction in the now controversial sense. And
surely it will not be denied, even by defenders of non-sceptical readings, that
Hume’s engagement with this topic is to be situated within the Sceptical tradi-
tion, for Hume himself explicitly presents it in this context, calling his account a
“sceptical” solution to “sceptical” doubts, as already noted.
Indeed, calling Hume a Sceptic in the present sense entails very little about
his positive views, for it is the prerogative of the Sceptics to pick and choose
doctrines from any of the other schools, depending on whoever seems to have the
better of that particular argument. This is exactly what we find Hume doing.
Although he has very little time for the Platonists, as I have said, his positive
views, where they have clear antecedents, are drawn from the Epicurean and the
Stoical traditions, as well as more directly from the Sceptics. As I noted at the
end of the previous section, however, there is some question as to whether he drew
more from the Epicureans or more from the Stoics; more from Hobbes, Locke,
and Mandeville, or more from Shaftesbury, Butler, and Hutcheson.
The trick to settling this question is to avoid an atemporal answer. For it
is also the prerogative of the Sceptics, crucially, to change their minds. Kemp
Smith’s evidence for his Stoical interpretation drew predominantly on the moral
Enquiry, and he read (or re-read) the earlier Treatise through this lens. Moore’s
case for the Epicurean reading, meanwhile, was based exclusively on the Treatise.
The right reaction to this debate is precisely the obvious one: Hume started life as
an Epicurean Sceptic, but after the Treatise he became more Stoical (with regard
to morals and motivation, that is; with regard to religion his Scepticism was
Epicurean throughout his life). This, in a nutshell, is the core of my Difference
Thesis.
* * *
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My thesis is divided into two parts. In Part 1, The Butler Moment, I tell the story
of what I take to be the major change in Hume’s later philosophy of emotion,
namely a move from Lockean hedonism and egoism about motivation to Butlerian
anti-hedonism and anti-egoism. I suggest that the reason for this reversal was
the obvious one, namely that Hume encountered and was persuaded by Butler’s
arguments. (Thus I disagree with Kemp Smith on two counts: not only did
Hume’s Stoicism develop after the Treatise, but it derived more from Butler than
from Hutcheson. His anti-Platonism, it is true, was with him from the start, and
borrowed heavily from Hutcheson; but that is a different matter.)
In Part 2, The Third Enquiry, I embark on my critical study of the Four
Dissertations proper, looking at the major topics of this work in roughly the
order in which they appear (skipping over the aspects that came up already in
the discussion of Part 1). I devote two chapters to each of the dissertations, and
thus these chapters are intended to be read in pairs. As I go, however, I will be
drawing particular attention to the links between these four texts, in prosecution
of my Unity Thesis, and thus none of these pairs is confined to discussing just
one of the dissertations. I will also be pointing to a number of additional ways
in which these works differ from the Treatise.
The importance of my central claims notwithstanding, I take it that the Four
Dissertations are of general interest in their own right, even when the views that
they present do not differ substantially from those put forward in the Treatise,
and even when the points being made do not resonate particularly strongly with
others in the vicinity. The Unity Thesis and the Difference Thesis are central to
this study, and provide its chief motivation; but the study itself does not end with
them. My aim, then, is to build up a coherent and—as far as possible within the
constraints of space—a complete interpretation of the Four Dissertations, with







Some Late Philosophers in England
In order to understand Hume’s philosophy of emotion, and in particular how it
developed over time, it is necessary to have a sense of British philosophy in the
hundred or so years leading up to his work. To this end, the present chapter offers
an introduction to some of the key philosophers and debates of this period. In
particular, I want to emphasise the importance of the egoism/anti-egoism debate
at this time. Perhaps because the anti-egoists are now generally considered to
have won this debate, while the battle between the rationalists and the anti-
rationalists still rages, this latter dispute often overshadows the former nowadays,
even in historical discussions. This leads to a serious distortion of Hume and his
interests, which I hope—in this chapter and the next—to go some way towards
correcting.
This chapter is also intended to set the scene for the central claim of Part 1
of this thesis: that, in between writing the Treatise and the Four Dissertations,
Hume changed sides on precisely this egoism/anti-egoism controversy. When he
wrote the Treatise, he was a hedonist and an egoist. Shortly afterwards, however,
he read and was persuaded by Butler’s anti-egoist arguments, and subsequently
became one of the keenest and clearest opponents of his own earlier view.
1.1. Hutcheson against Clarke
Our story of Hume’s influences begins, because I will be telling it largely in reverse,
with Hutcheson’s second work. First published in 1728, this was a pair of two
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treatises, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Illustrations
on the Moral Sense. In the preface to these two treatises, Hutcheson tells us that
the Illustrations on the Moral Sense “had never seen the Light, had not some
worthy Gentlemen mistaken some things about the moral Sense alleg’d to be in
Mankind” (1728, p. 7). The gentlemen in question were Gilbert Burnet, Samuel
Clarke, and William Wollaston, and the view that they brought to Hutcheson’s
attention was moral rationalism.
Hutcheson took it that a moral theory must explain two distinct phenom-
ena: moral motivation and moral approbation. On the one hand, we are moved
to perform kind and generous actions; on the other hand, we approve of these
motives, both in ourselves and in others. These two facts give rise to a distinction
between exciting and justifying reasons:
When we ask the Reason of an Action we sometimes mean, “What Truth
shews a Quality in the Action, exciting the Agent to do it?” Thus, why
does a Luxurious Man pursue Wealth? The Reason is given by this Truth,
“Wealth is useful to purchase Pleasures.” Sometimes for a Reason of Ac-
tions we shew the Truth expressing a Quality, engaging our Approbation.
Thus the Reason of hazarding Life in just War, is, that “it tends to pre-
serve our honest Countrymen, or evidences publick Spirit:” The Reason
for Temperance, and against Luxury is given thus, “Luxury evidences a
selfish base Temper.” The former sort of Reasons we will call exciting, and
the latter justifying. (1728, p. 138)
Hutcheson’s view, simply put, is that the source of moral motivation is a self-
less or disinterested benevolence, and that the source of moral approbation and
disapprobation is what he calls a moral sense, a disposition to be immediately
pleased by benevolent motives, and displeased by the contrary.
Hutcheson first presented this view in his Inquiry into the Original of Our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725). In a series of letters to the London Journal,
Burnet then criticised Hutcheson for failing to provide “a sufficient Foundation”
for morality: “tho’ the Conclusions were generally True and Right in themselves,”
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Burnet complained, “and were capable of Demonstrative Proof, yet he seemed to
me to have left them unsupported” (Burnet & Hutcheson 1735, p. iii).1 More
specifically, Burnet raised a sceptical worry with regard to Hutcheson’s moral
sense as the source of approbation:
I saw indeed, there was some such thing in humane Nature. But... I could
not be sure, it was not a deceitful and wrong Sense. The Pleasure arising
from the Perceptions it afforded, did not seem sufficient to convince me that
it was right... I wanted therefore some further Test, some more certain
Rule, whereby I could judge whether my Sense, my moral Sense as the
Author calls it, my Taste of Things, was right, and agreeable to the Truth
of Things, or not. (Burnet & Hutcheson 1735, pp. 9-10)
In order to answer this worry, Burnet appealed to the moral rationalism of Clarke
and Wollaston,2 according to which the things approved of by Hutcheson’s moral
sense are indeed reasonable or agreeable to truth.
I will say more about moral rationalism, and about Hutcheson’s and Hume’s
opposition to it, in chapter 10. It suffices for now to have made a note of the
debate and some of its participants. For the remainder of this chapter, how-
ever, and indeed for the first part of this thesis, it is another view and another
eighteenth-century debate that is of interest.
1.2. Hutcheson against Hobbes and Mandeville
The argument between Hutcheson and the moral rationalists has had a profound
influence on the subsequent development of moral philosophy (largely through
Books 2 and 3 of Hume’s Treatise, and then Kant’s work on the rationalist side).
At the time, however, this was by no means the main debate in this area. Before
1This book was a reprint of the correspondence which appeared in the London Journal in
1725, to which a preface and postscript by Burnet were added; see Peach (1970) for confirmation
of the date.
2Clarke (1706), Wollaston (1722). Burnet’s appeal is in Burnet & Hutcheson (1735, p. iv);
he also cites in the same context Cumberland (1672).
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Hutcheson turned to attack Clarke and Wollaston, having been prompted by
Burnet’s objections, the main target of sentimentalism was not rationalism, but
egoism: the “selfish hypothesis” (as Hume would later call it; M App2.6, p. 298)
that all motivation is reducible to self-love.
That egoism was Hutcheson’s main target is clear even in the Illustrations
themselves, which home in on the rationalist challenge only by first setting up
Hutcheson’s positive story as the default alternative to the selfish systems of
Epicurus and Thomas Hobbes:
There are two Opinions on this Subject entirely opposite: The one that
of the old Epicureans, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of
Cicero, De finibus; which is revived by Mr. Hobbes, and followed by many
better Writers: “That all the Desires of the human Mind, nay of all thinking
Natures, are reducible to Self-Love, or Desire of private Happiness: That
from this Desire all Actions of any Agent do flow.” ...
The other Opinion is this, “That we have not only Self-Love, but benev-
olent Affections also toward others, in various Degrees, making us desire
their Happiness as an ultimate End, without any view to private Happiness:
That we have a moral Sense or Determination of our Mind, to approve ev-
ery kind Affection either in our selves or others, and all publickly useful
Actions which we imagined do flow from such Affection, without our having
a view to our private Happiness, in our Approbation of these Actions.”
These two Opinions seem both intelligible, each consistent with itself.
The former seems not to represent human Nature as it is; the other seems
to do it. (1728, pp. 134, 136)
Only then does Hutcheson introduce moral rationalism as a threat to his anti-
egoist sentimentalism, and undertake to refute it. By his own admission in the
preface (quoted on page 22 above), he might never have done so, had Burnet not
issued the challenge.
While it is clear even in the Illustrations that Hutcheson intends his senti-
mentalism to be first and foremost a rival to egoism rather than rationalism, it is
yet clearer in Hutcheson’s first work, the Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of
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Beauty and Virtue, in which, according to the title page of its first edition, “the
principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are Explain’d and Defended, against the
Author of the Fable of Bees” (1725, p. 199). Interestingly, although Shaftesbury
is generally credited with having founded the sentimentalist tradition, we will see
below that he was no anti-rationalist. Far from it, he thought that reason was
required to justify and correct our sentiments. What Shaftesbury was opposed
to, however, was egoism. I will return to Shaftesbury later (see §1.4). First,
it is time to meet the aforementioned author of the Fable of the Bees, Bernard
Mandeville.
In 1705, Mandeville published, anonymously and without a preface, a short
allegory in verse called The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turned Honest. The story
begins by describing a large hive of industrious and prosperous bees, individually
selfish, vain, and deceitful, but on the whole thriving. Greed fuelled the industry
and trade of this hive, so that in time luxury rose “To such a Height, the very Poor
/ Liv’d better than the Rich before” (1705, p. 11). But some particularly immoral
bees then started to preach against all the dishonesty, and pray for virtue. Jove,
angered by their hypocrisy, decided that the best punishment would be to grant
them their wish. It was no sooner done than the hive collapsed: with everyone
now a model of virtue, there was no more work for lawyers or prison guards; every
bee settled its bar tab and resolved never to drink again, so the public houses
closed; all being content with plain clothes, tailors were forced to shut up shop;
and so on, the moral of the story being that vice is beneficial or even necessary
for a happy and prosperous state.
In 1714, Mandeville published the tale again, together with a short Enquiry
into the Origin of Moral Virtue, and a much lengthier set of remarks on the
poem, all under the title of The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick
Benefits. The motivational theory espoused in this Enquiry is unambiguously
egoist. Mandeville begins, in the very first sentence, by stating that “[a]ll un-
taught Animals are only solicitous of pleasing themselves, and naturally follow
the bent of their own Inclinations, without considering the good or harm that
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from their being pleased will accrue to others” (1714, p. 27). He goes on to de-
scribe man as an “extraordinary selfish and headstrong” animal (p. 28), and to
claim that the origin of virtue is essentially flattery. No one can be moved to give
up their own good for the good of another, he asserts, without some recompense
for themselves, but conjectures that cunning politicians realised that praising vir-
tuous behaviour would satisfy our natural vanity; thus “the Moral Virtues are
the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride” (p. 37).
There is no mention of Shaftesbury in the first edition of the Fable, but in
the second edition (1723) Mandeville appended an essay called A Search into the
Nature of Society, which is a sustained attack on Shaftesbury’s philosophy. “The
attentive Reader, who perused the foregoing part of this Book,” Mandeville there
tells us, “will soon perceive that two Systems cannot be more opposite than his
Lordship’s and mine. His Notions I confess are generous and refin’d: They are a
high Compliment to Human-kind, and capable by the help of a little Enthusiasm
of Inspiring us with the most Noble Sentiments concerning the Dignity of our
exalted Nature: What Pity it is that they are not true” (p. 372). This, then,
was the challenge that prompted Hutcheson to his defence of Shaftesbury in the
Inquiry of 1725, as discussed above.
1.3. Butler against Hobbes and Clarke
A year after the first appearance of Hutcheson’s Inquiry, Joseph Butler published
his Fifteen Sermons (1726), which includes an attack on egoism in a similar
spirit to Hutcheson’s. Butler does not mention Mandeville, but like Hutcheson
he attributes the view to Epicurus and Hobbes (in the preface added to the second
edition; 1729, p. 42). Butler likewise insists that we have genuinely benevolent
desires, and that they are the source of our virtuous behaviour. And his appeal
to what he calls the principle of conscience, at the heart of his moral theory, is
by his own (later) admission very nearly just Hutcheson’s moral sense by another
name:
[W]e have a Capacity of reflecting upon Actions and Characters, and mak-
ing them an Object to our Thought: And on doing this, we naturally and
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unavoidably approve some Actions, under the peculiar view of their being
virtuous and of Good-desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of Ill-
desert... It is manifest great Part of common Language, and of common
Behaviour over the World, is formed upon Supposition of such a Moral Fac-
ulty; whether called Conscience [the term Butler himself typically prefers],
moral Reason, moral Sense, or divine Reason; whether considered as a Sen-
timent of the Understanding, or as a Perception of the Heart, or, which
seems the Truth, as including both. (1736, pp. 309)
What this quotation also illustrates, however, is that Butler’s sentimentalism—
unlike Hutcheson’s—was not intended to oppose moral rationalism. Butler switches
the ordinary use of the terms, speaking of a sentiment of the understanding, and
a perception of the heart, while being indifferent between calling the moral fac-
ulty “moral Reason” or a “moral Sense”. More explicitly, in the preface added to
the second edition of his sermons, Butler distinguishes “two Ways in which the
Subject of Morals may be treated”: “One begins from inquiring into the abstract
Relations of things: the other from a Matter of Fact, namely, what the particu-
lar Nature of Man is, its several parts, their Oeconomy or Constitution” (1729,
p. 37). He says that both methods lead to the same thing, and has nothing bad
to say about the former (which is Clarke’s approach); he merely remarks that his
own work proceeds mainly in the latter way (ibid.). The common enemy of the
sentimentalists before Hume was not Clarke, therefore, but Hobbes.
Butler contributed one point to this anti-egoist debate that is particularly im-
portant here, for it was the appreciation of this point—as I will argue in the next
chapter—that was the pivotal moment in the development of Hume’s thought
between the Treatise and his later work. Butler distinguishes self-love from every
other desire, on the grounds that “[t]he Object the former pursues is somewhat
internal, our own Happiness, Enjoyment, Satisfaction”, while the latter—which
he calls “particular” appetites or passions—all pursue “this or that particular
external Thing” for its own sake, independently of its contribution to our hap-
piness (1726, p. 111). His argument for this crucial distinguishing feature of the
particular passions is simple but effective:
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That all particular Appetites and Passions are towards external Things
themselves, distinct from the Pleasure arising from them, is manifest from
hence; that there could not be this Pleasure, were it not for that prior
suitableness between the Object and the Passion: There could be no En-
joyment or Delight from one thing more than another, from eating Food
more than from swallowing a Stone, if there were not an Affection or Ap-
petite to one thing more than another. (1726, p. 111)
Egoism—particularly in its hedonist form, which reduces all desire to the general
appetite for pleasure and aversion to pain—is an attractively simple view of mo-
tivation. At a time when it was very popular, and perhaps even the mainstream
view, Butler was the first to point out that it gets things fundamentally back to
front : most things are not desired because they are pleasant; rather, they are
pleasant because we desire them.3
Butler’s “particular passions”—desires for objects themselves, independently
of the pleasure that they bring—will feature heavily in the discussion of Hume
to follow, and it will be convenient to have a name for them. Rather than adopt
Butler’s terminology, which is not very descriptive, I will refer to them instead as
object-directed desires. “Object” is used here, of course, in the broadest possible
sense, as anything whatsoever that may be desired; the point of the terminology is
that it is the object we desire, and for its own sake, rather than for the happiness
or pleasure that it brings.
Though Butler did not object to moral rationalism, it is worth remarking
that he and Hutcheson were opposed to many of the same people—and most
3It would be overstating the case to say that Butler decisively refuted psychological egoism
with this point, though I take it that his argument is decisive as far as it goes. The dialectical
situation is perhaps best summed up thus: There is a wealth of empirical evidence that, on
the face of it at least, suggests we are not purely selfish. Egoists have a standard way of
reinterpreting this evidence in accordance with their hypothesis (crudely, we help other people
because of the warm fuzzy feeling that it gives us). What Butler’s point conclusively shows
is that this reinterpretation cannot be right: it gets the relationship between pleasure and
desire the wrong way round (we wouldn’t get that warm fuzzy feeling unless we cared about
other people in the first place). Perhaps the egoists can come up with another reinterpretation
of prima facie unselfish motivation, in line with their cynical hypothesis. As things stand,
however, Butler’s argument leaves the anti-egoist in an overwhelmingly stronger position with
regard to the evidence. For further discussion, see Blackburn (1998, ch. 5), Sober (2000).
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notably Clarke—on the epistemology of religion. Clarke was the most prominent
defender of the a priori cosmological argument for the existence of God as the
first cause, and Butler was the most prominent defender of the a posteriori design
argument. The two came to blows about the success of Clarke’s argument (very
amicably and politely, I might add) in a private exchange that was then appended
to the fourth edition of Clarke’s Boyle lectures (1716).
Notwithstanding their opposition to Clarke’s brand of rationalist theism,
however, Butler and Hutcheson were both devout Christians. For them, further-
more, our benevolent nature—which they so insisted on against the egoists—was
not only the foundation of morality, but also evidence for the goodness of God,
the author of that nature. Thus Hutcheson writes:
The present Constitution of our moral Sense determines us to approve all
kind Affections: This Constitution the Deity must have foreseen as tending
to the Happiness of his Creatures; it does therefore evidence kind Affection
or Benevolence in the Deity[.] (1728, p. 153)
Butler, on a related note, maintains:
That God has given us a moral Nature, may most justly be urged as a Proof
of our being under his moral Government... For, our being so constituted,
as that Virtue and Vice are thus naturally favoured and discountenanced,
rewarded and punished respectively as such, is an intuitive Proof of the
Intent of Nature, that it should be so; otherwise the Constitution of our
Mind, from which it thus immediately and directly proceeds, would be
absurd. (1736, pp. 179, 180)
Butler’s argument is embedded in a much larger argument or battery of argu-
ments, first to the effect that God is a governor, rewarding and punishing us for
our actions, and then to the effect that he is a moral governor, rewarding and
punishing specifically according to desert. The arguments for this second con-
clusion point out the various ways in which nature is set up so as to benefit the
virtuous and harm the vicious, all of which suggest that this was the intention of
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its author. One of the various ways in which this is so is our own moral nature,
and our power over each other: we ourselves are naturally inclined to reward
virtue and punish vice.
Butler’s argument from our moral nature to theism is thus more sophisticated
and less direct than Hutcheson’s, and Butler has other points to appeal to in
support of God’s goodness should this particular one fail. Butler is after all the
more committed philosopher of religion. But for present purposes what matters
is the basic point of agreement: that our natural benevolence is evidence of the
moral goodness of the author of our nature.
1.4. Shaftesbury against Hobbes and Locke
Butler and Hutcheson were both, in their slightly different but closely related
ways, the intellectual descendants of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of
Shaftesbury. It was from Shaftesbury that they inherited their interest in the pas-
sions and affections of human nature, and their belief in the importance of these
things for morality. One can also find in Shaftesbury direct precursors both to
Hutcheson’s moral sense (e.g. 1711, p. 177) and to Butler’s conscience (e.g. 1711,
pp. 208-9); though Butler, it may be noted, explicitly criticised Shaftesbury for
failing to emphasise the authority of conscience over the other principles of the
human frame or constitution (Butler 1729, p. 40). And it was Shaftesbury, of
course, whom Hutcheson explicitly set out to defend against Mandeville’s criti-
cisms.
Where Hutcheson was opposed to rationalism, and Butler merely set it to
one side, it should be noted that Shaftesbury on the contrary saw reason as
necessary to correct and justify our moral sentiments, as for example in the
following argument against partiality:
But lest any shou’d imagine with themselves that an inferior Degree of
natural Affection, or an imperfect partial Regard of this sort, can supply
the place of an intire, sincere, and truly moral one... we may consider first,
That Partial Affection, or social Love in part, without regard to a
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compleat Society or Whole, is in it-self an Inconsistency, and implies an
absolute Contradiction... The Person, therefore, who is conscious of this
Affection, can be conscious of no Merit or Worth on the account of it. It
has no Foundation or Establishment in Reason[.] (1711, p. 205)
Here Shaftesbury clearly rejects a certain sentiment on the grounds that it is
inconsistent, and has no foundation in reason. Once again, I emphasise that
sentimentalism was intended first and foremost as an alternative to egoism, not
rationalism; and Shaftesbury’s principal targets were Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke.
Few things are uncontroversial in philosophy, and even the traditional egoist
interpretation of Hobbes has been called into question.4 This is not the place,
however, to enter into any detailed examination of Hobbes’s views; it suffices to
report that he was thought to be an egoist at the time, being named as such by
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler. Whatever may be said on the other side, it
is easy to see where these sentimentalists got their interpretation from. In the
first instance, Hobbes seems to have espoused a hedonist account of motivation:
This motion, in which consisteth pleasure or pain, is also a solicitation or
provocation either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire
from the thing that displeaseth; and this solicitation is the endeavour or
internal beginning of animal motion, which when the object delighteth, is
called appetite; and when it displeaseth, it is called aversion... So that
pleasure, love, and appetite, which is also called desire, are divers names
for divers considerations of the same thing. (1650a, pp. 31-2)
And in the second place, his definitions of pity and charity (i.e. benevolence) have
a strong appearance of egoism:
Pity is imagination or fiction of future calamity to our selves, proceeding
from the sense of another man’s calamity. (1650a, p. 44)
4By Gert (1967, 2006).
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There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find
himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other
men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity. In
which, first, is contained the natural affection of parents to their children,
which the Greeks call Στoργη, as also, that affection wherewith men seek
to assist those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men
many times bestow their benefits on strangers, is not to be called charity,
but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or fear, which
maketh them to purchase peace. (1650a, p. 49)
In this last passage, Hobbes seems to reduce charity—which includes kindness to
our friends and family—to the love of power or the exercise of it,5 while deny-
ing that there is even this semblance of benevolence in the case of kindness to
strangers. We display good will in the latter case purely with a self-interested
view to peace and security. This chimes with Hobbes’s attempt to derive morals
and political society from this same egoist desire for self-preservation, and for
peace as its necessary means (see 1650b, pp. 81-6; 1651, pp. 86-111).
The sentimentalists mentioned Locke less often than Hobbes in this connec-
tion, but if anything Locke’s hedonism and egoism is even clearer than Hobbes’s.
For Locke, desire is moved by “happiness and that alone” (1690, p. 258), and
happiness is understood hedonistically: “Happiness then in its full extent is the
utmost Pleasure we are capable of, and Misery the utmost pain” (ibid.). Indeed,
the whole point of pleasure, according to Locke, is to excite us to action, and
without it our wills would be entirely inert:
[T]o excite us to these Actions of thinking and motion, that we are capable
of, [the Author of our being] has been pleased to join to several Thoughts,
and several Sensations, a perception of Delight. If this were wholly sepa-
rated from all our outward Sensations, and inward Thoughts, we should
have no reason to prefer one Thought or Action, to another; Negligence,
to Attention; or Motion, to Rest. (1690, p. 129)
5This is how Butler, at least, interprets the passage (1726, p. 52, n2).
1.4. SHAFTESBURY AGAINST HOBBES AND LOCKE 33
It is worth noting the striking contrast here with Butler’s motivational psychology.
While for Locke there could be no desire without pleasure, for Butler there could
be no pleasure without desire:
[T]he very idea of an interested Pursuit, necessarily pre-supposes particular
[i.e. object-directed] Passions or Appetites; since the very Idea of Interest or
Happiness consists in this, that an Appetite or Affection enjoys its Object...
Take away these Affections, and you leave Self-love absolutely nothing at
all to employ itself about; no End or Object for it to pursue, excepting
only that of avoiding Pain. (Butler 1729, p. 20)
This reflects Butler’s crucial insight that the egoists’ account of motivation gets
things fundamentally back to front.6
For Locke, furthermore, the distinction between moral good and evil consists
in the following or not following of the divine law (1690, p. 352), and he insists that
moral motivation derives solely from the prospect of rewards and punishments
(if not in this life, then at least in the next), “it being impossible to set any
other motive or restraint to the actions of a free understanding agent but the
consideration of good and evil; that is, pleasure or pain that will follow from
it” (c. 1686-8, p. 301). This Christian egoism may seem fairly obviously crude
to us now, but it was not short of defenders in the eighteenth century. John
Clarke of Hull espoused it in opposition to both Samuel Clarke’s rationalism and
Hutcheson’s sentimentalism, and later Robert Clayton did the same in criticism
of Hume’s moral Enquiry.7
In failing to mention Locke alongside Hobbes, Hutcheson and Butler may
simply have been following Shaftesbury (not to mention that Hobbes was an
6Butler seems to have gone too far in this quotation: many physical pleasures (e.g. those of
taste) are surely not dependent on any antecedent desire or appetite. The pleasure of relieving
hunger is one thing; the pleasure of a delicious fruit is quite another. Hume himself was more
cautious in this regard: “Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love, that
propensity could scarcely ever exert itself; because we should, in that case, have felt few and
slender pains or pleasures” (M App2.12, pp. 301-2; my emphases). See also §6.2.
7Clarke (1726), Clayton (1753). John Clarke was master of the grammar school in Hull. So
as to distinguish him clearly from Samuel Clarke, and from Samuel’s nephew (also called John),
Hutcheson referred to him as “Clarke of Hull” (1728, p. 6).
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easy target, being widely thought of as the foremost enemy of religion). For
Shaftesbury, meanwhile, Locke had been a close family friend and tutor, which
may explain his reticence in this regard.8 But from a letter written to a student
whom he had taken under his wing, we learn Shaftesbury’s true thoughts:
In general truly it has happened, that all those they call Free-Writers now-
a-days, have espoused those Principles, which Mr. Hobbes set a foot in this
last Age. Mr. Locke, as much as I honour him on account of other Writings
(viz. on Government, Policy, Trade, Coin, Education, Toleration, &c.) and
as well as I knew him, and can answer for his Sincerity as a most zealous
Christian and Believer, did however go in the self same Track... ’Twas
Mr. Locke, that struck the home Blow: For Mr. Hobbes’s Character and
base slavish Principles in Government took off the Poyson of his Philosophy.
’Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all Fundamentals, threw all Order and
Virtue out of the World, and made the very Ideas of these (which are the
same as those of God) unnatural, and without Foundation in our Minds.
(1716, pp. 38-9)
As I have hedged regarding Hobbes, so I may hedge regarding Locke.9 It does not
matter for present purposes whether Shaftesbury was right in his interpretation
of either of these writers; it suffices to observe that this egoist interpretation was
common at the time, and that Hume himself read both Hobbes and Locke in this
way, these being his two explicit examples, alongside Epicurus, of defenders of
the “selfish system of morals” (M App2.3, p. 296).
8See Gill (2006, pp. 77-82).
9The question with Locke is not whether he was an egoist (no one that I know of has doubted
this); the interpretative difficulty in his case arises from the fact that he seems to have been
a rationalist as well: “I am bold to think, that Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well
as Mathematicks: Since the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be
perfectly known; and so the Congruity, or Incongruity of the Things themselves, be certainly
discovered, in which consists perfect Knowledge” (Locke 1690, p. 516). One (partial) resolution
of this tension is to say that Locke started out as a rationalist, and became more of an egoist
in his later work (while still retaining, inconsistently, traces of his earlier rationalism); see Von
Leyden (1954/2002), Aaron (1971). Another is to say that rationalism is Locke’s account of
moral obligation, while egoism is his account of moral motivation; see Colman (1983), Darwall
(1995). For a recent discussion, and defence of a third view according to which the two strands
are more closely connected, see Sheridan (2007).
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1.5. Egoists, Sentimentalists, Rationalists
As Hume was growing up, there were thus three main traditions of thought in
Britain regarding morals and motivation: the egoists (Hobbes, Locke, Mandev-
ille), the sentimentalists (Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson), and the rationalists
(Clarke, Wollaston, Burnet). The latter two groups, however, only formally be-
came opponents with the publication of Hutcheson’s Illustrations in 1728; and
even then Butler remained neutral, preferring the sentimentalist approach but
not ruling out the possibility of a rationalist foundation of morals as well. The
rationalist/anti-rationalist debate was thus comparatively recent and parochial:
the main battle was between egoism and anti-egoism.
It is no secret that Hume disagreed with more or less every aspect of Clarke’s
philosophy: the a priori cosmological argument for the existence of God, the truth
of (and the evidence for) Christian revelation, the dependence of morality on re-
ligion, physical and moral necessity, moral rationalism. Hume was certainly no
rationalist. On the other side, it is also common knowledge that Hume was pos-
itively influenced, in at least some particulars, by all of the other major thinkers
introduced in this chapter: Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson,
and Butler. With the exception of Hobbes, these are none other than the “late
philosophers in England” that Hume cites with approval as having “begun to put
the science of man on a new footing” (T Intro.7, p. xvii).10 As we have seen,
however, these thinkers were divided on the crucial issue of motivation.
10It is perhaps interesting that Hobbes is not included in Hume’s list. Russell has hypothesised
that the Treatise was modelled on Hobbes’s Human Nature and De Corpore Politico (1650a,b),
and conjectured that Hobbes is not on the list precisely because his influence on Hume was
so great, and Hume thought it unwise to draw attention to that fact (Russell 2008, pp. 61-6,
66-7). For scepticism regarding this conjecture, see Harris (2009), who suggests instead that
“Hobbes is not included on the list because he was, precisely, not one of those who put the
science of man on a new footing—that is, because his science of man is grounded on an a priori
commitment to materialism and to mechanistic physics, and not the Baconian inductivism that
Newton had had such success with” (p. 40). A third possibility suggests itself to me, albeit a
less profound one: that Hobbes didn’t make the list simply because his work was no longer all
that recent. Leviathan was published almost 80 years before the Treatise (1651), while Locke’s
Essay—the earliest work from the authors that Hume does name—had appeared only 49 years
previously (1690). Hobbes, however important his influence on Hume, was no longer a “late”
philosopher.
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And so we are brought inevitably to the question of whether Hume was an
egoist or an anti-egoist, a hedonist or an anti-hedonist. Given the importance
of this issue in the early modern debate, and specifically among the people that
influenced Hume most, it is hardly to be expected that he would have taken no
stance on the matter. As I have already advertised, this is the locus of the single
most important aspect of my Difference Thesis, and of the central claim of these
first six chapters: my position is that Hume was a hedonist and an egoist in the
Treatise, but an anti-hedonist and an anti-egoist in his later work (and that it
was Butler who changed his mind). It would be hard to overstate the significance
of this change. It is after all a complete reversal on one of the major debates at
the time. Differences do not come any bigger than this, and if it was the only
thing that I could point to in support of my Difference Thesis (which it isn’t), I
would still consider my position sufficiently established.
In the next chapter, I will present the core of my argument for this difference.
The story does not end here, however, for a reversal of this magnitude is certain to
leave its mark on other aspects of Hume’s philosophy of emotion. In chapters 3,
4, and 5, sure enough, I both strengthen and expand my position, by pointing
to a number of additional modifications that Hume went on to make in the light
of this initial change. In all of these chapters, my approach is simply to lay
out the positive evidence for my view, touching on potential arguments to the
contrary only insofar as these are directly relevant to the narrative. In chapter 6,
I then respond to some alternative interpretations that try to smooth over the
differences between the Treatise and the later works.
There is a general theme to the discussion to come. I take it that in ev-
ery case my interpretations of the relevant passages are the most obvious and
straightforward ones. Attempts to minimise the appearance of substantial change
in Hume’s thought, meanwhile, seem to me invariably to involve contrived and
ingenious ways of resisting the most natural readings of the text. But there is
nothing inherently implausible in the story that I am going to tell. There is
no reason to think that Hume wouldn’t initially agree with Hobbes and Locke
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about motivation (since it is uncontroversial that he agreed with them about
other things), and there is no reason to think that he wouldn’t subsequently be
persuaded by Butler’s arguments to the contrary (for these arguments are indeed
persuasive). When we find that the texts immediately appear to support this per-





The present chapter is concerned with Hume’s theory of motivation, and how
it changed after he wrote the Treatise. But it is also about motivation in an-
other way, for in addition I will be offering a conjecture as to what prompted
Hume’s change of mind. As I have advertised, I believe that the view endorsed
in the Treatise is essentially a Lockean hedonism and egoism. After the Trea-
tise, however, Hume became instead a firm adherent of Butler’s object-directed
motivational psychology. My conjecture, straightforwardly enough, is that Hume
changed sides on this debate because he read Butler’s Sermons, and was per-
suaded that Butler was right.
2.1. The Butler paragraph
The bulk of the Treatise of Human Nature was written between 1734 and 1737,
during Hume’s stay at La Fle`che in France. Butler’s Analogy of Religion was first
published in 1736, and so cannot have had much of an influence on Hume’s early
thought. We can be fairly certain that Hume read it soon after it was published,
however, and before Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise came out in January 1739.
For in December 1737, he wrote thus to Henry Home (later Lord Kames):
Your thoughts and mine agree with respect to Dr Butler, and I would be
glad to be introduced to him. I am at present castrating my work, that
is, cutting off its nobler parts; that is, endeavouring it shall give as little
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offence as possible, before which, I could not pretend to put it into the
Doctor’s hands. (HL 1, p. 25)
At about this time, Kames wrote a letter of introduction to Butler on Hume’s
behalf. Hume had hoped to present the letter to Butler before asking his opinion
of the Treatise, but alas the meeting never took place, as we learn from a surviving
letter from Hume to Kames in March 1738:
I shall not trouble you with any formal compliments or thanks, which would
be but an ill return for the kindness you have done me in writing in my
behalf, to one you are so little acquainted with as Dr Butler; and I am
afraid, stretching the truth in favour of a friend. I have called upon the
Doctor, with a design of delivering him your letter, but find he is at present
in the country. I am a little anxious to have the Doctor’s opinion. My own
I dare not trust to; both because it concerns myself, and because it is so
variable, that I know not how to fix it. (HL 1, p. 25)
I conjecture that it was also around this time that Hume first read Butler’s
Sermons, being prompted to do so by his good opinion of the Analogy. The first
edition of the Sermons appeared in 1726, with a second in 1729, so it is possible
that Hume had come across them earlier. But I can think of little reason why a
set of sermons by a young English clergyman would have struck him at this time
as a particularly worthwhile read.1 A third edition appeared in 1736, coinciding
with the Analogy, and I suspect that this is what first brought them to Hume’s
attention. At the very least, if he had read them before then, he nevertheless
1Hume was obviously familiar with Clarke’s Boyle lectures, and hence potentially also with
Butler’s correspondence with Clarke, which was appended to the fourth edition of these lectures
(1716). This correspondence was anonymous on Butler’s side, however, so even if Hume had
read this exchange and been impressed by Clarke’s antagonist, he may well not have known
that the unnamed “Gentleman from Glocestershire” was also the author of the Sermons. A
more likely route into Hume’s consciousness would be through the approving mention of the
Sermons themselves in the preface to Hutcheson’s Essay and Illustrations, first published in
1728; but even this is just a passing remark, noting merely that Butler “has done so much
Justice to the wise and good Order of our Nature” (1728, p. 9). Hume’s nephew, who inherited
his uncle’s library, had a copy of the 1736 edition of the Analogy, but apparently no edition of
the Sermons (Norton and Norton 1996, p. 80); and there is no mention of the Sermons in M.
A. Stewart’s essay on Hume’s early intellectual development (2005). I take it, therefore, that
my conjecture is consistent with the known facts.
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failed to appreciate the force and significance of Butler’s anti-egoist arguments.
This much is confirmed, as we will shortly see, by the text of the Treatise.
If Hume first read the Sermons shortly after reading the Analogy—just before
Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise were published, but after the bulk of them had
already been written—then we have a plausible explanation for the inclusion of
this intriguing paragraph in the penultimate section of Book 2:
Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct pas-
sions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly
unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies,
and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily ap-
petites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and
proceed not from them, like the other affections. (T 2.3.9.8, p. 439)
This paragraph is a clear statement of the crucial feature of Butler’s “particular”
passions—or object-directed desires, as I am calling them—familiar from the pre-
vious chapter: that they are the causes of pleasure and pain, rather than their
effect. It is possible, I suppose, that Hume hit on this idea independently, but it
seems much more likely that he got it from Butler (not to mention that Hume
explicitly attributes the point to Butler in his later work; see §2.4 below). In any
case, because I will want to refer to this paragraph often, it will be convenient to
dub it the Butler paragraph.
The text of the first two volumes of the Treatise strongly suggests that the
Butler paragraph was a late addition, an afterthought, and something the conse-
quences of which Hume did not yet fully appreciate. For one thing, it is entirely
isolated: of all the 397 paragraphs of Book 2 (and 555 of Book 1), this is the
only one to make any mention of Butler’s point.2 For another, it is at odds with
Hume’s official Treatise doctrine. For the official doctrine of Book 2, as I will
2The only mention of Butler himself, meanwhile, is in the footnote in the introduction
that I quoted in §1.5, which names Butler—alongside Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and
Hutcheson—as one of the “late philosophers in England” to have “begun to put the science of
man on a new footing” (T Intro.7, p. xvii). Butler’s inclusion in this list could likewise easily
have been a late addition.
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now argue, is Lockean hedonism, notwithstanding this (probably last-minute)
concession to Butler.
2.2. Hedonism in the Treatise
At the start of Treatise Book 2, Hume divides the passions into two groups, the
“direct” and the “indirect” (T 2.1.1.4, pp. 276-7). I will say more about this
distinction in the following chapters. For now, my present argument requires just
two points about the direct passions, which are easy to establish: (i) that they
all arise from pleasure and pain (this is indeed part of their very definition); and
(ii) that they include, among others, the passions of desire and aversion. Thus,
when he first introduces the class, Hume writes: “By direct passions I understand
such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure... And under
the direct passions [I comprehend] desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair
and security” (T 2.1.1.4, pp. 276-7).
Later on, in the section devoted exclusively to these direct passions (the
same section that includes the Butler paragraph), Hume begins by reminding the
reader of these important points:
’Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded
on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind,
’tis only requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the removal of pain
and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride
and humility, desire and aversion...
The impressions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, and
with the least preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion,
grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition. (T 2.3.9.1-2, p. 438)
Not long after this, and just before the Butler paragraph, Hume is then explicit
in spelling out the hedonist implication of these claims:
Desire arises from good consider’d simply, and aversion is deriv’d from evil.
The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may
be attain’d by any action of the mind or body. (T 2.3.9.7, p. 439)
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The hedonism of this passage is inescapable, when we remember that “good” and
“evil” are just synonyms for “pleasure” and “pain” respectively (as they were for
Locke). This is a fact that the paragraphs already quoted amply confirm. The
Butler paragraph, indeed, confirms it most clearly of all: “good and evil, or in
other words, pain and pleasure” (T 2.3.9.8, p. 439). And for good measure, here
is another clear statement of hedonism from several sections earlier: “’Tis from
the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards
any object” (T 2.3.3.3, p. 414).
Thus the things that Hume says about motivation prior to the Butler para-
graph leave no room for the object-directed desires that suddenly and unexpect-
edly intrude into the Treatise’s official hedonist framework. To bring out this
contradiction more clearly, I shall here repeat the most relevant sentences (al-
ready quoted in context above) one after the other, in the order in which they
appear in the text:
By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or
evil, from pain or pleasure. ... ’Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure
that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object... ’Tis easy to
observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded on pain
and pleasure... Upon the removal of pain and pleasure there immediately
follows a removal of... desire and aversion... The impressions, which arise
from good and evil most naturally, and with the least preparation are the
direct passions of desire and aversion... Desire arises from good consider’d
simply, and aversion is deriv’d from evil. ... Beside good and evil, or in
other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from
a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. ... These
passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from
them, like the other affections.
As this clearly shows, the Butler paragraph sits very uneasily alongside the rest
of the Treatise. In striking contrast, however, Butler’s object-directed desires
are—as we will see in the remaining sections of this chapter—at the very heart of
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Hume’s later motivational psychology, which is consistently and explicitly anti-
egoist throughout. Needless to say, this is a substantial difference, concerning
moreover what was one of the most important debates at the time.
Before turning to Hume’s later anti-egoism, it may be helpful to place my
view on these matters in the context of the existing secondary literature. I am
by no means alone in thinking that Hume was a hedonist and an egoist in the
Treatise, or at least that he almost entirely was, but for the Butler paragraph.3
A particularly clear statement of this view is given by Stephen Darwall:
“’Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure,” Hume writes, “that the aver-
sion or propensity arises towards any object.” Good and evil (“or in other
words, pain and pleasure”) “consider’d simply” give rise to desire and aver-
sion respectively. And “the Will exerts itself, when either the good or the
absence of the evil may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body.”
Hume’s theory of action thus not only employs the traditional idea that
the will invariably aims at the good. It interprets that idea hedonistically
and egoistically. Desires and aversions arise from the prospect of pleasure
or pain, respectively, for the agent.4
Darwall goes on to concede that the Butler paragraph is in tension with this
hedonism, and effectively offers Hume a dilemma: he must either reinterpret
these object-directed desires in hedonistic terms, or revise his theory of action
and the will.
The hedonist interpretation of the Treatise is not without opponents.5 Though
controversial, however, it has had plenty of supporters besides Darwall, and might
even be the majority view.6 No one, furthermore, has ever doubted that Hume
3The full story is a little more complicated, and I am simplifying for now. In fact the Butler
paragraph is not the only hint of anti-egoism in the Treatise, although it is the most evident.
See chapter 6.
4Darwall (1993, p. 423).
5Notably Garrett (2007). My aim in this chapter (and the following chapters) is to lay
out the positive evidence for my view; I turn to defensive matters, responding in particular to
Garrett’s arguments, in chapter 6.
6Glathe (1950, pp. 67-8, 76), Karlsson (2006, pp. 246-7), Cohon (2008b, pp. 31-5, 2010,
p. 200), Magri (2008, p. 190).
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was an anti-egoist in the moral Enquiry. This is hardly surprising, since, as we
will see in §2.4, his anti-egoism in this work could not have been clearer or more
explicit. One might have thought, therefore, that the central claim of this first
part of my thesis would be an extremely familiar point (if a little controversial,
given the mild controversy surrounding the egoist interpretation of the Treatise).
Such is the general lack of interest in Hume’s mature philosophy of emotion, how-
ever, and in the development of his thought in this area, that what should have
been an obvious difference between the earlier and later Hume—or at least an
obvious apparent difference—is almost never remarked upon.7
A few things are distinctive about my position. The first is at least the
emphasis on this difference, even if the respective interpretations of Hume’s earlier
and later philosophy on which it rests are in themselves nothing new. The second
is the identification of Butler as the source of Hume’s later view, and the cause of
his change of mind. And the third, which will emerge over the next few chapters,
is the placement of this change in a larger story about the development of Hume’s
mature philosophy of emotion in general. As we will see, this substantial change
of mind had ramifications for several other aspects of Hume’s thought in this
area, and accordingly prompted a number of further modifications.
2.3. The dignity of human nature
The crucial change in Hume’s philosophy of motivation occurred very soon after
the publication of the Treatise. I have conjectured that Hume in fact read Butler’s
Sermons just before his own first work went to print, in time to insert the Butler
paragraph. Given that this paragraph contradicts the official hedonism of Books 1
and 2, however, it seems that the import of Butler’s crucial point had not yet
fully sunk in. However that may be, the penny had at least started to drop as
7Almost never: for some exceptions, see McGilvary (1903, p. 272), A´rdal (1966, p. 70),
Magri (2008, p. 193). McGilvary and A´rdal, however, argue that Hume was not an egoist in
the Treatise (on which alternative possibility, see chapter 6), and explicitly have no interest in
Hume’s later view. Magri seems to agree with me about the difference, but mentions it only in
passing, being concerned in his article with other things.
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early as 1741, as we may discover from an essay that was then published, Of
the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature.8 In this essay, Hume distinguishes
between two “sects... in the learned world” (DM 1, p. 80), one consisting of those
“who are inclined to think favourably of mankind”, the other of those who prefer
to “give us a mean opinion of our nature” (DM 2, p. 81). Egoists are among the
second sort of thinkers, and in arguing against their view Hume appeals—for the
very first time in this context—to Butler’s key point about the priority of desire
over pleasure:
In my opinion, there are two things which have led astray those philoso-
phers, that have insisted so much on the selfishness of man. In the first
place, they found, that every act of virtue or friendship was attended with
a secret pleasure; whence they concluded, that friendship and virtue could
not be disinterested. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous sen-
timent or passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel
a pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love
him for the sake of that pleasure. (DM 10, pp. 85-6)
Since this paragraph mentions the first of two points against the egoists, it would
be remiss to ignore the second, which is a particular objection to Mandeville. The
argument is that vanity (the desire at the heart of Mandeville’s egoist account of
moral motivation) cannot prompt us to virtuous action unless we already have a
love of virtue for its own sake:
[V]anity is so closely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of laudable
actions approaches so near the love of laudable actions for their own sake,
that these passions are more capable of mixture, than any other kinds of
affection; and it is almost impossible to have the latter without some degree
of the former. Accordingly, we find, that this passion for glory is always
warped and varied according to the particular taste or disposition of the
mind on which it falls. Nero had the same vanity in driving a chariot,
8At the time it was titled Of the Dignity of Human Nature; Hume changed the name in the
1770 edition.
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that Trajan had in governing the empire with justice and ability. To love
the glory of virtuous deeds is a sure proof of the love of virtue. (DM 11,
p. 86)
Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature is a short essay intended for
lighter reading than Hume’s more substantial philosophical texts. In the first
three editions of this essay (1741, 1742, and 1748), however, Hume mentions his
desire to pursue these matters in greater depth:
I may, perhaps, treat more fully of this Subject in some future Essay. In
the mean Time, I shall observe, what has been prov’d beyond Question
by several great Moralists of the present Age, that the social Passions
are by far the most powerful of any, and that even all the other Passions
receive from them their chief Force and Influence. Whoever desires to see
this Question treated at large, with the greatest Force of Argument and
Eloquence, may consult my Lord Shaftsbury ’s Enquiry concerning Virtue.
(1741, p. 620)
In the fourth edition (1753), this promissory note is deleted. The key event
between 1748 and 1753 that prompted the deletion, of course, was the publication
(in 1751) of the first edition of Hume’s Enquiry concerning the Principles of
Morals, the very work that he had promised in the earlier essay. While the Treatise
had espoused a hedonistic egoism, in line with Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville,
Hume changed his mind very soon afterwards. In the 1741 set of Essays, Moral
and Political, he was instead agreeing with Butler and Shaftesbury, and explicitly
anticipating the extended arguments of the 1751 Enquiry to this effect.
2.4. The two Enquiries
We will turn to the moral Enquiry presently. Before this work appeared, however,
there were, in 1748 and 1750, two editions of the Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding. In section 1 of these two editions, there was a lengthy footnote
intended to illustrate the possibility of establishing clear and decisive results in the
48 CHAPTER 2. MOTIVATION
science of human nature. Two such discoveries were chosen. The first, credited
to Hutcheson, was that moral distinctions are founded on sentiment rather than
reason; the second, credited to Butler, was the crucial point about the priority of
desire over pleasure:
It has been prov’d, beyond all Controversy, that even the Passions, com-
monly esteem’d selfish, carry the Mind beyond Self, directly to the Object;
that tho’ the Satisfaction of these Passions gives us Enjoyment, yet the
Prospect of this Enjoyment is not the Cause of the Passion, but on the
contrary the Passion is antecedent to the Enjoyment, and without the for-
mer, the latter could never possibly exist[.] (E 1748)9
This note was deleted in the third edition (1756), and never reappeared. One ob-
vious explanation for its removal is the same as for the removal of the promissory
note in Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature, namely the appearance
of the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which examined both anti-
rationalism and anti-egoism in considerably more depth.
The student who approaches Hume’s moral philosophy today is likely to
imagine that rationalism was a more important target for Hume than egoism. For
one thing, current moral philosophers seem only ever to be concerned with Hume’s
anti-rationalist arguments, and this bias has perhaps affected Hume scholarship as
well.10 For another, the texts themselves may seem to support this view: students
9This note is not reproduced in Selby-Bigge’s edition of the two Enquiries; it can be found,
however, in Beauchamp (2000, p. 232) and Millican (2007b, p. 177). I am indebted to Millican
for drawing my attention to this note, and for first suggesting to me the importance of Butler
as a source of Hume’s later anti-egoism.
10In Radcliffe’s Companion to Hume (2008)—a 528-page volume including 8 essays on the
passions and morals—the index entry for egoism points to one solitary page. The page in
question is not even from one of the essays on the passions or morals, but from Buckle’s
introductory article putting Hume in his historical context, in which Hume’s opposition to
Hobbes, in agreement with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, is briefly noted (Buckle 2008, p. 34).
Norton and Taylor’s Cambridge Companion to Hume (2009) does a little better, mostly thanks
to their own contributions. Norton’s, on the foundations of morality in Hume’s Treatise, begins
by summarising the debates leading up to that work, including in particular the debate between
the sentimentalists and the egoists. When we come to Hume himself, however, this introduction
seems strangely out of place, for that debate has suddenly been replaced with the more parochial
debate between Hutcheson and the rationalists. Norton himself seems not to have noticed that
these were separate issues, for he speaks indiscriminately of “the dispute regarding the origin
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are presented with a copy of the Treatise, and a copy of the Enquiries ; the former
is fiercely anti-rationalist, with hardly any hint of anti-egoism (indeed, if I am
right it is even an egoist work itself), while the latter begins with the debate
between sentimentalists and rationalists, reserving its anti-egoist arguments for
an appendix at the end.
This reaction, however forgiveable, is quite mistaken. Egoism was at least
as important a target for Hume as rationalism, if not more important. To get a
more accurate reflection of its significance, we must do several things. First, we
must increase the weighting for the anti-egoist work: Hume only ever published
one edition of Treatise Book 3, but ten editions of the moral Enquiry. Second,
we must include the additional material: the deleted note from the early editions
of the first Enquiry, and the essay Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature.
Last but not least, it must be noted that what we now know as the second ap-
pendix of the moral Enquiry, which contains Hume’s most sustained attack on
egoism, was only relegated to this position at the very end of his life, for the
posthumous 1777 edition. In all other editions—which is to say, in every edition
published in Hume’s lifetime—it in fact had pride of place at the very start of sec-
tion 2, Of Benevolence.11 The first appendix, in contrast, which contains Hume’s
anti-rationalist arguments (where section 1 merely introduces and postpones the
debate) was always an appendix.
The facts, therefore, are these: After one edition of the Treatise, a publication
which the author himself sorely regretted, Hume wrote an essay against egoism,
of moral distinctions” (2009, p. 286; my emphasis). His article focuses exclusively on the
Treatise, which focus, being shared by most Hume scholars, presumably helps to explain the
corresponding focus on anti-rationalism at the expense of anti-egoism. Taylor is the exception
that proves the rule: her article spends more time on this aspect of Hume’s moral philosophy
(2009, pp. 316-8), but then she has long been urging a preference for the moral Enquiry over
Book 3 of the Treatise. Penelhum’s article in the same collection, on Hume’s moral psychology,
notes Hume’s anti-egoism just once in passing, 23 pages in (Penelhum 2009, p. 260).
11This fact, incidentally, explains a curious remnant of the earlier structure in the 1777 edition:
in a footnote in the second appendix, Hume writes that “we shall have occasion frequently to
treat of [the sentiment of benevolence] in the course of this enquiry” (M App2.5, n60, p. 298);
an odd thing to say in an appendix, but of course an entirely natural thing to say right at the
start of a work. The remnant suggests that Hume did not fully think through this last-minute
rearrangement.
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not rationalism, using this as the occasion to promise a fuller examination of
morals. In an early footnote in the first Enquiry (deleted after the moral Enquiry
appeared), Hutcheson’s anti-rationalism and Butler’s anti-egoism were mentioned
side by side. They were side by side again in the moral Enquiry, the second section
of which, before this was moved to an appendix, began as follows:
There is a principle, supposed to prevail among many, which is utterly
incompatible with all virtue or moral sentiment... This principle is, that
all benevolence is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a farce,
fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence; ...
There is another principle, somewhat resembling the former; which has
been much insisted on by philosophers, and has been the foundation of
many a fair system; that, whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he
feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most gener-
ous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love[.] (M App2.2,
pp. 295-6)
After a number of preliminary objections to this egoist view, Hume once again
appeals to Butler’s object-directed motivational psychology in his defence of the
alternative:
There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which
necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek
possession of the object... In the same manner, there are mental passions,
by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects, such as
fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to interest; and when
these objects are attained, a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the consequence
of our indulged affections... In all these cases, there is a passion, which
points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our good or happiness;
as there are other secondary passions, which afterwards arise, and pursue it
as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted such by our original
affections...
Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the
case with benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame of
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our temper, we may feel a desire of another’s happiness or good, which,
by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards
pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment?
(M (M App2.12-3, pp. 301-2)
Just like Butler, Hume makes clear that our pleasure in the important cases is
a consequence of our desires being satisfied, and hence that those desires cannot
themselves be hedonistic.
2.5. Desire in the Dissertation on the Passions
It would seem to be the standard view that, when writing the Dissertation on the
Passions, Hume did nothing more than select a few passages from Book 2 of the
Treatise, reorder them, and make some minor stylistic changes. My Difference
Thesis, of course, claims that Hume’s revisions were much more substantial. It
is true that only a very small proportion of the Dissertation contains entirely
new material, and that many of the modifications to the old material are purely
stylistic. But though they are small in number, the few additions and non-stylistic
changes that Hume did make are enormous in implication. What Hume does with
the Butler paragraph is an excellent case in point.
Let us start by looking again at the original Butler paragraph in the Treatise,
together with some of its preceding context:
’Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are
founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of
any kind, ’tis only requisite to present some good or evil. ...
When good is certain or probable, it produces Joy. When evil is in the
same situation there arises Grief or Sorrow.
When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to Fear or Hope,
according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other.
Desire arises from good consider’d simply, and Aversion is deriv’d
from evil. The Will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of
the evil may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body.
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Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the di-
rect passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is
perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our
enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bod-
ily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil,
and proceed not from them, like the other affections. (T 2.3.9.1, 2.3.9.5-8,
p. 438-9)
Recall, in particular, that “good” and “evil” are used in the Treatise simply as
synonyms for “pleasure” and “pain”, and thus that the penultimate paragraph
just quoted constitutes a clear endorsement of hedonism; an account which is
then promptly contradicted by the Butler paragraph.
With this in mind, let us now take a look at what happened to these para-
graphs when Hume came to rewrite them in the Dissertation on the Passions :
Some objects produce immediately an agreeable sensation, by the original
structure of our organs, and are thence denominated Good; as others, from
their immediate disagreeable sensation, acquire the appellation of Evil.
Thus moderate warmth is agreeable and good; excessive heat painful and
evil.
Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to pas-
sion, excite an agreeable or painful sensation; and are thence called Good
or Evil. The punishment of an adversary, by gratifying revenge, is good;
the sickness of a companion, by affecting friendship, is evil.
When good is certain or probable, it produces Joy. When evil is in the
same situation, there arises Grief or Sorrow.
When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to Fear or Hope,
according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other.
Desire arises from good considered simply, and Aversion is derived
from evil. The Will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of
the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body. (P 1.1-2, 4-6,
p. 3)
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To a careless eye, not much has changed. The last three paragraphs are word
for word repeats (spot the extra comma), and the second paragraph is just an
abridged or slightly modified version of the Butler paragraph, moved a little way
up the page. But if we look again more closely, we can see that, with a very few
carefully crafted alterations, Hume has effected a considerable change in meaning.
The key is in the first of the paragraphs just quoted (which is, appropri-
ately enough for my first argument in support of the Difference Thesis, the very
first paragraph of the Dissertation on the Passions). Here Hume defines good
and evil as pertaining to the objects that give rise to agreeable and disagree-
able sensations: as the external causes of pleasure and pain, then, rather than
as identical to these feelings. Similarly in the second paragraph (the amended
version of Butler paragraph from the Treatise): objects are said to be good or
evil, when they excite pleasure or pain (in virtue of gratifying or thwarting an
object-directed desire). This seemingly small terminological difference has a con-
siderably important consequence: the very same words that constituted, in the
Treatise, an endorsement of hedonism, no longer carry that meaning. Desire is
now said to arise from the consideration of objects, rather than the consideration
of pleasure; and similarly the will is now said to exert itself when the object can
be attained, rather than the pleasure. The author of the Dissertation, therefore,
was not a hedonist. He was, as he had been ever since 1741, a clear and consistent
supporter of Butler’s object-directed motivational psychology.
Analogous to this particular point about desire and aversion, there is a gen-
eral point about the direct passions as a whole. At the start of the Treatise, we
may recall, Hume defined the direct passions—“desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope,
fear, despair and security” (T 2.1.1.4, p. 277)—as those that “arise immediately
from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (T 2.1.1.4, p. 276). Hume’s definition
of these passions in the Dissertation is on the face of it much the same: he says
that they “arise from a direct pursuit of good and aversion to evil” (P 2.1, p. 7).
But again, since good and evil are no longer identical to pleasure and pain, but
are instead applied to the objects that give rise to these feelings, the very same
words now have a very different meaning. And Hume’s mature definition of the
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direct passions, unlike his earlier one, is consistent with the inclusion of object-
directed desires in this set. I have drawn this closely related conclusion here and
now, for the sake of clarity, but I will draw it again in the next chapter—perhaps
a little more carefully, and at any rate in the context of the relevant existing
debate—when I turn to examine Hume’s classification of the passions.
As noted in the introduction, Selby-Bigge dismissed the Dissertation on the
Passions long ago as containing nothing more than “verbatim extracts from Bk. II
of the Treatise, with some trifling verbal alterations”.12 More recently, Terence
Penelhum has expressed a similar sentiment, saying that the later work “is merely
a brief re´sume´ of the arguments of Book II of the Treatise”.13 Though it is seldom
said explicitly (the Dissertation is seldom mentioned at all), this is presumably
the standard view. As the present example illustrates, it is certainly understand-
able. But this hasty reaction has apparently discouraged commentators from
looking more closely at the detail of what Hume says in the earlier and the later
works. When we do this, we can see that the differences are in fact considerable.
By altering just a few words, Hume changed sides on one of the major debates at
the time, abandoning his hedonism in favour of Butler’s object-directed view. Or
rather (as we saw in the previous two sections), the change of sides had already
taken place. But the first four paragraphs of the Dissertation, when contrasted
with their corresponding Treatise passages, provide a clear and independent cor-
roboration of the developmental story that I have told, and a refutation of the
view that there are no substantial differences between these two texts; and all
this just on the first page of the later work. As we will see over the course of the
thesis, this was by no means the only change that Hume made.
12Selby-Bigge (1893/1975, pp. xx-xxi).
13Penelhum (1975, p. 110).
Chapter 3
Hume’s Classification of the Passions
The aim of this chapter is to locate the passions within Hume’s general taxon-
omy of the perceptions of the mind, and to introduce his distinctions among the
passions themselves. It will emerge that Hume’s terminology and classificatory
remarks are not exactly the same in the earlier and later works, and that many
of these changes can be traced back to a greater awareness of Butler’s object-
directed desires and of the need to make room for them. The present chapter is
concerned only with Hume’s general remarks; when we turn to the particulars,
in the next two chapters, yet more differences will emerge.
3.1. Impressions and sentiments
The very first distinction that Hume draws in his science of the mind, both in the
Treatise and in his later work, is that between “feeling and thinking”, or equiv-
alently that of the mind’s perceptions into “impressions and ideas” (T 1.1.1.1,
p. 1; E 2.1-3, pp. 17-8). This distinction, I trust, is well known, and I have
little to add to our existing understanding of it. One thing, however, is not com-
monly remarked upon, and is of particular relevance here: where in the Treatise
(and particularly in Books 1 and 2) Hume almost invariably labelled our felt per-
ceptions “impressions”, in his later writing (and to an extent in Book 3 of the
Treatise) there is an increasing preference for the term “sentiment”.
When Hume draws the distinction in section 2 of the first Enquiry, “impres-
sion” is still his official choice:
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The less forceful and lively [perceptions] are commonly denominatedThoughts
or Ideas. The other species want a name in our language... Let us, there-
fore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions[.] (E 2.3, p. 18)
But while the term “sentiment” appears not once in the first section of the Treatise
(where “impression” appears 46 times), it appears 5 times in section 2 of the first
Enquiry (where “impression” appears 10 times), and in the Enquiry as a whole
it outnumbers the other word by almost 2 to 1.1
There can be no doubt that some of the time, at least, Hume intends “senti-
ment” as just a synonym for “impression”. A couple of examples suffice to prove
the point (and any of the 5 from section 2 of the first Enquiry would do):
These faculties [memory and the imagination] may mimic or copy the per-
ceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and
vivacity of the original sentiment. (E 2.1, p. 17)
[W]hen we analyse our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime,
we always find, that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were
copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. (E 2.6, p. 19)
Furthermore, the theory of the “double relation of impressions and ideas” from
Book 2 of the Treatise (e.g. T 2.1.5.5, p. 286)—which I will look at briefly in the
next chapter, and more thoroughly in chapter 9—has become, in the Dissertation
on the Passions, that of the “double relation of sentiments and ideas” (e.g. P 2.22,
p. 11; my emphasis). Again, the switch is not complete: the theory is later referred
to once by its former name (P 3.1, p. 18). But the new name occurs three times,
where in the Treatise it was never used.
1The exact figure is 63 to 33. The trend here is quite general: in the Treatise as a whole,
“impression” wins by 616 to 236 (a ratio of more than 5 to 2), while in the Four Dissertations
and the two Enquiries combined, “sentiment” wins by an enormous 362 to 50 (a ratio of more
than 7 to 1). In the two Enquiries alone the ratio is only fractionally smaller (261 to 37). These
statistics do not measure exactly what we want: sometimes “impression” is used in its ordinary
sense (e.g. “[t]he inference is by no means just, that, because a system of religion has made
no deep impression on the minds of a people, it must therefore have been positively rejected
by all men of common sense”; N 12.19, p. 73), and sometimes “sentiment” is used to mean
opinion (see page 57 below). Ideally, the data would be sifted and these instances discounted.
Nevertheless, the figures are telling.
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In a sense, the change here is superficial, as all terminological changes are.
“Impression” is after all a technical term for Hume, meaning no more than what
he has defined it to mean, and “sentiment” is later used in a similarly artificial
sense. But, as anyone who has tried to coin a technical term themselves knows,
connotations do matter. And in any case, the fact that Hume increasingly adopted
a new term, either deliberately or unconsciously, demands its explanation; and
that explanation must presumably take the form of pointing to some connotations
of the later word that would have been attractive.
I can think of two such connotations, which, if I am right that these are
what attracted Hume, point to or at least highlight two noteworthy features of
his thought in this area. The first point is the obvious one: that with this choice
of word Hume more closely aligned himself, verbally at least, with the earlier
“sentimentalists” Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (Butler does not use the term very
much; Hutcheson uses it more than Shaftesbury). This reflects his general move
in this direction, and in particular his joining these thinkers in the campaign
against egoism (recall chapter 2).
The second connotation of the word “sentiment” is perhaps the more interest-
ing, and this is its intellectual or cognitive connotation. Though Hume describes
impressions as feelings rather than thoughts, the word “sentiment” is nicely am-
biguous or midway between these two things. Johnson’s dictionary defines it as
“thought, notion, opinion” (1755), without any mention of the feeling sense of
the word at all (though that is surely an oversight). Kames makes nice use of the
double meaning in his definition of a sentiment as a “thought prompted by pas-
sion” (1762, vol. 1, p. 311; see also vol. 2, p. 741). And Hume himself sometimes
uses the word in its opinion sense, for example in the first Enquiry :
It is confessed, that the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of
bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret
powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these
secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without
the aid of experience; contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and
contrary to plain matter of fact. (E 4.21, p. 37)
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And though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philoso-
phers, in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find,
upon reflection, that they [all mankind] dissent from it in words only, not
in their real sentiment. (E 8.21, p. 92)
Something like Hume’s impression/idea distinction survives in current de-
bates about the nature of emotions, dividing the “feeling” or “non-cognitivist”
views from the “judgment” or “cognitivist” ones.2 Given Hume’s identification
of the passions with impressions of a certain sort—see §3.2 below—it is tempting
to align him with the modern-day non-cognitivists.3 This temptation, however,
should be resisted. As we will see later (chapter 9), Hume’s view has clear cogni-
tivist elements, and overall occupies something of a middle ground between these
two rival schools. Accordingly it seems to me that Hume’s later choice of the
word “sentiment” is extremely apt, and perhaps less likely than “impression” to
invite crude non-cognitivist misreadings.
3.2. Three more distinctions
Having distinguished impressions from ideas, Hume proceeds in the Treatise to
divide impressions themselves into “those of Sensation and those of Reflex-
ion” (T 1.1.2.1, p. 7). As we will see shortly, there is a difficulty regarding the
way in which Hume draws this distinction. Nevertheless, the intention behind it
is perfectly clear. Impressions as a whole include “all our sensations, passions and
emotions” (T 1.1.1.1, p. 1), and the point of the sensation/reflection distinction is
simply to draw a line at the comma, with “sensations” on one side, and “passions
and emotions” on the other. Impressions of sensation are obviously meant to be
sensations (hence the name); impressions of reflection, meanwhile, are said to be
our “passions, desires, and emotions” (T 1.1.2.1, p. 8).
2See Nussbaum (2001) and Solomon (2004a) on the cognitvist side, and Prinz (2004) on
the non-cognitivist side. Solomon’s collection (2004b) also contains articles by Nussbaum and
Prinz, and is a good source of further articles and references.
3Thus Pitcher (1965), Solomon (1977), Deigh (1994), Zemach (2001).
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The examples of sensations at the start of the Treatise are “heat or cold,
thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other” (T 1.1.2.1, p. 8). In
the context this must mean bodily pleasure or pain, for at the start of Book 2,
when Hume repeats the distinction in new terms (impressions of sensation are
now called “original”, and those of reflection are now called “secondary”), the
former are said to comprise “all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains
and pleasures” (T 2.1.1.1, p. 275; my emphasis). The latter, as before, are said
to be “the passions, and other emotions resembling them”. (ibid.).
Extensionally, then, there can be no doubt about what Hume intended by
this sensation/reflection distinction. Unfortunately, however, the way in which
the distinction is drawn in the Treatise is problematic, for it presupposes the
hedonism which I have already argued dominates this early work:
Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation and those
of Reflexion. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown
causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and
that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses,
and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of
some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind,
which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This
idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new
impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be
called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. (T 1.1.2.1, pp. 7-8)
Here Hume seemingly defines impressions of reflection (including desire and aver-
sion) as those that arise from an antecedent idea of pleasure or pain. At the very
least, if this is not intended as their definition, it is nevertheless a general thesis
that is apparently supposed to apply to them all. Having familiarised ourselves
with Hume’s later views, however, we can see that Butler’s object-directed desires
are counterexamples to this definition or general thesis. They are not derived from
pleasure and pain, but rather pleasure and pain are derived from them. Further-
more, as we will see in chapter 5, they arise in the soul originally, from unknown
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causes, much like the sensations or “original” impressions with which all passions
and desires are here contrasted. When Hume wrote this paragraph, I therefore
submit, he was not yet aware of the existence of these original, object-directed
desires. In line with my conjecture at the start of chapter 2, he had not yet read
Butler’s Sermons ; or if he had, he certainly had not absorbed Butler’s crucial
point about the priority of desire over pleasure and pain.
Having distinguished impressions from ideas, and divided impressions into
original and secondary, Hume’s next move in Book 2 of the Treatise is to further
subdivide the secondary or reflective impressions into the calm and the violent.
When drawing this third distinction, Hume uses “emotion” as the general term
(i.e. to refer to all secondary impressions, both calm and violent), while reserving
“passion” specifically for the violent emotions:
The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and
the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action,
composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love
and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility... properly call’d passions...
[I]n general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from
beauty and deformity... I... shall now explain those violent emotions or
passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects. (T 2.1.1.3, p. 276)
On the face of it, at least, the point of this distinction is to separate the moral and
critical sentiments (i.e. moral approbation and disapprobation, and the sentiments
of beauty and deformity) from passions in the more natural sense, i.e. what
we would today call “emotions”. Hume doesn’t mention the moral sentiments
explicitly, but I take it that these are what he means by “the sense of beauty
and deformity in action” (my emphasis). I will examine this distinction in more
detail in §3.4 below, but we will see no cause to modify this straightforward first
impression.
With just one more distinction, our reconstruction of Hume’s Treatise taxon-
omy will be complete. This is the division of the passions (the violent secondary
impressions) into direct and indirect :
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When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them
into direct and indirect. By direct passions I understand such as arise
immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as
proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities.
This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any farther. I can only
observe in general, that under the indirect passions I comprehend pride,
humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with
their dependants. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief,
joy, hope, fear, despair and security. (T 2.1.1.4, pp. 276-7)
Like Hume, I will not presently explain this distinction any further. There are
important interpretative questions surrounding it, but it will be easier to answer
these over the next two chapters, when we move from the current level of general-
ity to discuss more particular matters. For now, it suffices to make a note of the
distinction, and to point out that—like the distinction between impressions of
sensation and impressions of reflection—the way in which Hume draws it again
presupposes hedonism. The passions on both sides of this divide, Hume says,
“arise... from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”, the difference being that the
direct passions do so “immediately”, while the indirect do so “by the conjunction
of other qualities”. (The other qualities that Hume has in mind here will be
examined in the next chapter.) This was in effect my argument in §2.2, but we
are now able to place it in the context of Hume’s taxonomy as a whole.
3.3. The Butler paragraph (again)
With this context in mind, let us turn again to the Butler paragraph:
Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct pas-
sions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly
unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies,
and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily ap-
petites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and
proceed not from them, like the other affections. (T 2.3.9.8, p. 439)
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As I pointed out in §2.2, classing these object-directed desires as direct contra-
dicts the definition of the direct passions as those that arise immediately from
pleasure and pain. I shall now rub the point in: calling them passions of any
kind also contradicts the definition of impressions of reflection (as impressions
that arise from ideas of pleasure and pain, one way or another); and placing
the bodily appetites such as hunger in the same group contradicts the sensa-
tion/reflection distinction. For impressions of sensation, we may recall, include
all bodily pains and pleasures, with hunger and thirst being named as explicit
examples at T 1.1.2.1 (p. 8); bodily appetites, being impressions of sensation,
cannot also be passions (impressions of reflection).
Existing attempts to reconstruct Hume’s taxonomy of impressions and pas-
sions all focus on the Treatise, ignoring Hume’s later works, and are also curiously
blind to these inconsistencies. In one of the earliest attempts at reconstruction,
Kemp Smith treats the object-directed desires as a third category, distinct from
both the direct and the indirect passions, thereby being faithful to Hume’s def-
inition of the direct passions, but ignoring his claim that object-directed desires
are examples of such passions.4 In one of the most recent attempts, by contrast,
James Fieser respects this claim, counting object-directed desires among the di-
rect passions, but ignores the contradictory definition.5 Either proposal seems a
viable and consistent revision of the Treatise taxonomy, but neither can claim
to be the view that is actually presented in that work. As far as the Treatise is
concerned, there is nothing to choose between them.
Fortunately Hume’s later work breaks the tie, for attention to the Disser-
tation on the Passions shows that Hume himself revised the Treatise taxonomy
into something consistent; as a result, no doubt, of coming to appreciate the im-
portance of Butler’s object-directed desires, and of the need to make room for
them. He might have gone either way, I suppose, but as it happens he opted for
4Kemp Smith (1941/2005, pp. 164-9). To be more precise, Kemp Smith does briefly ac-
knowledge the contradictory claim in a footnote (p. 165, n2); but he ignores the contradiction.
5Fieser (1992, pp. 10-1).
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Fieser’s revision. He no longer uses the technical terms “direct” and “indirect”,
but the distinction is still clearly present in the Dissertation, as indicated by the
opening sentence of section 2:
Besides those passions above-mentioned, which arise from a direct pursuit
of good and aversion to evil, there are others which are of a more com-
plicated nature, and imply more than one view or consideration. (P 2.1,
p. 7)
The passions “above-mentioned”, i.e. the ones discussed in section 1 of the Dis-
sertation, are desire and aversion (including the object-directed desires such as
benevolence and anger), joy and sorrow, hope and fear. These are precisely the
direct passions of the Treatise, including the object-directed desires.6 They are
said to arise from a direct pursuit of good and aversion to evil. As noted before
(§2.5), “good” and “evil” are no longer synonymous with “pleasure” and “pain” in
the Dissertation, but are instead applied to the objects that give rise to pleasure
and pain. The present definition of the “above-mentioned”—i.e. direct—passions
is thus verbally similar but substantially different from that given in the Treatise;
in exactly the same way as we have seen with Hume’s account of motivation. And
the new definition is consistent with the inclusion of object-directed desires in the
group. For ease of exposition, I already rehearsed this argument at the end of
the previous chapter, but it is well to have repeated it here in the context of
discussing Hume’s classification of the passions in general.
As to the other passions—those “of a more complicated nature”—these cor-
respond to the Treatise category of indirect passions, though Hume happens not
to use that label any more. The immediate examples in the Dissertation are
pride, humility, love, and hatred, which are named as indirect passions at the
start of Treatise Book 2 (T 2.1.1.4, p. 276-7). These four passions are the main
6To be thorough, I should note that the Treatise list also includes despair and security, which
are not mentioned in section 1 of the Dissertation. Despair and security are the contraries of
hope and fear respectively, and so must presumably still belong in the same group, although
Hume happens not to mention them. Hume has very little to say about these passions anyway;
for the little that he does say, see T 2.3.4.8 (pp. 421-2), repeated at P 6.9 (p. 27).
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subject matter of section 2 of the Dissertation, and of most of sections 3 and 4
as well. Later on, in section 3, Hume also examines pity, malice, and envy, three
more of the passions named as indirect at the start of Treatise Book 2 (ibid.).
Generosity, another of Hume’s Treatise examples, is not mentioned in the Dis-
sertation, but we will see over the course of the next two chapters that there is
nothing significant about that. Ambition and vanity are more interesting: these
are indirect passions in the Treatise, but object-directed desires—and hence direct
passions—in the moral Enquiry (see the brief comment below, and the detailed
discussion in §5.3). Notwithstanding this particular change of mind, however,
Hume clearly retained the general distinction.
One wrinkle remains to be ironed out. What about the bodily appetites such
as hunger and thirst, which in the Butler paragraph Hume counted as straightfor-
ward examples of object-directed desires, but which are on the wrong side of his
sensation/reflection distinction? It may be noted that Butler did not much care
for the distinction between the bodily appetites and other desires, and so on the
assumption that Hume added this paragraph after reading Butler, the inclusion
of bodily appetites in the group is not surprising. In his later work, however,
Hume himself maintained the distinction between bodily appetites and mental
desires, while agreeing with Butler insofar as to say that the two are analogous
in the key respect of their causal priority over pleasure and pain:
There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which
necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek
possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking
for their end; and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises
a pleasure, which may become the object of another species of desire or
inclination, that is secondary and interested. In the same manner, there
are mental passions, by which we are impelled immediately to seek par-
ticular objects, such as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard
to interest; and when these objects are attained, a pleasing enjoyment en-
sues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. (M App2.12, p. 301;
my emphases)
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Insisting on the distinction between bodily appetites and mental passions, as
Hume does here, is consistent with the revised Butler paragraph that appears in
the Dissertation (P 1.2, p. 3), for this paragraph mentions only benevolence and
anger as examples of object-directed desires, making no reference to the bodily
appetites at all. While we are here, it is also well to observe that the paragraph
just quoted establishes something I claimed a moment ago, namely that in the
moral Enquiry Hume saw ambition and vanity (the desires for power and fame
respectively) as object-directed desires, rather than indirect passions. But I will
pursue this point in detail in chapter 5.
Hume’s considered view, then, contrary to the Butler paragraph (and to
both Kemp Smith’s and Fieser’s interpretations of the Treatise, which agree on
this point), is that the bodily appetites are in a category of their own, distinct
from the passions. This, in fact, was also the official position of the Treatise—
as shown by Hume’s drawing of the sensation/reflection distinction—and would
have consistently been his view throughout that work, were it not for the isolated
contradictory assertion in the Butler paragraph. This is therefore further confir-
mation of my claim that the Butler paragraph fits very uncomfortably into the
rest of the Treatise, and was thus most likely a last-minute addition. Needless
to say by now, however, object-directed desires fit very nicely into Hume’s later
view; indeed, they are absolutely central to it.
3.4. Calm and violent
In §3.2, I suggested that the aim of Hume’s calm/violent distinction was to sep-
arate the passions in the familiar sense from the moral and critical sentiments.
This seems the only natural and plausible reading of T 2.1.1.3, which I quoted at
the time but will repeat here:
The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and
the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action,
composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love
and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility... properly call’d passions...
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[I]n general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from
beauty and deformity... I... shall now explain those violent emotions or
passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects. (T 2.1.1.3, p. 276)
I take it that this interpretation of the calm/violent distinction is, by itself, fairly
innocuous and insubstantial; certainly my endorsement of it is intended to be.
Louis Loeb, however, has defended it in the context of a more substantial point,
namely that Hume’s views on morality—contra Pall A´rdal—can be understood
without reference to his account of the passions. Loeb saw the calm/violent
distinction as driving a wedge between the passions (the subject matter of Book 2)
and the moral sentiments (the subject matter of Book 3). More specifically, where
A´rdal had argued that the moral sentiments were indirect passions, Loeb insisted
that they were not passions at all, let alone indirect ones.7
The question of where the moral sentiments belong in Hume’s taxonomy
remains a controversial one. Before A´rdal argued that they were indirect passions,
Kemp Smith had classified them as direct passions, and later Thomas Hearn
defended Kemp Smith’s claim in opposition to A´rdal. Then Loeb, as we have
seen, insisted in opposition to both parties that they were not passions at all.
More recently, Fieser concurred with Loeb’s classification; more recently still, a
version of A´rdal’s view has been resurrected by Rachel Cohon, although Cohon
insists only that the moral sentiments are indirect secondary impressions, leaving
open the question of whether or not they are passions.8
As I have said, my inclination on this matter is to go along with Loeb and
Fieser regarding the classificatory question. There is a distinction to be drawn
between the passions on the one hand, which are partial and incapable of being
rightly or wrongly held (save with regard to mistakes of fact), and the moral
and critical sentiments on the other, which are supposed to be derived from an
impartial common point of view, and are subject to a standard of taste that
goes beyond mere factual errors. But I would be surprised if this claim, prop-
7A´rdal (1966), Loeb (1977).
8Kemp Smith (1941/2005, p. 168), Hearn (1973), Fieser (1992), Cohon (2008a, 2010).
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erly understood, excited any controversy. In particular, it does not rule out the
possibility that the moral sentiments have a lot in common with the passions
(or perhaps with some special subset of the passions; see below). Nor—contra
Loeb—does it undermine A´rdal’s basic point that Hume’s treatment of the pas-
sions is of considerable value for understanding his treatment of morals. A´rdal
was surely right about this; Hume was interested in the passions for their own
sake, but like everyone else at the time he was also interested in their bearing on
morality, and this secondary interest is seldom out of sight.
Insofar as the moral sentiments have a particular affinity with some of the
passions more than with others, it seems to me that A´rdal and Cohon are closer
to the truth in identifying them with the indirect passions. I have neither the
space nor the need to defend this claim in any detail. I do want to suggest,
however, that this identification is perhaps a little careless in one crucial respect
(as this will be relevant again in an argument at the end of the next chapter).
Among the indirect passions, four stand out as particularly important for Hume,
namely pride, humility, love, and hatred. I propose to call these the double-
relation passions, since Hume accounts for their origin with his theory of the
double relation of sentiments and ideas (see chapters 4 and 9). Insofar as the
moral sentiments have analogues among the passions, for Hume, it seems to me
that these analogues are not the indirect passions in general, but only the double-
relation passions in particular. It is easy to see how moral approbation might be
a kind of love or pride, and how disapprobation might be a kind of hatred or
humility. It is considerably harder to see what the moral sentiments might have
in common with ambition, pity, malice, or any of the other indirect passions.
The carelessness of the association of the moral sentiments with the indirect
passions as a whole, rather than the double-relation passions in particular, comes
out in a recent argument from Cohon, to the effect that the moral sentiments do
not motivate us directly.9 Cohon rightly observes that pride, humility, love, and
hatred do not move us to act directly. We may be moved by the prospect of pride
9Cohon (2010).
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or humility (as with any potential pleasure or pain), but the present experience of
these passions, according to Hume, has no motivational effect. Love and hatred,
meanwhile, move us only indirectly, by first prompting the desires of benevolence
and anger:
[P]ride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any
desire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are
not compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they
produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always follow’d
by a desire of the happiness of the person belov’d, and an aversion to his
misery: As hatred produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the
happiness of the person hated. (T 2.2.6.3, p. 367)
Cohon then uses these four examples—pride, humility, love, and hatred—to ar-
gue that the indirect passions as a whole do not move us to act directly, and
concludes that the moral sentiments, being likewise indirect, must also have this
property. But she seems, in this argument, to have forgotten about the other
indirect passions, such as ambition, vanity, pity, and malice. These very plainly
do move us to act directly, and so the argument is made to depend upon a false
generalisation. Fortunately, the generalisation seems to be as unnecessary as it is
untrue. She need only have said that the moral sentiments are analogous to the
double-relation passions in particular, not to the indirect passions in general.
Hume’s calm/violent distinction appears to resurface later in the Treatise,
in the form of a contrast between “certain calm desires and tendencies” such as
“benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children” on the
one hand (T 2.3.3.8, p. 417), and such things as “a violent passion of resent-
ment” or particularly strong “fears, apprehensions, and aversions” on the other
(T 2.3.3.9, pp. 418). On closer inspection, however, this would seem to be a dif-
ferent distinction. For one thing, the examples on both sides of this new line all
belong on the violent side of the earlier division. For another, Hume is explicit in
saying that the “calm desires” in this new sense are nevertheless “real passions”
(T 2.3.3.8, p. 417), i.e. violent in the earlier sense.
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This is not to say that the corresponding terminology is mere coincidence.
Both distinctions are based on a difference in felt intensity between the sentiments
on the different sides of the divide. But the similarity ends there, and I suggest
that the two distinctions need to be kept apart. The later calm/violent distinction
is drawn in the context of Hume’s discussion of the relationship between reason
and passion, and will be examined further in chapter 10.
3.5. Some peculiar feelings
Hume’s distinction between impressions of sensation and impressions of reflec-
tion is an echo of Locke’s distinction between ideas drawn in the same terms
(Locke 1690, p. 105). While Locke’s and Hume’s categories of sensation coincide,
however, their notions of reflection are importantly different. For Hume, as we
have seen, impressions of reflection are essentially passions and emotions (though
there is a complication here that I will come to presently). For Locke, on the
other hand, reflective ideas are those that arise in us from “the perception of the
operations of our own mind”, and are of such things as “perception, thinking,
doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing” (1690, p. 105).
Hume seems to have had a curious blind-spot with regard to Lockean re-
flection as a source of ideas.10 Without ever denying it explicitly, he implicitly
rules it out with his copy principle—that all our simple ideas are copied from a
precedent impression (T 1.1.1.7, p. 4; E 2.5, p. 19)—and also fails to appeal to
it at three crucial points in his work where one might have thought it was the
obvious thing to appeal to: belief, necessary connection, and volition. In each
of these three cases he instead posits an impression as the source of our ideas.11
Since these cannot be sensory impressions, meanwhile, they are presumably to
be classified as impressions of reflection. As such, they complicate the otherwise
straightforward equation of impressions of reflection with emotions.
10I am grateful to Peter Millican for drawing my attention to this, and to its relevance in the
present context.
11See, respectively, T App.2-3 (pp. 623-5) and E 5.10-3 (pp. 47-50); T 1.3.14.22 (pp. 165-6)
and E 7.28 (pp. 75-6); and T 2.3.1.2, 2.3.9.2, 2.3.9.4 (pp. 399, 438-9).
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Hume’s treatment of belief is notoriously problematic, even by his own ad-
mission, and this is not the place to delve into these murky waters.12 I shall
also set aside here the origin of our idea of necessary connection.13 Both of these
would take us too far from our present concerns. The impression of the will or
volition, however, does belong in a discussion of Hume on the passions. Indeed,
we find it in Hume’s discussion of the passions in Book 2 of the Treatise.
This impression does not feature heavily in Hume’s theory. It appears in just
three paragraphs in Treatise Book 2, none of which is repeated in his later work
on the subject:
I desire it may be observ’d, that by the will, I mean nothing but the internal
impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to
any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind. (T 2.3.1.2,
p. 399)
The impressions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, and with
the least preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion, grief
and joy, hope and fear, along with volition. (T 2.3.9.2, p. 438)
Thus a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty; and this
pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition and
desire. (T 2.3.9.4, p. 439)
Despite the isolated—and frankly very peculiar—nature of these remarks, it seems
to be fairly common for interpreters to accept the impression of the will or volition
unquestioningly into the fold, and even to make it the crucial distinctive feature
of Hume’s account.14 In opposition to this trend, however, I should like to suggest
that these three paragraphs were mistakes, and to attribute to Hume instead the
12See Broackes (2002) for a discussion.
13See Millican (2007a) for an interpretation of Hume’s account along Lockean lines: “it is our
reflexive awareness of making the inference that leads us to the very idea of connexion” (p. 224;
cf. p. 249n26).
14Thus Bricke (1984), Stalley (1986), Connolly (1987). Fieser stops short of classifying voli-
tion as a passion, but still accepts it as a secondary impression (1992, pp. 12-3).
3.5. SOME PECULIAR FEELINGS 71
more commonsensical view that the will is a mental faculty, and that volition is
the mental act for which this faculty is responsible.
This much more natural position should certainly have been familiar to
Hume, for it was precisely Locke’s view:
Volition, ’tis plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion
it takes it self to have over any part of the Man, by imploying it in, or
withholding it from any particular Action. And what is the Will, but the
Faculty to do this? (1690, p. 241)
Moreover, when Hume himself discusses volition or the will—in all but the three
unfortunate paragraphs quoted above—he seems pretty clearly to have the same
understanding of these things in mind. For example:
Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary im-
pulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter
faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to
cause, as well as hinder any act of volition. (T 2.3.3.4, pp. 414-5)
Beside these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain
violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on
that faculty. (T 2.3.3.9, pp. 417-8)
The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or
pain; and when these sensations are remov’d, both from our thought and
feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire
or volition. (T 3.3.1.2, p. 574)
Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently ac-
quainted. (E 7.20, p. 69)
I suggest, therefore, that Hume’s views on volition and the will should be un-
derstood in essentially Lockean terms. It is true that he was tempted towards
a different view, presumably because of his copy principle and his blind-spot
regarding Lockean reflection. But the three Treatise passages committing him
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to an impression of volition or the will should be treated as aberrations, not as
representing the core of his position.15 It is no accident, I take it, that none of
these passages reappears in the Dissertation on the Passions, or anywhere else in
Hume’s mature writing.
Before proceeding, I cannot resist a general complaint. As we have seen,
existing discussions of Hume’s classification of the passions all focus on Book 2 of
the Treatise, ignoring the evidence of the later works. Not only that, but such is
the reverence for the early work that even its internal imperfections are glossed
over or simply ignored. Cohon, for example, has described what we find in the
Treatise as a “careful taxonomy”.16 I do not see how a close and unprejudiced
reading of the text can leave one with this impression. And a reading of the
later works alongside the Treatise reveals quite the opposite: Hume’s first work
presents what can only be described as a careless taxonomy, but one that he
subsequently tidied up (once Butler’s anti-hedonist arguments had had time to
sink in). Trying to understand Hume’s taxonomy as a static view that was already
fully in place in the Treatise is a task that is doomed to failure. In this, as in
many other things, Hume changed his mind.
15Cf. Millican (2009b): “[Hume’s] equation of the will with an internal impression, no doubt
motivated by his Copy Principle, seems to be a slip, as it leaves no obvious mark on his treatment
of the will elsewhere. A more charitable reading would be that Hume intends ‘the will’ to refer
to our faculty of knowingly - and ‘willingly’ - giving rise to actions (of the mind and body), a
faculty of which we become aware, and whose idea we thus acquire, through a corresponding
internal impression” (p. 6).
16Cohon (2008a, p. 160).
Chapter 4
Association, Comparison, Sympathy
In explaining the causes of the indirect passions, Hume appeals to three general
principles: the comparison of ideas, the communication of sentiments (or sym-
pathy), and a complex associative mechanism that he calls the double relation
of sentiments and ideas.1 His thinking concerning all three of these principles
changed after the Treatise. In the present chapter, however, my Difference The-
sis is temporarily on hold. My description of the double relation theory will be
deliberately vague, glossing over the differences between Hume’s earlier and later
versions of it. These differences are not relevant to the current line of argument,
and will be examined separately in chapter 9. The differences in Hume’s attitude
towards sympathy and comparison, meanwhile, are immediately relevant, but it
will be simplest to tell this story chronologically. In this chapter, therefore, I
will focus exclusively on what Hume had to say about these two principles in
the Treatise, the better to see what changed when, in the next chapter, I turn to
what he said about them in his later works.
I also have a secondary aim in this chapter, not directly related to my main
thesis. I will argue for it overtly in the final section, but the whole chapter is
intended to support it by illustration. The point is that sympathy, comparison,
and the double relation belong very much together in Hume’s mind, and that
all three of them are crucial to his account of the indirect passions. This is in
1More familiarly, Hume refers to the third of these things in the Treatise as the double
relation of impressions and ideas; but, as we saw in the previous chapter (§3.1), he increasingly
preferred the term “sentiment” over “impression” in his later work.
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opposition to a tendency among recent commentators to overemphasise the double
relation theory, at the expense of sympathy and comparison, and correspondingly
to shrink the category of indirect passions to just pride, humility, love, and hatred.
But Hume’s explicit list of indirect passions in the Treatise includes ambition,
vanity, pity, malice, envy, and generosity, as well as these more familiar four. In
this chapter I mean to account for every one of the passions on Hume’s list.
4.1. The double relation theory
The centrepiece of Hume’s psychology of the passions is his theory of the double
relation of sentiments and ideas. This is his account of the causes of the indirect
passions of pride, humility, love, and hatred. These are the four indirect pas-
sions that I singled out in the previous chapter as particularly closely associated
with the moral sentiments, and decided to call—for obvious reasons—the double-
relation passions. In Book 2 of the Treatise, the double relation theory, and the
four passions whose origins it accounts for, dominates both part 1 (Of pride and
humility) and part 2 (Of love and hatred). In the Dissertation on the Passions
it similarly dominates sections 2-4, which together make up about two thirds of
the whole.
There is plenty to be said about this theory, and in particular about how
Hume’s thoughts concerning it developed over time. What I have to say in this
regard, however, is not directly relevant to the story that I am telling in Part 1,
about Hume’s change from egoism to anti-egoism. I shall therefore postpone the
full discussion until chapter 9. In the meantime, it is necessary to be familiar
with a rough outline of this theory, in order to complete the picture of Hume’s
classification of the passions.
In outline, then, this theory comprises two principles of association, regarding
sentiments and ideas respectively, together with a third principle of the “mutual
assistance” of these other two: “The present theory of the passions depends en-
tirely on the double relations of sentiments and ideas, and the mutual assistance,
which these relations lend to each other” (P 4.1, p. 21). The association of ideas,
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first, is familiar from Book 1 of the Treatise (T 1.1.4, pp. 10-3) or the first Enquiry
(E 3, pp. 23-4). Hume sums it up as follows in the Dissertation on the Passions :
However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be, they are not
entirely without rule and method in their changes. They usually pass with
regularity, from one object, to what resembles it, is contiguous to it, or
produced by it. [Footnote: See Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,
Sect. III.] When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united
by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility, by
means of that introduction. (P 2.6, p. 7; cf. T 2.1.4.2, p. 283)
Thus this “principle” of the association of ideas is in fact three principles (resem-
blance, contiguity, and causation), all of which nevertheless have the same effect
of governing the progress of our thoughts.
In Book 2 of the Treatise, and again in the Dissertation on the Passions,
Hume goes on to endorse a less familiar parallel to this principle of the association
of ideas, namely an analogous association of sentiments:
The second property, which I shall observe in the human mind, is a like
association of impressions or emotions. All resembling impressions are
connected together; and no sooner one arises, than the rest naturally follow.
Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice,
and malice to grief again. In like manner, our temper, when elevated with
joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, courage, pride, and other
resembling affections. (P 2.7, p. 8; cf. T 2.1.4.3, p. 283)
Notice that there really is just one principle or relation governing this association,
namely resemblance.
Finally, Hume adds a third principle concerning the mutual assistance of
these other two: “In the third place, it is observable of these two kinds of associ-
ation, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition
is more easily made, where they both concur in the same object” (P 2.8, p. 8; cf.
T 2.1.4.4, pp. 283-4).
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Pride and humility, for Hume, are good and bad feelings, respectively, about
ourselves: “Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some ac-
complishment or possession, which we enjoy: Humility, on the other hand, is
a dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity” (P 2.1,
p. 7). Love and hatred are the corresponding good and bad feelings about other
people: “Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his ac-
complishments or services: Hatred, the contrary” (P 2.2, p. 7).
Hume’s three principles operate together to produce the first of these double-
relation passions in the following way. When presented with something pleasant
that is mine—my beautiful house, for example—I experience both an idea of the
house, and a pleasing impression of its beauty. The impression, by the association
of sentiments, has an inherent tendency to prompt a feeling of pride, since pride is
also a pleasant feeling. The idea, meanwhile, has the very same tendency, thanks
to the association of ideas and the fact that pride is a feeling of self -satisfaction
(and it is my house). Each of these principles on its own, finally, might give
rise to any number of consequent perceptions in the mind: pride is not the only
pleasant feeling, and I am not the only thing associated with my house. Given
the mutual assistance of the two associative principles, however, pride becomes
the most likely result.
It is obvious, I trust, how an exactly parallel story can be told with regard
to the other double-relation passions, humility, love, and hatred. If my house is
ugly, humility will be the result. If someone else’s house is in question, love and
hatred will follow, depending on whether it is a pleasant or an unpleasant place to
live. As I have already advertised, there is more to be said here about the detail,
and in this summary I have skipped over several important and controversial
points (see chapter 9 for the full discussion). For immediate purposes, however,
all that is needed is to know that Hume had this theory, and to have at least an
approximate idea of its shape.
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4.2. Comparison
Next to this theory of the double relation, Hume’s other major psychological
principles in the Treatise are the communication of sentiments (or sympathy)
and the comparison of ideas. The last of these is by far the simplest of the three,
the straightforward idea being just this: we may compare our own situation with
that of another, and conclude that the other person is either better or worse off
than ourselves. If the comparison goes in our favour, this produces the passion of
malice, “a joy in the sufferings and miseries of others” (T 2.2.8.1, p. 372). If the
comparison goes in the other person’s favour, it produces envy, this passion being
“excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes
our idea of our own” (T 2.2.8.12, p. 377).
Malice and envy in these senses are kinds of pleasure and pain arising from
a comparison of actual, present circumstances. There is another closely related
sense of malice to be found in the Treatise, however, and that is the desire for
this particular pleasure: “malice is the unprovok’d desire of producing evil to
another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison” (T 2.2.8.12, p. 377).
This understanding of malice as a desire, rather than a kind of pleasure, surely
fits better with current usage. Nor were things different in the eighteenth century:
Johnson’s dictionary defines malice as “[i]ll intention to any one; desire of hurting”
(1755); and Hutcheson similarly defines it as “the Desire of [another’s] Misery”
(1728, p. 53). But Hume seems to be indifferent between using the word to
refer to the pleasure of a comparison in our favour, and to the desire for this
pleasure. In fact, it is doubtful whether he had quite mastered the distinction
between these two things, since he writes throughout as though there were only
one passion called “malice”, never once acknowledging the ambiguity.
This ambiguity was first brought to my attention by Samuel Rickless.2 How-
ever, it seems to me that Rickless makes the matter more complicated than it
needs to be, by insisting that there must be just one passion called “malice”, and
2Rickless (2013).
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therefore that one of Hume’s senses must be dismissed as a mistake. On the basis
of this assumption, he argues—rightly, to my mind—that the joy should be given
priority over the desire, since this is the direct result of the comparison, while
the desire is simply an application of self-love to this particular pleasure.3 But I
don’t see why we shouldn’t just say that “malice” is ambiguous in the Treatise,
referring to two distinct (but closely related) passions.
It is important to stress how specific the malicious desire is in the Treatise,
since this specificity is unusual (and not to be found in Hutcheson, for example).
Rather than a general desire for the suffering of another, it is very precisely a
desire for the particular pleasure of comparison. The malicious person, for Hume,
does not seek another’s misery for its own sake, but rather for the sake of feeling
better about themselves by contrast: to repeat, “malice is the unprovok’d desire
of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison”
(T 2.2.8.12, p. 377; my emphasis). Hume’s conception of the malicious desire
is thus consistent with the hedonism of the Treatise. Malice is not an object-
directed desire for the unhappiness of another for its own sake; their unhappiness
gives us a pleasure from comparison, and we desire the former only as a means
to the latter.
Hume examines the principle of comparison in depth during his discussion
of envy and malice (T 2.2.8, pp. 372-80). Earlier in the Treatise, however, he had
referred ahead to this account, while deriving ambition from the same origin:
Comparison is in every case a sure method of augmenting our esteem of
any thing. A rich man feels the felicity of his condition better by opposing
it to that of a beggar. But there is a peculiar advantage in power, by
the contrast, which is, in a manner, presented to us, betwixt ourselves
and the person we command. The comparison is obvious and natural:
The imagination finds it in the very subject: The passage of the thought
to its conception is smooth and easy. And that this circumstance has a
considerable effect in augmenting its influence, will appear afterwards in
examining the nature of malice and envy. (T 2.1.10.12, pp. 315-6)
3Rickless (2013, pp. 340-1).
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Though the word “ambition” does not appear in this passage, this is the name that
Hume gives to the desire for power.4 And in referring back to this passage later
on (in the discussion of pity and malice), the word is explicit: “I have observ’d
in considering the nature of ambition, that the great feel a double pleasure in
authority from the comparison of their own condition with that of their slaves”
(T 2.2.8.14, p. 378).
Finally, comparison also plays a role in Hume’s account of the causes of
respect and contempt, in the following way. The good qualities of another give
rise to love, and their bad qualities give rise to hatred, according to the double
relation of sentiments and ideas already examined. But good qualities may also
give rise to humility, and bad qualities to pride, by virtue of a comparison with
ourselves. The love and humility then mix together to form respect, as the hatred
and pride mix together to form contempt (T 2.2.10, pp. 389-93).
4.3. Sympathy
Towards the end of part 1 of Book 2 of the Treatise, Hume introduces and en-
deavours to explain “that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and
to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different
from, or even contrary to our own” (T 2.1.11.2, p. 316). On Hume’s story, there
are two stages to this communicative process. First, someone else’s passion gives
rise to an idea of that passion in our minds (typically because we are in contact
with them, and observe the outward signs of their emotional state); and second,
that idea is then converted into the passion itself:
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its
effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation,
which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an im-
pression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the
4E.g. “Strength is a kind of power; and therefore the desire to excel in strength is to be
consider’d as an inferior species of ambition” (T 2.1.8.4, p. 300); “If I be void of ambition,
power gives me no enjoyment” (M App2.12, p. 301).
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very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection.
(T 2.1.11.3, p. 317)
Of these two stages, it is the second that is the most important, and Hume
treats the conversion of an idea into a sentiment as an instance of sympathy
even when there is no real passion in the mind of the other person to get the
communicative process underway.5 For example, Hume counts our emotional
responses at the theatre as instances of sympathy, when the ideas to be converted
are obviously of fictitious emotions (T 2.2.7.3, p. 369-70). And he says that we
sympathise with real people in fortunate or unfortunate situations, even when
they themselves have no (strong) feelings about the matter:
[W]hen a person obtains any honourable office, or inherits a great fortune,
we are always the more rejoic’d for his prosperity, the less sense he seems
to have of it, and the greater equanimity and indifference he shews in its
enjoyment. In like manner a man, who is not dejected by misfortunes, is
the more lamented on account of his patience; and if that virtue extends
so far as utterly to remove all sense of uneasiness, it still farther encreases
our compassion. (T 2.2.7.5, p. 370)
Finally, Hume also allows for a sympathy with the anticipated future feelings of
others: “Sympathy being nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression,
’tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of
any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our
own concern; and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither
belong to ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence” (T 2.2.9.13,
pp. 385-6).
The conversion itself, meanwhile, is supposed to take place in something like
the following manner. Ideas and impressions differ only in their relative force
and vivacity (T 2.1.11.7, p. 319), so all that is needed to convert an idea of a
passion into the passion itself is an increase in this force. The idea of someone
5For a closer examination of the first stage, see Pitson (1996).
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else’s passion receives its additional vivacity from an association with the ever-
present impression of self, in proportion to the strength of the association (which
is why we sympathise more with people who are more closely related to us): “The
stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the
imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of
conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person” (T 2.1.11.5,
p. 318).
In addition to his evident pride in his associative explanation of sympathy,
the Hume of the Treatise was also extremely excited by the explanatory poten-
tial of sympathy itself. When he first introduces the principle, he writes that
“[n]o quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its conse-
quences” (T 2.1.11.2, p. 316). And by way of immediate advertisement, he offers
one such consequence, namely the uniformity of character among people of the
same nation:
To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in
the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation; and ’tis much
more probable, that this resemblance arises from sympathy, than from any
influence of the soil and climate, which, tho’ they continue invariably the
same, are not able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a
century together. (T 2.1.11.2, pp. 317-6)
But the headline application, given in the section in which the principle is first
introduced and explained, is to the passion of vanity, the desire for fame or
respect.
This desire does not arise from any “original instinct” (T 2.1.11.11, p. 321),
Hume argues, but is instead derived from our desire for the pleasant feeling of
pride. The respect of other people is a source of pride—or at least helps to
reinforce our existing pride—for two reasons. First, it literally becomes pride
when communicated to us through sympathy; and second, it confirms our own
good opinion of ourselves through an argument from authority:
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[N]othing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others...
both from sympathy, which renders all their sentiments intimately present
to us; and from reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a
kind of argument for what they affirm. These two principles of authority
and sympathy influence almost all our opinions; but must have a peculiar
influence, when we judge of our own worth and character... [B]eing con-
scious of great partiality in our own favour, we are peculiarly pleas’d with
any thing, that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves, and are
easily shock’d with whatever opposes it. (T 2.1.11.10, p. 321)
The principle of authority is only mentioned briefly, however, and in this one
paragraph; in the rest of the section it is Hume’s favourite principle of sympathy
that receives all of the attention.
Though Hume’s emphasis on sympathy in this context was new, he appears
to have borrowed the core of his explanation of vanity from Mandeville:
Nature has given [Creatures] an Instinct, by which every Individual val-
ues itself above its real Worth; this in us, I mean, in Man, seems to be
accompany’d with a Diffidence, arising from a Consciousness, or at least
an Apprehension, that we do over-value ourselves: It is this that makes
us so fond of the Approbation, Liking and Assent of others; because they
strengthen and confirm us in the good Opinion we have of ourselves. (1729,
p. 134).
At any rate this shows that Mandeville said it first. The striking similarity in
the wording additionally suggests that this is where Hume got it from. As with
Hume’s derivations of the malicious and compassionate desires from comparison
and sympathy respectively, this reduction of vanity is consistent with his early
hedonism (which is unsurprising, given the similarities between Hume and Man-
deville on this point). We do not pursue fame for its own sake, but merely as a
source or confirmation of pride. And pride is pursued, of course, simply because
it is pleasant.
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4.4. More applications of sympathy
Having introduced the principle of sympathy at T 2.1.11, and used it to account
for vanity, Hume then goes on to apply it liberally throughout the rest of the
Treatise. Indeed, so enthusiastic was he in his application of this principle that one
commentator has claimed there are simply “too many [uses] to bother counting”.6
Undeterred, I have counted eight, including the two already examined in the
previous section. These are, in the order in which they appear:
1. The uniformity of character among people of the same nation (T 2.1.11.2,
pp. 316-7).
2. Vanity, or the love of praise and fame (T 2.1.11, pp. 316-24).
3. The love of family relations (T 2.2.4, pp. 351-7).
4. Respect for the rich and contempt for the poor (T 2.2.5.1-14, pp. 357-63).
5. The beauty of utility (T 2.2.5.16-20, pp. 363-5).
6. Pity or compassion (T 2.2.7.2-6, pp. 369-71).
7. Our emotional responses at the theatre (T 2.2.7.3, pp. 369-70).
8. Moral approbation and disapprobation (T 3.2.2.24, 3.3.1.10-11, pp. 499-500,
577-9).
Perhaps the most obvious and straightforward case is number 6 in this list:
pity or compassion.7 For this isn’t really an application of the principle of sym-
pathy, so much as an instance of the general phenomenon. When the sentiment
being communicated through sympathy is sorrow, the resulting sadness at the
other end is called pity :
6Debes (2007a, p. 313).
7Hume uses these terms interchangeably in the Treatise, and though “compassion” is the
word used in the section titles (T 2.2.7, p. 368; T 2.2.9, p. 381), “pity” is more common in
the main text. By contrast, “compassion” is more common in the moral Enquiry and the
Dissertation, with “pity” not actually being used in the Dissertation at all. I doubt, however,
that there is anything significant to be read into this.
84 CHAPTER 4. ASSOCIATION, COMPARISON, SYMPATHY
’Twill be easy to explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning
concerning sympathy. We have a lively idea of every thing related to us.
All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons,
therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must
strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the
original one; since a lively idea is easily converted into an impression. If
this be true in general, it must be more so of aﬄiction and sorrow. These
have always a stronger and more lasting influence than any pleasure or
enjoyment. (T 2.2.7.2, p. 369)
Immediately following this paragraph, Hume also cites sympathy as responsible
for our sharing in the feelings—both positive and negative—of the characters
in a tragic drama (T 2.2.7.3, p. 369-70). For clarity, I have counted this as
a distinct application in my list (number 7); but there is nothing particularly
special about this special case, beyond the fictional nature of the feelings that are
communicated.
As we saw in §4.2 above, a favourable comparison of ourselves with someone
else gives rise to malice, a joy in another’s misery ; while an unfavourable com-
parison gives rise to envy, a uneasiness in another’s happiness. The sympathetic
communication of a negative passion, as we have just seen, gives rise to pity, an
uneasiness in the sufferings of another. These three passions set up an obvious
pattern, which would be completed by a joy in the happiness of another, arising
from the communication of a positive passion.
There is no reason why positive passions should not be communicated in
just the same way as negative ones. For the most part, Hume does focus on the
negative cases, even saying—as we saw above—that the effect is more pronounced
in the case of “aﬄiction and sorrow”, because “[t]hese have always a stronger and
more lasting influence than any pleasure or enjoyment” (T 2.2.7.2, p. 369). But he
does give at least one example of the happy counterpart to pity, which I already
quoted in the previous section to illustrate a different point: “when a person
obtains any honourable office, or inherits a great fortune, we... [rejoice] for his
prosperity” (T 2.2.7.5, p. 370). He also maintains that we sympathise with “the
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fictitious joy as well as every other passion” at the theatre (T 2.2.7.3, p. 369),
and the communication of a positive feeling is important in accounting for our
respect for the rich, as we will see shortly.
Though there is thus no doubt that Hume believed in the positive counterpart
to pity, it is not obvious what name should be given to this passion, since Hume
never labels it explicitly. At the start of Book 2, however, Hume’s list of indirect
passions includes “envy, pity, malice, [and] generosity” side by side (T 2.1.1.4,
p. 277). Though this is scant evidence to go on, my tentative conjecture is that
“generosity” is therefore the word that we are looking for. Generosity, while
hardly featuring at all in Book 2 or the Four Dissertations (at least not by
name), is nevertheless frequently mentioned in Book 3 and the moral Enquiry. I
do not know whether my conjecture would have any bearing on the interpretation
of Hume’s moral philosophy, or whether any such interpretation would give us
grounds for abandoning the conjecture (or simply acknowledging an ambiguity in
the term). Nor do I have the space here to do anything more than observe this
interesting point.
We also saw in §4.2 that Hume’s use of “malice” is ambiguous between the
pleasure of comparison, and the desire for this pleasure. “Pity” is ambiguous in
exactly the same way, referring sometimes to a communicated sorrow (as above),
and sometimes to a corresponding desire to alleviate the cause of this pain: “pity
is a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery; as malice is the
contrary appetite” (T 2.2.9.3, p. 382). It may be noted that this compassionate
desire, with its origin from the sympathetic communication of passions, is likewise
consistent with Hume’s early hedonism and egoism. Self-love is a desire for our
own pleasure and the avoidance of our own pain; since other people’s pleasure and
pain can be a cause of our own (through sympathy), we thus have a self-interested
motive to help others.
As in the case of malice, it is thanks to Rickless that I became aware of this
ambiguity. Rickless’s treatment of pity is exactly analogous to his treatment of
malice: he insists that there must be just one passion of that name, and hence
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that one of Hume’s uses must be a mistake; and he gives preference to the sorrow
over the desire, since it is the sorrow that is the direct consequence of sympathy.8
Again, I agree that priority should be given to the sorrow, and for the same
reason, but I do not see why we should not simply allow that there are two
(closely related) passions of the same name.
The third application of sympathy in the Treatise is to the love of family
relations, and is an addendum to the theory of the double relation. According
to that theory, recall, our love of others is prompted by some pleasing quality
that they possess. But we love our relations, says Hume, independently of their
character, and even when they do not have any particularly endearing features
(T 2.2.4.2, pp. 351-2). There are two parts to Hume’s explanation for this. The
first part is an idea borrowed from Du Bos, namely that any strong emotional
stimulation, even of a negative sort, is often preferable to boredom.9 By itself,
this explains “that continual search after amusement in gaming, in hunting, in
business; by which we endeavour to forget ourselves, and excite our spirits from
the languid state, into which they fall, when not sustain’d by some brisk and
lively emotion” (T 2.2.4.4, p. 352). The second part is sympathy, thanks to
which the company of other people produces—through the communication of
their sentiments—an agreeable enlivening of the spirits. We sympathise most,
of course, with those closely related to us, making their company particularly
stimulating. Thus we have the requisite sentimental input for the double relation
to work on, and produce our love for these people.
Hume’s fourth use of sympathy in the Treatise is another addendum to the
theory of the double relation. Ordinarily, the causes that excite our love of other
people are things related to the person in question that are also immediately
agreeable to us; thus we have some input for the association of sentiments as
8Rickless (2013, pp. 340-1).
9Du Bos (1719, p. 5). No doubt Du Bos was not alone in making the observation; Norton and
Norton, in their critical edition of the Treatise, cite Pascal as a likely source, before mentioning
Du Bos as well (2007, volume 2, p. 846). But the link with Du Bos is the more important here,
given Hume’s appeal to this idea again in Of Tragedy, when he mentions Du Bos explicitly
(Tr 3, p. 217). This may be considered a small taste of things to come in Part 2, when I turn
more explicitly to the unity of the Four Dissertations. See chapter 11.
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well as of ideas. But Hume also wants to account for the love or esteem that we
have for people on account of their wealth and power, even when we expect no
particular favour from them. Without this expectation, their wealth and power
can be no direct source of pleasure to us; but it can please us by a sympathetic
communication of the immediate pleasure that it brings them. Thus we have the
sentiment as well as the idea, and the double relation can thereafter proceed as
before (T 2.2.5.1-14, pp. 357-62).
As it is with respect for the rich and powerful, so it is with contempt for the
poor and weak: from them we receive a sympathetic communication of negative
emotions, which feeds into the double relation mechanism on the negative side,
resulting in hatred or contempt. Hume doesn’t spell this out explicitly in the
Treatise, but it is obvious, I trust, how the exactly parallel story would run.
At the start and end of his discussion Hume mentions the negative case as well
(T 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.14, pp. 357, 362), and later on he makes it even clearer that his
account was intended to apply to both:
I have endeavour’d to prove, that power and riches, or poverty and mean-
ness; which give rise to love or hatred, without producing any original
pleasure or uneasiness; operate upon us by means of a secondary sensation
deriv’d from a sympathy with that pain or satisfaction, which they pro-
duce in the person, who possesses them. From a sympathy with his pleasure
there arises love; from that with his uneasiness, hatred. (T 2.2.9.11, p. 384)
This comment appears after Hume has argued that pity and malice give rise to
love and hatred respectively, because of their similar “impulses or directions”
(T 2.2.9.2, p. 381): pity and love both give rise to a desire for the happiness of
the person in question, as malice and hatred both give rise to a desire for their
misery.
There is a tension here, and Hume himself draws explicit attention to it:
sometimes pity gives rise to love, because of the similar tendencies of these pas-
sions (both prompt a benevolent desire), but sometimes it gives rise to hatred or
contempt, because of the resemblance of sentiment (both are negative emotions).
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Hume argues that the difference is accounted for by variations in the force of the
sympathetically communicated passion. If it is strong, then it extends beyond
the immediate suffering, to take in the prospects of the person’s future happiness
or misery as well, and the similar tendency with love or benevolence wins. If it
is weak, then it remains only with the present sorrow, and hatred or contempt is
the result (T 2.2.9.12-9, pp. 385-9).
The remaining applications of sympathy in the Treatise are to the beauty
of utility and moral approbation. These (closely related) applications will be
examined in the next chapter (§§5.4 and 5.5).
4.5. The indirect passions
In the Dissertation on the Passions, Hume says that the indirect passions (though
he does not call them by that name) are “of a more complicated nature” than the
direct (P 2.1, p. 7). In the Treatise, he says that they “proceed from the same
principles [as the direct], but by the conjunction of other qualities” (T 2.1.1.4,
p. 276). We are now in a position to see clearly what Hume means by this:
the other qualities in question are precisely the three principles examined above,
namely, comparison, sympathy, and the double relation. The distinction between
the direct and the indirect passions is based on their causal origins, and the
defining feature of the indirect passions is that they have a more complicated
aetiology than the direct.
At the start of Treatise Book 2, Hume enumerates the indirect passions
thus: “under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity,
love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants” (T 2.1.1.4,
pp. 276-7). The dependants that Hume has in mind, as becomes clear later on,
are respect and contempt (T 2.2.10, pp. 389-393) and “the amorous passion”
(T 2.2.11, pp. 394-6). This last is a mixture of love, complacency in beauty, and
the bodily appetite for generation (see also P 3.14, p. 20). The mixture of these
things is accounted for by the association of sentiments; they are all pleasant
feelings. Respect and contempt, as we have seen, are accounted for in general by
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means of comparison and the double relation (recall §4.2), and in the particular
case of respect for the rich and contempt for the poor, sympathy also plays a role
(§4.4). We have also seen above how all of the other passions in Hume’s list are
accounted for by one or other of these three principles.
This reconstruction of the category of indirect passions ought, therefore, to
be pretty well established. Not only does it make sense of Hume’s definition, it
also agrees—to the letter—with his explicit list in the Treatise. Amongst com-
mentators, however, there have been two kinds of opposition to it; one principled,
and the other careless.
As I noted in §4.1 above, the double-relation passions (pride, humility, love,
and hatred) receive more of Hume’s attention—both in Treatise Book 2 and in
the Dissertation—than all of the other passions put together. It is presumably
because of this emphasis that a careless tendency has arisen to shrink the category
of the indirect passions to the double-relation passions alone, ignoring ambition,
vanity, pity, generosity, envy, and malice. For example, Cohon has written:
Hume’s account [of the passions] in both the Treatise and the Dissertation
concentrates on four passions he groups together under the label “indirect”:
pride, humility, love, and hatred. (He mentions other indirect passions, but
apparently they are all combinations or simulacra of these four.)10
This mistake presumably explains Cohon’s false generalisation that I complained
about in the previous chapter (§3.4), when she says that the indirect passions as
a whole do not motivate us immediately, when in fact there are several indirect
passions that do: ambition and vanity, and also pity and malice (at least in
the desire senses). But it is a mistake. Respect and contempt, admittedly,
are combinations of the double-relation passions, as Cohon says. But ambition,
vanity, generosity, pity, malice, and envy are neither combinations nor simulacra,
and it is difficult to see how anyone could suppose for a moment that they were.
Though alike in being indirect (i.e. in having a more complicated aetiology than
the direct passions), they are no more closely related than that.
10Cohon (2008a, p. 160).
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This carelessness has, I fear, become quite common.11 I should confess that
I myself was initially misled by Hume’s emphasis on the theory of the double
relation into ignoring the indirect passions that do not arise in this way. To
my embarrassment, furthermore, I went into print thus blinkered, talking about
the indirect passions in an article when I really just meant the double-relation
passions.12 In my defence, nothing in my argument there hung on the point:
simply replace every occurrence of “indirect passions” with “double-relation pas-
sions”, and all will be well.13 The same, unfortunately, cannot be said for Cohon’s
article, which is precisely about the indirect passions, and the nature of Hume’s
direct/indirect distinction. It is therefore in need of some rather more substantial
rewriting.
While Cohon and I simply made a careless mistake, paying insufficient at-
tention to the passions that Hume himself pays less attention to, a recent article
by Rickless has presented a clear and well-reasoned case that might be appealed
to in our defence. Rickless argues that pity and malice (and hence presumably
also generosity and envy) should in fact be classified as direct passions rather
than indirect, and hence that their inclusion in Hume’s explicit list of indirect
passions should be treated as a mistake.14 If this were right, I would not need to
be so hard on Cohon and my earlier self after all. But it seems to me that it is
not right.
Rickless has two reasons for reclassifying pity and malice as direct. First,
these two passions are special cases of sorrow and joy respectively: a sorrow and
a joy in the sufferings of others. But joy and sorrow are both direct passions, and
so pity and malice ought to be direct as well.15 This consideration does not seem
11The error goes at least as far back as Kemp Smith (1941/2005, pp. 179-191). More recently,
see e.g. Inoue (2003, p. 208), Taylor (2008, pp. 276-7).
12Merivale (2009).
13In fact, this is what I have done in §§9.4 and 9.5 below; though I have made some other
changes there as well.
14Rickless (2013).
15As noted in §§4.2 and 4.4, “malice” and “pity” are both ambiguous in the Treatise, referring
to a joy and sorrow in the sufferings of others respectively, and also to corresponding desires.
As he points out himself, however, Rickless’s argument applies to both readings, for desire in
general is also a direct passion.
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to me to be persuasive. The direct/indirect distinction is not based on intrinsic
features of the passions, but on their causal origins. There is thus no contradiction
in the idea that joy is a direct passion in general, but an indirect passion in the
special case of joy in another person’s misery; in this case, uniquely, it has a more
complicated aetiology involving comparison. Similarly for the general passion of
sorrow with its direct origin, and the particular passion of pity, which arises in a
more complicated manner through sympathy. It is perhaps a little unfortunate
that Hume was not clear on this point; it seems an obvious potential source of
confusion that he might have spared a few words to clear up. But since he clearly
says that joy and sorrow are direct, and that pity and malice are indirect, we
are left to make the best sense of these claims that we can. And on reflection, it
seems that we can render them consistent.
Rickless’s second consideration is that “[i]f there is anything that counts
as a fixed point in [Hume’s] theory, it is that indirect passions, unlike direct
passions, are either produced or constituted by a double association of ideas and
impressions”.16 In other words, the indirect passions just are the double-relation
passions; precisely Cohon’s and my earlier careless thought. If this were right,
then it obviously would restrict the class of indirect passions to just the double-
relation ones, leaving pity and malice and all of the rest outside the group.
Rickless, unlike Cohon and me, did produce some direct textual evidence for
his “fixed point”:
That propensity, which unites us to the object, or separates us from it, still
continues to operate, but in conjunction with the indirect passions, which
arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas. (T 2.3.9.3, p. 439)
The natural interpretation of this sentence, Rickless maintains, entails that all of
the indirect passions arise from the double relation.17 I concede that this does
indeed seem a plausible reading. On my broader interpretation of the category of
indirect passions, Hume should perhaps rather have said “those indirect passions,
16Rickless (2013, pp. 339-40).
17Rickless (2013, p. 340, n13).
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which arise from a double relation”, indicating that there are some that do not
arise in this way.
In reply, I can only say that the weight of evidence on the other side seems
strongly to overbalance this one passage. There is of course Hume’s explicit
inclusion of pity and malice (and envy and generosity) in his list of indirect
passions, which Rickless acknowledges, but argues should be treated as a mistake.
There is also the inclusion of ambition and vanity in the list, which Rickless
doesn’t mention, but which he must also suppose is an error. But perhaps most
striking of all are the cases of respect and contempt, the explanations of which,
as we have seen, feature all three of Hume’s principles: sympathy, comparison,
and the double relation. By drawing a line between sympathy and comparison
on the one hand, and the double relation on the other, Rickless would seem to
render respect and contempt unclassifiable on Hume’s system. Not to mention
that sympathy also plays a role in supporting the double relation theory in the
case of the love of family relations.
Existing discussions of Hume on the indirect passions have given vastly more
attention to the theory of the double relation than to sympathy and comparison,
and correspondingly more attention to pride, humility, love, and hatred than
to the other indirect passions. This is understandable: Hume’s own discussions
exhibit precisely the same bias. But we must not let this emphasis distort our
understanding of the bigger picture. As I hope to have made clear, the category
of the indirect passions is larger than just that of the the double-relation passions.
Rickless’s fixed point needs to be dislodged.
Chapter 5
Original Instincts
The previous chapter introduced Hume’s three main psychological principles con-
cerning the causal origins of the (indirect) passions: sympathy, comparison, and
the theory of the double relation. When these things fail him, however, Hume’s
other theoretical device is to appeal to an original instinct, a brute, inexplicable
feature of human nature. These original instincts are, in particular, the founda-
tion of our object-directed desires. With the rise in importance of these desires
after the Treatise, therefore, (as argued for in chapters 2 and 3) we should expect
a corresponding rise in original instincts at the expense of the other three prin-
ciples. In this chapter we will see that this is exactly what happens: the double
relation remains unchallenged, but comparison takes a hit, and sympathy suffers
most of all. Many of the things that sympathy earlier explained are, it turns out,
accounted for just as well or even better by original instincts.
5.1. Object-directed desires and original instincts
For the later Hume, as for Butler, the vast majority of our desires are for ob-
jects directly, independently of their contribution to our happiness. The only
exceptions are the various applications of self-love to particular pleasing objects.
Even self-love itself is a direct desire for happiness or pleasure, rather than for
the happiness or pleasure that these things bring. Nevertheless, it will be useful
to have in hand Hume’s explicit examples of object-directed desires.
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In the Butler paragraph from the Treatise, Hume mentions the desires of
happiness to our friends and of punishment to our enemies (T 2.3.9.8, p. 439),
named as “friendship” and “revenge” in the corresponding passage in the Dis-
sertation (P 1.2, p. 3). In the same vein, he often speaks of “benevolence” and
“anger” (e.g. T 2.2.6.3, p. 367; T 2.2.9.3, p. 382), or “gratitude” and “resent-
ment” (e.g. T 2.3.3.8, p. 417). Sometimes the implication is that “gratitude” is a
response to services rendered (T 2.2.3.3, p. 348), and “revenge” or “resentment”
a response to injuries done to us (T 2.3.3.9, p. 418; T 2.2.7.1, p. 369); but in any
case, the core ideas—desiring another person’s happiness or misery, for whatever
reason—are the same for all of these passions.
In the introduction to the Natural History, Hume lists, alongside gratitude
and resentment, “self-love, affection between the sexes, [and] love of progeny”
(N Intro.1, p. 33). Love of progeny is named again (as the “affection of parents
to children”) in the Dissertation on the Passions, in an important footnote that I
will return to in §5.3 below (P 3.3, n4, p. 18). In the moral Enquiry (M App2.12,
p. 301), the explicit examples are “anger” (again), alongside “vanity” (the desire
for praise or fame) and “ambition” (the desire for power). Most of these exam-
ples would have had a particular resonance in the context of the egoism debate:
benevolence and parental love for being such striking potential counterexamples
to the egoist thesis,1 and ambition and vanity for their roles in Hobbes’s and Man-
deville’s respective accounts of (superficially) altruistic motivation (recall §§1.2
and 1.4).
As to the origins of these object-directed desires, Hume has very little to say,
because he believes that there is very little that can be said. They all arise from
what he calls an “original instinct” or “primary impression” of our human nature;
as when, in the introduction to the Natural History of Religion, he contrasts them
with the belief in invisible, intelligent power:
It would appear, therefore, that this preconception springs not from an
original instinct or primary impression of nature, such as gives rise to self-
1See Hutcheson (1725, pp. 112-4), Butler (1726, p. 76).
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love, affection between the sexes, love of progeny, gratitude, resentment...
The first religious principles must [rather] be secondary[.] (N Intro.1, p. 33)
This effectively just means that they are brute, inexplicable facts of our frame
and constitution. Hume says as much explicitly, we may recall, in the Butler
paragraph from the Treatise: “Besides good and evil, or in other words, pain and
pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct,
which is perfectly unaccountable” (T 2.3.9.8, p. 439). Object-directed desires, or
at least the original instincts on which they are founded, had for Hume the same
status in psychology as elasticity and gravity had in physics (see E 4.12, pp. 30-
1). He was certainly not inclined—as Butler and Hutcheson had been before
him (recall §1.3)—to explain them in terms of final causes, as being planted in
our nature by a kind and intelligent creator, with a view to the happiness of his
creation. Our motivational make-up is for Hume simply an observable fact, that
neither has nor requires any further explanation.
The fundamental point to appreciate here, a point at the heart of everything
that I have to say in this chapter, is that original instincts or object-directed
desires are in implicit tension with the principles of sympathy and comparison.
To illustrate this, consider hedonistic egoism, the view that our only original
motivational instinct is for our own pleasure (and the avoidance of pain), and
that all other desires are at bottom reducible to this one. The obvious potential
counterexamples to this thesis are benevolent desires for other people’s happiness,
and (slightly less obviously) malicious desires for other people’s suffering. For if
it is only our own pain and pleasure that ultimately moves us, how is it that we
can be guided—either way—by other people’s?
Sympathy and comparison, as we saw in the previous chapter, provide the
egoist with potential answers to this question, in keeping with their selfish hy-
pothesis. Sympathy gives us a joy in the happiness of others, and a sorrow in
their misery, while comparison gives us a pleasure in their pain, and a pain in
their pleasure. In these two ways, then, the felicity of others has an impact—
either positive or negative—on our own well-being, and so our selfish desire for
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the latter can explain our (derivative) desires for and against the former. But
for anti-egoists, like Butler and the later Hume, who acknowledge multiple origi-
nal desires, there is an obvious and more straightforward alternative explanation
to hand: we have benevolent and malicious desires originally implanted in our
nature. And it is through the satisfaction or thwarting of these desires that our
pleasure or pain in the happiness and misery of others arises, rather than through
sympathy or comparison.
The situation here is not black and white. The egoists certainly have no
business appealing to any original instincts beyond self-love: it is precisely their
view that self-love is the only one, from which all other desires are derived. But
the anti-egoists are free to admit sympathy and comparison into their psycho-
logical theories, alongside the several original instincts that they posit. Suppose,
therefore, that an egoist—let us call him David—was formerly very keen on these
two principles, but was subsequently persuaded of Butler’s view. We might ex-
pect David to be reluctant, in later life, to abandon these principles altogether,
but to place considerably less weight on them, and correspondingly more weight
on object-directed desires.
Lo and behold, this is exactly what Hume did. We will see the details below,
but as a quick preliminary point, here are some crude but very telling statistics:
The word “sympathy” appears 77 times in Book 2 of the Treatise, and 77 times
in Book 3. By contrast, it appears only 9 times in the Four Dissertations (3
times in the Dissertation on the Passions, 4 times in Of Tragedy, and once in
each of the other two), and 26 times in the moral Enquiry. Even taking into
account the fact that the later works are (slightly) shorter overall, that is still
a staggering reduction of over 70 per cent. “Benevolence”, meanwhile, the most
important object-directed desire in the context of the egoism debate, appears just
17 times in Treatise Book 3, but 36 times in the moral Enquiry. And in addition
to this crude word count, let us not forget that benevolence and anti-egoism are
the very first things that Hume discusses in this later work, following the initial
introductory section.
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The very evident cooling of Hume’s enthusiasm for the principle of sympathy
after the Treatise is, I take it, one of the major puzzles regarding his intellectual
development. I would not be so bold as to claim to have a definite and complete
explanation of this curious fact. There might have been several reasons, and
unfortunately Hume left us very little direct textual evidence to work with. But
his conversion to Butler’s object-directed motivational psychology is certainly a
possible explanation, and such indirect textual evidence as we have seems to me
to make it a very plausible one, as I will argue below.
5.2. Later traces of sympathy and comparison
The first thing to note is that, notwithstanding the striking drop in enthusiasm,
Hume does not abandon his principle of the sympathetic communication of pas-
sions altogether. Its first application in the Treatise, we may recall, was to the
uniformity of character among people of the same country. Hume returned to this
topic in a 1748 essay, Of National Characters, in which he argues that character
is determined solely by moral causes, i.e. “circumstances, which are fitted to work
on the mind as motives or reasons”, and not at all by physical causes, i.e. “those
qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to work insensibly on the
temper” (NC 2, p. 198).
Those who believe in the influence of physical causes have an obvious expla-
nation for the uniformity of character among compatriots: they are in the same
physical environment. Given Hume’s position, this explanation was obviously not
available to him, but sympathy continued to furnish him, after the Treatise, with
a moral alternative:
The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any
set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of
manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues.
The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures;
and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter
deeply into each other’s sentiments, and causes like passions and inclina-
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tions to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of
companions. Where a number of men are united into one political body,
the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, com-
merce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language,
they must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or
national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual...
If we run over the globe, or revolve the annals of history, we shall
discover every where signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners, none of
the influence of air or climate. (NC 9-10, pp. 202-3)
Here we have the very same idea of sympathy as a communication (or “conta-
gion”) of passions, and a repeat of its first application in the Treatise. What
we are lacking is the detailed associative account of how this communication is
supposed to come about.
In the Dissertation on the Passions, however, we find some more of Hume’s
earlier applications of this principle being repeated. And although the detailed
associative account is never given explicit attention in its own right, Hume says
just enough to indicate that he still held to it. Here is his very brief repetition of
the earlier explanation of pity or compassion:
Compassion... is an uneasiness in the sufferings of another. It seems to
spring from the intimate and strong conception of his sufferings; and our
imagination proceeds by degrees, from the lively idea to the real feeling of
another’s misery. (P 3.7, p. 19)
This shows that he still thought of the communicative process as involving the
conversion of an idea into an impression or sentiment. And here is his succinct
restatement of the Treatise account of the love of family relations:
A person, who is related to us, or connected with us, by blood, by similitude
of fortune, of adventures, profession, or country, soon becomes an agreeable
companion to us; because we enter easily and familiarly into his sentiments
and conceptions: Nothing is strange or new to us: Our imagination, passing
from self, which is ever intimately present to us, runs smoothly along the
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relation or connexion, and conceives with a full sympathy the person, who
is nearly related to self. He renders himself immediately acceptable, and is
at once on an easy footing with us: No distance, no reserve has place, where
the person introduced is supposed so closely connected with us. (P 3.4,
p. 18)
This shows that he still considered the ever-present impression of self to be the
source of the extra force and vivacity that turns the idea into the real feeling.
The Treatise account of the love of family relations, recall, also depended on
an idea borrowed from Du Bos, namely our general desire for emotional stimu-
lation. Our relations, whose passions affect us particularly deeply through sym-
pathy, are stimulating in this way to a particularly high degree. Although there
is no explicit repetition of this point in the Dissertation on the Passions, it does
recur in Of Tragedy, albeit in a different context:
L’Abbe Dubos, in his reflections on poetry and painting, asserts, that
nothing is in general so disagreeable to the mind as the languid, listless
state of indolence, into which it falls upon the removal of all passion and
occupation. To get rid of this painful situation, it seeks every amusement
and pursuit; business, gaming, shews, executions; whatever will rouze the
passions, and take its attention from itself...
It is impossible not to admit this account, as being, at least in part,
satisfactory. You may observe, when there are several tables of gaming,
that all the company run to those, where the deepest play is, even though
they find not there the best players. The view, or, at least, imagination
of high passions, arising from great loss or gain, affects the spectator by
sympathy, gives him some touches of the same passions, and serves him for
a momentary entertainment. (Tr 3-4, p. 217)
In fact, Hume did change his mind with regard to tragedy, on a matter closely
related to this point; but that is a topic for further down the line (see chapter 11).
For the present, we may note that the point itself was not abandoned.
Hume also retained his earlier account the role of comparison in producing
envy and malice:
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The comparison of ourselves with others seems to be the source of envy
and malice. The more unhappy another is, the more happy do we ourselves
appear in our own conception. (P 3.8, p. 19)
However, in the same way that the later references to the sympathetic communi-
cation of passions are sparse and oblique, these two sentences are a pale imitation
of the 20-paragraph section in the Treatise on envy and malice (T 2.2.8, pp. 372-
80), which examines in great detail the effect that comparison has on the passions.
On the one hand, the fact that Hume retained these principles in the Disser-
tation makes the difference between the earlier and the later work in this respect
less radical than it might otherwise have been. The present component of my
Difference Thesis would certainly have been more dramatic if he had abandoned
them altogether, or explicitly renounced them. On the other hand, however, it
makes such differences as there are all the more puzzling. Though not entirely
absent, these formerly central aspects of Hume’s treatment of the passions are, in
the later work, peripheral at best. Something ought to explain this very curious
fact.
5.3. Ambition, vanity, and parental love
The applications of sympathy and comparison examined in the previous section
show that these principles are not altogether absent from Hume’s later work,
although they do seem to be much less important. In fact, however, this is just
the start. In three crucial cases—ambition, vanity, and parental love—original
instincts and object-directed desires explicitly muscle in on explanatory territory
that was formerly occupied by sympathy and comparison. As I pointed out at
the end of §5.1 above, original instincts are in implicit tension with sympathy and
comparison, and so the rise in the former is at least a possible explanation for the
fall of the latter. I now start to present my case that it is not just possible, but
probable.
When Hume gave his account of the love of family relations in the Treatise,
based on the sympathetic communication of passions between people with a close
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relationship or connection to one another, he was explicit in including parental
love within the remit of this mechanism: “Thus the relation of blood produces the
strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their children, and a
lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation lessens” (T 2.2.4.2, p. 352). As
we saw in the previous section, Hume repeats his general account of the love of
relations in the Dissertation. But there is a crucial difference in this later work
that I passed over above: parental love is now explicitly singled out in a footnote
as being accounted for instead by an original instinct:
The affection of parents to children seems founded on an original instinct.
The affection towards other relations depends on the principles here ex-
plained. (P 3.3, n4, p. 18)
This little footnote is another one of those small changes in the Dissertation with
large implications. For it establishes beyond any doubt that Hume saw sympathy
and original instincts as alternative explanations, and that in at least one case
he changed his mind from the former to the latter.
This crucial footnote is of course all of a piece with what we have seen al-
ready. Parental love is one of Hume’s later explicit examples of an object-directed
desire. It ought therefore to be accounted for by an original instinct. And with
this original instinct admitted, there is no longer any need to account for the phe-
nomenon in terms of sympathy. Sympathy may remain, as I said in §5.1 about
the general case; there is no reason why there shouldn’t be some overdetermina-
tion. But insofar as parental love is an object-directed desire, accounted for by
an original instinct, sympathy can be playing no role. Any additional fondness
for one’s children generated through sympathy will be a derivative of self-love.
Why do parents take a pleasure in their children’s happiness? The communica-
tion of passions is one possible explanation: the children’s pleasures are conveyed
to their parents via the corresponding ideas. An original and instinctive love of
one’s offspring is another: parents simply want their children to be happy.
We saw in the previous chapter how ambition and vanity were explained, in
the Treatise, in terms of comparison and sympathy respectively. In a nutshell,
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power over others gives us a pleasure from the favourable comparison of ourselves
with them, while the respect of others, communicated to us through sympathy,
produces or at least reinforces our pride. As noted in §5.1 above, however, ambi-
tion and vanity are two of Hume’s explicit examples of object-directed desires in
the moral Enquiry. Here, now, is the relevant passage in full:
[T]here are mental passions, by which we are impelled immediately to
seek particular objects, such as fame, or power, or vengeance, without
any regard to interest; and when these objects are attained, a pleasing
enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. Nature
must, by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original
propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or
pursue it from motives of self-love, and desire of happiness. If I have no
vanity, I take no delight in praise: If I be void of ambition, power gives me
no enjoyment: If I be not angry, the punishment of an adversary is totally
indifferent to me. (M App2.12, p. 301)
As with parental love, these new accounts of ambition and vanity as object-
directed desires go against the grain of the Treatise accounts based on compar-
ison and sympathy respectively. Hume needn’t abandon the earlier accounts
altogether, if he is prepared to allow for the possibility of overdetermination. But
he needn’t keep them either. And insofar as these desires are object-directed,
they must arise from an original instinct rather than from comparison or sympa-
thy; for when they arise in these latter two ways, they are merely derivatives of
self-love.
Ambition and vanity, as I noted in §5.1 above, were particularly important
passions in the debate about the foundation of morals, since they had been put
forward by Hobbes and Mandeville respectively as the major sources of altruistic
motivation. In the concluding section of the moral Enquiry, indeed, Hume ex-
plicitly mentions them as forming no part of his own theory concerning the origin
of morals (M 9.5, p. 271), which appeals instead to the principle of humanity or
benevolence. This is of course a clear and unambiguous statement of his align-
ment with the sentimentalists or Stoics, in opposition to the egoists or Epicureans.
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Insisting on the object-directed nature of ambition and vanity, furthermore, was
an implicit attack on the Epicurean tradition: if even these two passions cannot
be accounted for in terms of self-love, then the most prominent egoist accounts
of altruism involve object-directed desires anyway. Thus there can be no good
reason for refusing to acknowledge the more straightforward explanation: that
we simply have object-directed desires for the happiness of others.
The case of vanity is in fact somewhat complicated by the Dissertation on the
Passions, for in this work Hume reverts to his old Treatise account, apparently
forgetting the change that he had already made in the moral Enquiry. In the
Treatise, when deriving vanity from the principle of sympathy, Hume was explicit
in denying that original instincts played any role:
Among these phaenomena we may esteem it a very favourable one to our
present purpose, that tho’ fame in general be agreeable, yet we receive a
much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we ourselves
esteem and approve of, than of those, whom we hate and despise. In like
manner we are principally mortify’d with the contempt of persons, upon
whose judgment we set some value, and are, in a great measure, indifferent
about the opinions of the rest of mankind. But if the mind received from
any original instinct a desire of fame, and aversion to infamy, fame and
infamy wou’d influence us without distinction; and every opinion, according
as it were favourable or unfavourable, wou’d equally excite that desire or
aversion. (T 2.1.11.11, p. 231)
In the moral Enquiry, as we have just seen, he changed his mind, insisting that
the mind does contain “an original propensity to fame” (M App2.12, p. 301).
But then in the Dissertation on the Passions, when he was obviously looking at
the Treatise again and revising this material, he seems to have forgotten what
he wrote in the meantime, for he reverts to his former denial of the originality of
this passion, and repeats the Mandevillean explanation:
Our opinions of all kinds are strongly affected by society and sympathy, and
it is almost impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment, against
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the universal consent of every one, with whom we have any friendship or
correspondence. But of all our opinions, those, which we form in our own
favour; however lofty or presuming; are, at bottom, the frailest, and the
most easily shaken by the contradiction and opposition of others... Hence
that strong love of fame, with which all mankind are possessed. It is in
order to fix and confirm their favourable opinion of themselves, not from
any original passion, that they seek the applauses of others. And when
a man desires to be praised, it is for the same reason, that a beauty is
pleased with surveying herself in a favourable looking-glass, and seeing the
reflection of her own charms. (P 2.33, p. 14)
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Hume was simply careless on this
point: in the Treatise he explicitly denies that vanity arises from an original
instinct (preferring Mandeville’s explanation); in the moral Enquiry he explicitly
says that it does (preferring Butler’s story); and in the Dissertation he again
explicitly denies it (reverting once more to the Mandeville story).
Fortunately, this oscillation is not a devastating problem, either for Hume’s
own mature view, or for my hypothesis concerning the development of his thought.
We need only remember that a commitment to an original instinct or object-
directed desire—as it might be, for fame and praise—is not itself inconsistent with
Mandeville’s idea. There is no reason why we should not have both an original
desire for praise, and a derivative desire for the same, as a self-interested means
of bolstering our own pride. Hume doesn’t actually say this; he seems to assume
that it must be one or the other, and to oscillate back and forth between the
two. Taking into account both the moral Enquiry and the Dissertation, however,
and doing our best to find in them a coherent view, we may surmise that this
hybrid account was, or at least ought to have been, his considered view. And
regarding my developmental story, it suffices that the original desire for praise
is an additional feature of the later work, doubtless inspired by Butler, that was
nowhere to be found in the Treatise.
It is also notable about the passage just quoted from the Dissertation that,
although the word “sympathy” appears in the first sentence, as an echo of Hume’s
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view from the Treatise, when we get down to business it is in fact only the
principle of authority that is doing any of the real work in this later presentation:
“the favourable suffrages of the world are regarded only as authorities, or as
confirmations of our own opinion” (P 2.40, p. 15; my emphasis). In the Treatise,
we may recall, Hume mentioned the principle of authority only in passing, giving
most of the discussion over to sympathy; in the Dissertation, it is the other way
round.
5.4. Sympathy and benevolence
It is not only in the area of motivation that original instincts take over from
sympathy and comparison as an explanatory mechanism, but also in the area
of approbation (recall Hutcheson’s crucial distinction between motivation and
approbation, introduced in §1.1). There are two applications of sympathy in
the Treatise that I mentioned in the previous chapter but said nothing about,
promising to return to them here: moral approbation and disapprobation, and
the beauty of utility. In these final two sections I will look at each of these in
turn.
It is well known that sympathy plays a central and indispensable role in
Hume’s account of the causes of moral approbation and disapprobation in Book 3
of the Treatise, first with regard to the “artificial” virtue of justice (T 3.2.2.24,
pp. 499-500), and then with regard to the “natural” virtues such as beneficence,
charity, generosity, and moderation (T 3.3.1.10-1, pp. 577-9). These virtues all
have a “tendency to the good of mankind” (T 3.3.1.9, p. 577), which is precisely
what pleases us about them and raises our moral approbation. But:
[A]s the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable;
and as the good of society, where our own interest is not concern’d, or that
of our friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the
source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues. (T 3.3.1.9,
p. 577)
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Hume then proceeds, in the next two paragraphs, to urge the same explanation
with regard to the natural virtues as well. As he summarises the point in the
conclusion of the book:
Justice is certainly approv’d of for no other reason, than because it has
a tendency to the public good: And the public good is indifferent to us,
except so far as sympathy interests us in it. We may presume the like
with regard to all the other virtues, which have a like tendency to the
public good. They must derive all their merit from our sympathy with
those, who reap any advantage from them: As the virtues, which have a
tendency to the good of the person possess’d of them, derive their merit
from our sympathy with him. (T 3.3.6.1, p. 618)
In section 5 of the moral Enquiry, however, when Hume repeats an exactly
analogous argument, benevolence has taken the place of sympathy:
Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a contradiction
in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an end, where the end itself
no wise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment,
and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self; it
follows, that every thing, which contributes to the happiness of society,
recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a
principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And
what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one
so obvious and natural? (M 5.17, p. 219)
“Good-will” is of course just another word for benevolence. And in a footnote at
precisely this point, furthermore, Hume makes his position even clearer:
It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity
or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be
a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination
of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond
which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No man is
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absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. The first has
a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. This every one may
find in himself. It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved
into principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have
been made to that purpose. But if it were possible, it belongs not to
the present subject; and we may here safely consider these principles as
original: Happy, if we can render all the consequences sufficiently plain and
perspicuous! (M 5.17, n19, pp. 219-20)
Where sympathy once was, we now have an original and unaccountable instinct.
It is now benevolence, more than sympathy, that accounts for moral approbation
and disapprobation: “Thus, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit,
ascribed to the social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that
regard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the
interests of mankind and society” (M 5.43, p. 230).
As we have seen, traces of Hume’s earlier commitment to sympathy remain
in the Dissertation on the Passions and the essay Of National Characters. There
are also traces in the moral Enquiry ; benevolence has there taken centre stage,
but it has not shunted out sympathy altogether. The latter reappears most
unambiguously in Hume’s treatment of our approbation of qualities immediately
agreeable to their possessor:
CHEARFULNESS carries great merit with it, and naturally conciliates
the good-will of mankind. No quality, indeed, more readily communicates
itself to all around...
From this influence of chearfulness, both to communicate itself, and to
engage approbation, we may perceive, that there is another set of men-
tal qualities, which... diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders, and procure
friendship and regard. Their immediate sensation, to the person possessed
of them, is agreeable: Others enter into the same humour, and catch the
sentiment, by a contagion or natural sympathy: And as we cannot forbear
loving whatever pleases, a kindly emotion arises towards the person, who
communicates so much satisfaction. (M 7.1-2, pp. 250-1)
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Who would live amidst perpetual wrangling, and scolding, and mutual
reproaches? The roughness and harshness of these emotions disturb and
displease us: We suffer by contagion and sympathy; nor can we remain
indifferent spectators, even though certain, that no pernicious consequences
would ever follow from such angry passions. (M 7.21, p. 257-8)
A full account of what is going on here—explaining, in particular, whether this
is just a stylistic echo of the earlier view, or whether sympathy still plays some
substantial role in Hume’s later theory—is well beyond the scope of this thesis.
My focus is on Hume’s later philosophy of emotion, not his later moral philosophy.
But there is no denying the fact that benevolence subsequently moves in on
sympathy’s territory in Hume’s moral theory; and it seems probable that this
was at least in part the result of Hume’s conversion to Butler’s object-directed
motivational psychology.2
5.5. Sympathy and the rules of art
The remaining application of sympathy in the Treatise is to the beauty of utility.
Hume’s views on this matter are to be understood in the context of a debate
between Hutcheson and Berkeley.3 Hutcheson, in his Inquiry into the Original of
Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, argued that our perception of beauty was im-
mediate, that it did not depend on any knowledge or reasoning, and in particular
that it had nothing to do with the utility of the beautiful object:
This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because of its
Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from
2In a recent pair of articles, Remy Debes argues that there is no real change in Hume’s later
attitude to sympathy in the moral Enquiry (2007a,b). He claims, first, that Hume did not
abandon his associationist account of sympathy; I agree, and have offered evidence for this in
§5.2 above. He goes on to argue that sympathy still plays a role in the later moral philosophy,
working in tandem with benevolence to generate our moral approbation and disapprobation. I
have my doubts about the details of Debes’s proposal here, but let that be. For even supposing
that this is right, the argument nevertheless misses a step. Assuming that sympathy continues
to play some role in Hume’s later account, there is still the crucial addition of benevolence,
which had no part in the Treatise explanation. This alone is a substantial difference.
3See Guyer (2002).
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any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of
the Object; but strikes us at first with the Idea of Beauty[.] (1725, p. 25)
Berkeley then objected to Hutcheson’s view, insisting that the perception of
beauty did depend on reason, and indeed on precisely the recognition of the
object’s utility:
Euph. Is not a thing said to be perfect in its kind when it answers the
ends for which it was made?
Alc. It is.
Euph. The parts, therefore, in true proportions must be so related, and
adjusted to one another, as that they may best conspire to the use and
operation of the whole?
Alc. It seems so.
Euph. But the comparing parts with one another, the considering them
as belonging to one whole, and the referring this whole to its use or end,
should seem to be the work of reason: should it not?
Alc. It should.
...
Euph. Consequently, beauty, in your sense of it, is an object, not of the
eye, but of the mind. (1732, p. 67)
In the fourth edition of his Inquiry, Hutcheson added a footnote replying to
Berkeley’s objection. Several points are made, of which just one is salient here,
namely that we can find things beautiful even when we expect no use from them
ourselves: “The Shapes of the Horse or the Ox may promise Use to the Owner;
but is he the only Person who relishes the Beauty?” (1738, p. 208).
Hume’s contribution to this debate in the Treatise was a hybrid theory that
combined Berkeley’s utility-based story with Hutcheson’s appeal to a direct non-
rational perception of pleasure: “the beauty of all visible objects causes a pleasure
pretty much the same, tho’ it be sometimes deriv’d from the mere species and
appearance of the objects; sometimes from sympathy, and an idea of their utility”
(T 3.3.5.6, p. 617). The addition of sympathy on the Berkelean side of this story,
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however, is a marked improvement, answering Hutcheson’s point that was just
highlighted: for Hume, a useful object needn’t be of use to the observer in order
to give rise to a sentiment of beauty; it need only be useful to someone with
whom the observer can sympathise.
Although he officially endorses a hybrid theory, however, Hume places more
weight on Berkeley’s account than on Hutcheson’s: “Most of the works of art
are esteem’d beautiful, in proportion to their fitness for the use of man, and
even many of the productions of nature derive their beauty from that source”
(T 3.3.1.8, p. 577; cf. T 2.1.8.2, pp. 298-9). He is similarly grudging in his
concession to Hutcheson in the moral case:
Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish’d by our sentiments, not
by reason: But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or
appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency
to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons. My opinion is, that
both these causes are intermix’d in our judgments of morals; after the same
manner as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external
beauty: Tho’ I am also of opinion, that reflections on the tendencies of
actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great lines
of our duty. (T 3.3.1.27, pp. 589-90)
Hume also says here that Hutcheson’s moral sense explains our approbation “by
particular original principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for”
(ibid.); and while he allows some room for such original principles, he thinks
that his more complicated account in terms of sympathy and utility fits the vast
majority of cases.
In the Treatise, then, not only did sympathy explain the beauty of utility,
but utility was also the great source of beauty in art as well as morals. To repeat:
“Most of the works of art are esteem’d beautiful, in proportion to their fitness
for the use of man” (T 3.3.1.8, p. 577). In the moral Enquiry, Hume continues
to hold that utility is the main source of bodily beauty, at least:
It will naturally be expected, that the beauty of the body, as is supposed
by all ancient moralists, will be similar, in some respects, to that of the
mind...
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It is evident, that one considerable source of beauty in all animals is
the advantage, which they reap from the particular structure of their limbs
and members, suitably to the particular manner of life, to which they are
by nature destined...
Broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are beau-
tiful in our species, because signs of force and vigour. Ideas of utility and
its contrary, though they do not entirely determine what is handsome or
deformed, are evidently the source of a considerable part of approbation
or dislike. (M 6.23-5, pp. 244-5)
He also indicates that utility accounts for some of the beauty of artefacts that
have an obvious purpose, such as ships and doors:
A ship appears more beautiful to an artist, or one moderately skilled in
navigation, where its prow is wide and swelling beyond its poop, than if it
were framed with a precise geometrical regularity, in contradiction to all
the laws of mechanics. A building, whose doors and windows were exact
squares, would hurt the eye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to
the figure of a human creature, for whose service the fabric was intended.
(M 5.1, pp. 212-3)
(There is an implicit dig at Hutcheson here, who emphasised the beauty of geo-
metrical regularity, while denying that ideas of utility played any role; Hutcheson
1725, pp. 28-35.)
It is unclear whether Hume still thought that sympathy played the crucial
role in engaging our critical approbation of useful objects or bodily features, for
there is simply too little text to go on. Perhaps, as in the moral case, he would
have placed more weight on the role of benevolence. But however that may be,
what is more interesting about the development of Hume’s thought in this area
is that he no longer places anywhere near so much emphasis on utility in the
explanation of beauty in general. Certainly it is one factor, but it is now only
one among many.
In Hume’s fourth dissertation, Of the Standard of Taste, in which he considers
our critical approbation of art works in general (especially poetry and plays), there
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is no mention of utility or sympathy at all.4 Instead, we have now a multiplicity
of original principles responsible for our reaction:
It appears then, that, amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, there
are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a
careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. Some particular forms
or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated
to please, and others to displease[.] (ST 12, p. 233)
There is also a much more sophisticated account in this dissertation of the causal
“noise” that interferes with these several general principles: ignorance, inexperi-
ence, prejudice, and so on. I will look at this more closely in chapters 13 and 14,
when I come to examine Of the Standard of Taste in its own right. The variety
of taste observable among different people is something that Hume’s somewhat
crude appeals to sympathy and utility in the Treatise are powerless to explain.
In the meantime, the point to take away from these last two sections is that
Hume’s conversion to Butler’s object-directed motivational psychology appears
to have had an effect on his treatment of approbation as well as motivation. The
effect on motivation is of course immediate and obvious. The case of approbation
is more complicated, and there may well have been other factors in play. My
examination of the matter here has of necessity been much briefer than the topic
deserves. But even in this brief discussion, the parallels that we have seen are
striking enough to warrant the general claim of this chapter: that in Hume’s later
work, original instincts encroached very seriously on the explanatory territory of
sympathy and comparison, in the case of approbation as well as motivation.
4An insignificant exception: Hume notes that we may have “a peculiar sympathy with the
writer who resembles us” (ST 29, p. 244). This is the one occurrence of “sympathy” in this
work that featured in my crude word count in §5.1 above.
Chapter 6
The Development of Hume’s Thought
In chapters 2 and 3, I argued that Hume’s conversion to Butler’s object-directed
motivational psychology came only after the bulk of the Treatise had been written,
albeit in time to insert the Butler paragraph. The core of my case was, quite
simply, that Hume was committed to egoism in this early work (since his anti-
egoism in the later work is obvious and uncontroversial). It is of course crucial
to my thesis that this should be so: my position is that Hume’s anti-egoism was
a later development, and one that explains a lot of the differences between the
Treatise and the later work. As I indicated at the time, however, my egoist
interpretation of the Treatise—though by no means original—is not without its
opponents. In this final chapter of Part 1, the case for supposing that Hume was
already an anti-egoist when he wrote the Treatise will be considered, and found
wanting.
6.1. Anti-egoism in the Treatise
As I noted in §2.2, Stephen Darwall (among others) agrees with my hedonist and
egoist interpretation of the Treatise.1 In response to Darwall’s interpretation,
however, Don Garrett has recently objected that “although Hume clearly holds
that prospective pleasure or pain can be sufficient to move the will, he never claims
that it is necessary. (Nor does he treat motivation by the prospect of pleasure or
1Darwall (1995).
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pain egoistically—Appendix 2 of An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,
entitled ‘Of Self-Love,’ argues directly against psychological egoism)”.2 This is
the latest in a long-running tradition of anti-egoist interpretations of the Treatise,
interpretations that would of course minimise or deny altogether the differences
between the earlier and later Hume that I have been insisting on throughout the
first part of this thesis.
Garrett’s parenthetical remark, first of all, is easily dealt with. One can
hardly argue that Hume was not an egoist in the Treatise because of his explicit
anti-egoism in the moral Enquiry. Such an argument would plainly presuppose
the falsehood of my Difference Thesis, and so cannot be used against it. Nor
would Garrett use such an obviously question-begging move; this comment of
his is taken from the context of a different debate. (Darwall had not claimed
that Hume later changed his mind; like so many, he more or less just ignored the
later work.) Nevertheless, if anti-egoist interpreters of the Treatise have hitherto
drawn much of their evidence from the moral Enquiry, their case will now be
substantially weakened in the light of my proposals about how Hume’s thought
changed on precisely this matter.
More hopeful is Garrett’s reinterpretation of the apparently hedonist pas-
sages of the Treatise as holding merely that pleasure and pain are sufficient for
desire, not that they are necessary. In favour of reading the Treatise as endorsing
only this partial hedonism, Garrett quotes the Butler paragraph, unsurprisingly,
and also the following more moderate claim from Book 1: “There is implanted in
the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure as the chief spring and moving
principle of all its actions” (T 1.3.10.2, p. 118). As Garrett rightly notes, a chief
spring need not be the only spring; and indeed, describing it in this way clearly
suggests that there are others.
Let us run with Garrett’s suggestion for a while. If pleasure and pain are
merely the chief springs of action, but not the only ones, what might the others
be? Garrett himself is not explicit, but the two most obvious potential candidates
2Garrett (2007, p. 273).
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in the Treatise are benevolence (the desire of another’s happiness) and anger (the
desire of another’s misery). These two desires, says Hume, arise from love and
hatred respectively:
The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin’d
with benevolence and anger... Love is always follow’d by a desire of the
happiness of the person belov’d, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred
produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the happiness of the
person hated. (T 2.2.6.3, p. 367)
Furthermore, the connection between love and benevolence, and between hatred
and anger, is explained in the Treatise by an original instinct, just like those that
are later responsible for the object-directed desires: “the desire of the happiness
or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them, [is] an arbitrary
and original instinct implanted in our nature” (T 2.2.7.1, p. 368).
In Hume’s account of the generation of benevolence and anger, then, there is
no hint of any hedonism. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the default
interpretation must surely be that these were not hedonistic desires for Hume,
even in the Treatise. Even more than this, there is direct evidence in favour of this
default: benevolence and anger are precisely Hume’s examples of object-directed
desires in the Butler paragraph.
Hume also apparently acknowledges (somewhat less explicitly) another pair
of desires for the happiness or misery of another, namely gratitude and resentment,
which arise in response to services rendered and injuries received respectively (see
the brief remarks at T 2.2.3.3 and T 2.3.3.9; pp. 348, 418). As with benevolence
and anger, the default interpretation of these two desires is also surely anti-
hedonist. What is more, Hume’s only remark about the origin of resentment is
explicitly so: “When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent pas-
sion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent
of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself ” (T 2.3.3.9, p. 418; my
emphasis).
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It is true, as I have already noted, that pity and malice either are or give
rise to desires for another person’s happiness or misery respectively, and in a way
that is perfectly consistent with the selfish hypothesis. It is to be expected—
and in perfect accordance with my thesis—that Hume should devote a lot of
attention to these passions in the Treatise, and to the principles of sympathy and
comparison on which they depend. But, to put the point most forcibly against
myself, have I not thus far simply been misrepresenting the Treatise, by examining
these passions, but ignoring the apparently anti-egoist ones of benevolence, anger,
gratitude, and resentment? Doesn’t the presence of these latter desires in Hume’s
philosophy as early as 1739 show that he was never the egoist that I have made
him out to be?
Another couple of passages from the Treatise may be added to the case
against me here. In the first, Hume asserts that there are “certain instincts
originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the
love of life, and kindness to children” (T 2.3.3.8, p. 417). Here benevolence and
resentment are once again stated to be original instincts, which goes against the
egoist thesis, and kindness to children is also included in this list. By “kindness to
children”, Hume presumably means parental love. What is more, when comparing
human beings to other animals, Hume explicitly acknowledges the instinctive
nature of this passion: “The affection of parents to their young proceeds from a
peculiar instinct in animals, as well as in our species” (T 2.2.12.5, p. 398). In §5.3,
I noted that Hume’s official account of parental love in the Treatise depended on
sympathy, treating it as just a special case of the love of family relations in general
(while in the Dissertation it is explicitly singled out as not being accounted for in
this way). The truth, however, is slightly more complicated: the Treatise derives
parental love from sympathy, but also contains these two remarks suggesting
instead that it is an original instinct.
In this way, then, there is quite a lot to be said for Garrett’s interpretation
of the Treatise as endorsing what we might call a moderate hedonism or egoism,
as opposed to the full-blown egoism that I have been attributing to him thus far.
On Garrett’s reading, Hume maintains that self-love or the desire for our own
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pleasure is the chief component of our motivational psychology, but not the only
one. Already in the Treatise he was acknowledging the existence of anti-egoist
desires. If Garrett is right—and as we have seen there is certainly evidence in his
favour—then my case for substantial change appears to be significantly weakened,
depending as it does on a blinkered interpretation of the Treatise.
6.2. Egoism, careless egoism, and anti-egoism
There are two reasons, however, why the argument of the previous section is not
the devastating objection to my thesis that it might at first sight appear. In the
first place, my position all along has been that Hume was committed to (full-
blown) hedonism and egoism in the Treatise; I never said that this commitment
was consistent with everything else that he said in this large and ambitious work.
Indeed, I have insisted from the very start that it is not : in the Butler paragraph
Hume clearly contradicts it. What I am now acknowledging is that the Butler
paragraph is not the only place in which Hume contradicts himself. There is
also the claim that benevolence, resentment, the love of life, and kindness to
children are all original instincts (T 2.3.3.8, p. 417), and again that parental love
is instinctive in human beings as well as other animals (T 2.2.12.5, p. 398), not
to mention the explicit claim that resentment is a desire for another’s misery
independent of all considerations of our own pleasure (T 2.3.3.9, p. 418). The
account of the origin of benevolence and anger, furthermore, as arising from love
and hatred respectively, seems also to be implicitly in tension with it.
It does not follow from these exceptions, however, that Hume was a moderate
hedonist. The evidence that he was committed to full-blown hedonism—which
I presented in chapters 2 and 3—remains as forceful now as it was then. The
final conclusion, taking all of the evidence into account, is not that Hume was
a consistent moderate hedonist in the Treatise, but that he was an inconsistent
full-blown hedonist. What this means is that the young Hume already had an
inkling of the view that he later grasped more clearly, and expressed consistently.
I have never denied this.
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To be clear, then, I am disagreeing with Garrett on a crucial point: Hume
does claim that pleasure is necessary for motivation. As I explained in §2.2,
Hume begins Book 2 of the Treatise by dividing the passions into the direct and
the indirect, a division that is clearly supposed to be exhaustive. And he claims
that the passions in both of these classes arise from pleasure and pain (but in
different ways). He explicitly places desire and aversion in the former category,
as among those that “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”
(T 2.1.1.4 p. 276). He says that “[u]pon the removal of pleasure and pain there
immediately follows a removal of desire and aversion” (T 2.3.9.1, p. 438). If this
is not claiming that pleasure (or pain) is necessary for motivation, I do not know
what would be. And this is just a brief summary; my argument on this head has
been given in more detail in chapters 2 and 3.
The second and more important reason why the previously noted exceptions
do not trouble me is this. Suppose that I am after all being too harsh on the
Treatise, and that in this work Hume is consistently endorsing a moderate hedo-
nism, rather than inconsistently endorsing a full-blown hedonism. Suppose, that
is to say, that Garrett is right and I am wrong. Even then, the concession that I
would be required to make regarding my Difference Thesis is in fact negligible.
The reason for this is that moderate hedonism—according to which pleasure
and pain are the chief spring and moving principle of the mind, though there
are a handful of exceptions—is still a very long way from the rigorous full-blown
anti-hedonism of Hume’s later works. Consider Locke’s claim, already quoted in
§1.4, that without pleasure and pain there would be no desire:
[T]o excite us to these Actions of thinking and motion, that we are capable
of, [the Author of our being] has been pleased to join to several Thoughts,
and several Sensations, a perception of Delight. If this were wholly sepa-
rated from all our outward Sensations, and inward Thoughts, we should
have no reason to prefer one Thought or Action, to another; Negligence,
to Attention; or Motion, to Rest. (1690, p. 129)
And consider, alongside this, Hume’s strikingly similar claim in Book 3 of the
Treatise:
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The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or
pain; and when these sensations are remov’d, both from our thought and
feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire
or volition. (T 3.3.1.2, p. 547)
Here again, as in the Book 1 passage that Garrett draws attention to (T 1.3.10.2,
p. 118), Hume does appear to be retreating ever so slightly from Locke’s full-
blown hedonism. He says only that pleasure and pain is the chief principle, and
that without it we are incapable in a great measure of action or desire. The
implication is that there are exceptions.
But Butler’s objection to Locke, of course, was not just that there are a
handful of exceptions to the hedonist account of motivation. His point was that
this view is utterly mistaken, since it gets the causal and explanatory relationship
between pleasure and desire fundamentally the wrong way round. For Butler,
the overwhelming majority of our desires are object-directed, with hedonistic
applications of self-love being the exception rather than the norm. This view is
opposed to hedonism in all its forms, both moderate and full-blown.
After the Treatise, as we have seen, Hume was fully persuaded of Butler’s
point. He was no longer remotely attracted to hedonism, even in a moderate
form, but fervently insisted on Butler’s conclusion that it got things back to
front. He was no longer endorsing Locke’s claim (even in a moderated form)
that without pleasure and pain there would be no desire. Rather, he insisted on
Butler’s alternative, that without desire there would be (almost) no pleasure or
pain:
Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity
could scarcely ever exert itself; because we should, in that case, have felt
few and slender pains or pleasures, and have little misery or happiness to
avoid or to pursue. (M App2.12, pp. 301-2)3
Even if Garrett is right, therefore, his interpretation of the Treatise in fact does
very little to bring that earlier work in line with the later. The Treatise account
3Butler implausibly claimed that there could be no pleasure without desire. Hume does not
go that far, while still accepting the essential point. Recall chapter 1, page 33.
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of motivation is hedonist, whether moderate or full-blown. The later work is
radically anti-hedonist.
6.3. Butler, not Hutcheson
It seems clear that the Butler paragraph in the Treatise did indeed come from
Butler. The point that Hume makes in this paragraph is very obviously Butler’s,
and in the footnote from the first two editions of the first Enquiry (removed
after the appearance of the moral Enquiry), Hume explicitly attributed it to him
(recall §2.4). Surprisingly, however, it has been suggested twice before—by Kemp
Smith, and more recently by the Nortons—that the inspiration for this paragraph
was in fact Hutcheson, rather than Butler.
In chapter 2, I conjectured that Hume read Butler’s Sermons just before the
Treatise was printed (and in time to insert the Butler paragraph), but after it
had already been mostly written. And I suggested that this event was not only
what prompted the Butler paragraph, but also—once the importance of Butler’s
point had sunk in—what led Hume to abandon his hedonism altogether, in favour
of Butler’s object-directed motivational psychology. These claims are not crucial
to my Difference Thesis: the textual evidence for the change of mind is there,
regardless of what caused it. Nevertheless, this background story fits very nicely
with the story told by the texts themselves. And so if Hume got this point from
Hutcheson rather than Butler, that ought to give me some cause for concern; for
Hume was already familiar with Hutcheson when he was writing the Treatise.
Fortunately, however, in addition to the direct evidence that Hume got the
point from Butler (i.e. it is to Butler that Hume himself attributes it in the first
Enquiry), there is also evidence that he can’t have got it from Hutcheson. This is
for the very simple reason that Hutcheson nowhere makes this point. No doubt its
anti-egoist implications would have been welcome to him, but Hutcheson’s own
motivational psychology is in fact precisely the moderate hedonism that Garrett
attributes to Hume in the Treatise, according to which the pleasure and pain of
others moves us directly, as well as the prospect of our own:
6.3. BUTLER, NOT HUTCHESON 121
Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehen-
sion of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our selves
or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to
prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. (1728, p. 18)
Butler’s point that desires give rise to pleasure and pain, rather than the other
way round, was as unfamiliar to Hutcheson as it was to the young Hume.4
Why, then, would someone think that Hume got this idea from Hutcheson?
Norton and Norton, in their annotations to the Treatise, seem to hold that he
did.5 In support of this claim, they quote the following passage from Hutcheson’s
Essay :
But we must here observe an obvious Difference among our Desires, viz.
that “some of them have a previous, painful, or uneasy Sensation, an-
tecedently to any Opinion of Good in the Object; nay, the Object is often
chiefly esteemed good, only for its allaying this Pain or Uneasiness; or if
the Object gives also positive Pleasure, yet the uneasy Sensation is previ-
ous to, and independent of this Opinion of Good in the Object.” These
Desires we may call Appetites. “Other Desires and Aversions necessarily
presuppose an Opinion of Good and Evil in their Objects; and the Desires
or Aversions, with their concomitant uneasy Sensations, are produced or
occasioned by this Opinion or Apprehension.” (1728, p. 67)
I can only reply that this, though perhaps superficially similar, is on closer ex-
amination quite clearly a different point. Here Hutcheson is simply noting—
something which is perfectly consistent with hedonism, full-blown as well as
moderate—that some desires are for the removal of a present pain (e.g. hunger
and thirst, the examples that Hutcheson goes on to give), while others are for
positively pleasant objects.
4Hutcheson’s Inquiry (1725) predated Butler’s Sermons by a year (1726). We can surmise
that Hutcheson read them soon after, for they are mentioned in the preface to his Essay and
Illustrations (1728, p. 9). But I can find no evidence that this later work took on board Butler’s
crucial anti-hedonist point.
5Norton and Norton (2007, volume 2, p. 877).
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A more sustained case for the importance of Hutcheson’s influence rather
than Butler’s on this matter was made by Kemp Smith.6 Kemp Smith was
generally very keen on emphasising the importance of Hutcheson’s influence, an
influence that he took to have been with Hume right from the start; it was his
overarching hypothesis “That Hume, under the Influence of Hutcheson, entered
into his Philosophy through the Gateway of Morals”.7 This hypothesis does not
seem to me particularly plausible, but this is not the place to criticise it in detail.8
What I want to take issue with here is a particular proposal made in the context of
this general claim: that the existence of object-directed desires, and consequently
the denial of hedonism, was one of Hume’s very first philosophical commitments;
and, of course, in keeping with the general claim, that Hume got this idea from
Hutcheson.9
The term “object-directed desire” is my own; Kemp Smith himself speaks
of a distinction between “primary” and “secondary” passions, where the latter
are founded on pleasure and pain, and the former instead give rise to pleasure
and pain. Thus my object-directed desires are Kemp Smith’s primary passions.
Kemp Smith also claims that “primary” and “secondary” were Hume’s own terms,
and that Hume got them from Hutcheson.10 No references are given, and Fieser
has objected that Hume himself did not use these terms.11 In this, Fieser gives
away the insufficient attention that he (like many others) has paid to Hume’s
later work, for Hume does use the terms; but he uses them in the moral Enquiry
rather than the Treatise:
6Kemp Smith (1941/2005).
7Kemp Smith (1941/2005, p. 12).
8For criticism, and a defence of what strikes me as a much more plausible hypothesis—
namely, that Hume approached his philosophy through an interest in causation in relation to
irreligion and the free-will debate—see Millican (forthcoming).
9Part 3 of Kemp Smith’s book is titled a “Detailed Consideration of [Hume’s] Central Doc-
trines, Taken in What May Be Presumed to Have Been the Order of Their First Discovery”
(p. 157); following some introductory remarks, object-directed desires are then one of the first
things discussed (pp. 163-5).
10Kemp Smith (1941/2005, p. 165).
11Fieser (1992, p. 9).
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There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which
necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek
possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking
for their end; and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises
a pleasure, which may become the object of another species of desire or
inclination, that is secondary and interested. In the same manner, there
are mental passions, by which we are impelled immediately to seek partic-
ular objects, such as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to
interest; and when these objects are attained, a pleasing enjoyment ensues,
as the consequence of our indulged affections... In all these cases, there is
a passion, which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our
good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions, which afterwards
arise, and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted
such by our original affections. (M App2.12, p. 301; my emphases)
This of course is in the context of stating precisely Butler’s anti-hedonist point;
contrary to Kemp Smith, it has nothing to do with Hutcheson, and it postdates
the Treatise by more than ten years. There is no evidence that Hume got the
terms from Hutcheson while he was writing his early work.
Kemp Smith doesn’t say where Hutcheson uses these terms any more than
where Hume does, but my best guess is that he had in mind the following passage
from Hutcheson’s Essay :
Now since we are capable of Reflection, Memory, Observation, and Reason-
ing about the distant Tendencies of Objects and Actions, and not confined
to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our original Desires,
“secondary Desires of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the pri-
mary Desires, with strength proportioned to the several original Desires,
and the imagined Usefulness, or Necessity, of the advantageous Object.”
Hence it is that as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of Wealth or
Power to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them.
(1728, p. 19)
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Here, however, Hutcheson is once again making a different point. Hutcheson’s
original or primary desires—as confirmed by the paragraphs preceding that above
(one of which I quoted on page 121)—are all directly for pleasure or the avoidance
of pain (either for ourselves or for others). His secondary desires, meanwhile,
are for the means to pleasant ends. This is no doubt a perfectly respectable
distinction; but it is not Butler’s distinction between the desire for pleasure on
the one hand, and desires for objects, independently of the pleasure that they
bring, on the other.
In line with his view that anti-hedonism was one of the first philosophical
positions that Hume adopted, Kemp Smith of course interprets the Treatise as
an anti-hedonist work. The only evidence of Hume’s anti-hedonism that he pro-
duces from the Treatise, however, is the Butler paragraph.12 Otherwise, all of his
quotations—including his terminology for the distinction between hedonistic and
object-directed desires—are from the moral Enquiry. No compelling reasons are
given for supposing that Hume appreciated Butler’s point before he wrote the
Treatise.
6.4. Going back to the source
Anti-egoist interpreters of the Treatise have their hearts in the right place. The
view emerged, in the early 1900s, out of opposition to T. H. Green’s false and
ungenerous interpretation of Hume as doing nothing more than taking Locke’s
and Berkeley’s principles to their logically absurd conclusions, an interpretation
that had its roots, in Hume’s own day, with Thomas Reid.13
As well as viewing Hume (as Reid had before him) as a dogmatically negative
sceptic, Green also interpreted him as a thoroughgoing Lockean hedonist,14 and
it is in large part with the noble aim of refuting Green that the tradition of
anti-hedonist interpretations of the Treatise begins. Green was in many respects
12He quotes this paragraph on p. 141, and again later on p. 164.
13Reid (1764), Green (1882a).
14Green (1882b, pp. 31-5).
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Kemp Smith’s principal target, not only regarding Hume’s views on motivation;
and Garrett, in his introduction to the recent reprint of Kemp Smith’s book,
commends its author for criticising “Green’s unduly hedonistic reading of Hume’s
psychology”.15
This anti-Green tradition begins, in fact, not with Kemp Smith, but with an
old article by E. B. McGilvary.16 Kemp Smith explicitly leans on the arguments in
this article,17 as did at least one other defender of the anti-egoist interpretation
at the time.18 In Taylor’s words: “With respect to Hume’s moral philosophy,
Green’s analysis began a trend of viewing Hume as an advocate of hedonism.
As Norman Kemp Smith reminds us... this trend only began to reverse in the
twentieth century, with E. B. McGilvary’s important 1903 article”.19
While I heartily approve of the ultimate aims of these critics of Green, it
seems to me that they are fighting their battle in the wrong way. Green’s un-
charitable interpretation of Hume—much like Reid’s before him—draws its am-
munition exclusively from the Treatise. Rather than attempt tortuous readings
of the pretty obviously hedonist passages of this early work, the proper response
is surely the very one that Hume himself made in the light of Reid’s criticisms: to
deny that the Treatise contains his considered view, and to look to the Enquiries
and the Dissertations instead. In the famous advertisement prefixed to volume 2
of the posthumous edition of his Essays and Treatise on Several Subjects, Hume
complained (in response to Reid) of precisely this sort of unfair treatment:
[S]everal writers, who have honoured the Author’s Philosophy with an-
swers, have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work
[the Treatise], which the Author never acknowledged, and have affected to
triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over
it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and
15Garrett (2005, p. xxviii).
16McGilvary (1903).
17Kemp Smith (1905, p. 336); Kemp Smith (1941/2005, pp. 140-2).
18Chapman Sharp (1921, p. 43).
19Taylor (2007, pp. 305-6).
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a strong instance of those polemical artifices, which a bigotted zeal thinks
itself authorised to employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the fol-
lowing Pieces [the Enquiries and Dissertations] may alone be regarded as
containing his philosophical sentiments and principles. (Ad 1777, p. 2)
When we follow Hume’s own very clear and explicit request, which most Hume
scholars seem strangely not to take seriously, the defence against Green’s argu-
ment becomes unnecessary; he is firing blanks. And that Hume’s considered view
was anti-hedonist and anti-egoist, meanwhile, is inescapable even on the most
cursory reading of his later work.
McGilvary’s defence of the non-hedonist reading of the Treatise relies in part
on moves that are by now familiar: of course he quotes the Butler paragraph,20
and insists, like Kemp Smith and Garrett, that it does not contradict the apparent
endorsements of hedonism, for the latter assert only that pleasure and pain are
the chief motives, not the only ones.21 In addition to these points, however,
McGilvary has two further arguments that ought to be addressed. The first is his
argument that, even with those desires that Hume says are founded on pleasure
and pain, the foundation is causal rather than intentional. These desires are
always caused by an immediate sensation of pleasure, that is to say, but need
not themselves be desires for pleasure; they might instead be for certain objects
directly.22
Against this interpretation, one might simply quote Hume: “’Tis from the
prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any
object” (T 2.3.3.3, p. 414). But to be thorough I ought also to address the
evidence that McGilvary offers in support of his alternative reading, which comes
from a couple of paragraphs in Book 1:
20McGilvary (1903, p. 276).
21McGilvary (1903, pp. 277-8).
22McGilvary (1903, p. 281). Perhaps Garrett had this idea in mind when he claimed that
Hume doesn’t treat motivation by the prospect of pleasure or pain egoistically in the Treatise;
though Garrett, recall, defends this claim solely by appeal to the anti-egoism of the moral
Enquiry.
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There is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure,
as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions. But pain and
pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of which
the one has effects very different from the other. They may either appear
in impression to the actual feeling, or only in idea, as at present when I
mention them. ’Tis evident the influence of these upon our actions is far
from being equal. Impressions always actuate the soul, and that in the
highest degree; but ’tis not every idea which has the same effect...
Tho’ an idle fiction has no efficacy [i.e. no power of actuating the will],
yet we find by experience, that the ideas of those objects, which we believe
either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect
with those impressions, which are immediately present to the senses and
perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an
equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the
passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an
impression in force and vivacity. (T 1.3.10.2-3, pp. 118-9)
In this passage, Hume says three things: first, that present impressions of pleasure
or pain give rise to desire or aversion; secondly, that ideas of pleasure or pain also
give rise to desire or aversion; and thirdly, that ideas have this effect only when
we believe that the objects “either are or will be existent”, since belief renders
them nearly as forceful and vivacious as the impressions themselves.
While the first two of these claims seem straightforward enough, the third is
surely false: we do not need to believe that an object either is or will be existent
in order to form a desire for it. Perhaps what Hume meant to say was that desire
(or aversion) only arises when we believe that the object in question might be
obtained (or avoided). This would fit with his claim in the introduction to the
Treatise that “we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying
any desire, than the desire itself vanishes” (T Intro.9, p. xvii); though that itself
is also a very questionable claim.
However that may be, the important point here is that there is nothing in this
passage to support McGilvary’s interpretation. According to McGilvary, these
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paragraphs show that Hume thought pleasure and pain (whether as impressions
or as believed ideas) are the efficient causes of desire and aversion, but that they
are not always the objects of desire and aversion: “Hume’s view, here expressed,
is that when we are influenced by pleasure to perform an action, we always act
from pleasure, not always for pleasure”.23 True enough, Hume does say here
that pleasure and pain are the causes of desire and aversion. But that doesn’t
mean that they are not also the objects of desire and aversion, and nothing here
suggests that Hume thought they were not. In McGilvary’s terms, Hume does
indeed affirm that we always act from pleasure; but he nowhere denies that we
always act for pleasure as well. At best, McGilvary’s contrived reading renders
this passage consistent with Hume’s later anti-hedonist view; it certainly does
not force that view upon us any earlier.24
McGilvary’s second argument admits of a similar response. It is natural to
associate sympathy with egoism, as I have already pointed out in previous chap-
ters, for sympathy with other people’s pains and pleasures provides an obvious
explanation for seemingly altruistic motivation, on the assumption that we are
ultimately only motivated by our own pleasure and pain. If other people’s plea-
sures and pains effectively become our own through the mechanism of sympathy,
that can explain why we want other people to be happy, even supposing a purely
egoist motivational psychology. In this way, as I have said, Hume’s account of
pity or compassion is not only consistent with egoism, but is also strongly sup-
portive of it, since it provides an egoist reduction of much seemingly altruistic
behaviour.
McGilvary, however, came up with an ingenious alternative reading of Hume
on this point. He suggested that it was not only other people’s pleasure or
pain that is communicated to us by sympathy, but also their desires. These
desires, meanwhile, even if they are egoist to begin with, are no longer egoist
23McGilvary (1903, p. 281).
24Indeed, it is difficult to see what causal mechanism Hume could have in mind here, if not
precisely the obvious intentional one: present pleasure and pain move us to continue or change
what we are doing because we desire the former shun the latter; and ideas of these things—“the
prospect of pain or pleasure” (T 2.3.3.3, p. 414)—move us for the very same reason.
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when communicated sympathetically to other people. You want your pleasure,
but when this desire is communicated to me it remains a desire for your pleasure;
which, when I have it, is plainly not egoist.25
It seems to me that McGilvary focuses his argument here in exactly the
wrong place. He spends some time defending an interpretation of the sympathy
mechanism according to which a sympathetically communicated desire, though
it is egoist in the original mind, is not egoist in the mind to which it has been
communicated. But this point is surely quite obvious. The substantial claim
that needs defending, meanwhile, but which McGilvary offers literally nothing
in support of, is that Hume thought of pity as a sympathetically communicated
desire, rather than a sympathetically communicated sorrow. If this were so, then
Hume’s treatment of pity would indeed be anti-egoist. But it simply isn’t what
Hume says. In the Treatise, the talk is exclusively of “aﬄiction and sorrow” being
communicated (T 2.2.7.2, p. 369), never of desire; in the Dissertation, similarly,
compassion is “an uneasiness in the sufferings of another” (P 3.7, p. 19), not a
transmitted desire. There is no conceptual difficulty with McGilvary’s suggestion;
the problem is that it is McGilvary ’s rather than Hume’s.26
6.5. Why so much resistance?
Interestingly, just after quoting the Butler paragraph, McGilvary himself antici-
pated precisely my own view of the Treatise on this matter:
A higher criticism of the Treatise might try to distinguish between egoistic
passages which were written first and non-egoistic passages which were af-
terwards inserted without proper rewriting of older passages in the interest
of complete consistency.27
25McGilvary (1903, pp. 291-4).
26In §4.4 I noted that “pity” is ambiguous in Hume, sometimes referring to a desire as well
as to a sympathetically communicated sorrow. But this fact alone will not help McGilvary;
nowhere does Hume say that this compassionate desire is a sympathetically communicated one.
And in the absence of any such statement, the default interpretation is the obvious one, namely
that this desire is the result of self-love applied to the sympathetically communicated sorrow.
27McGilvary (1903, p. 277).
130 CHAPTER 6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUME’S THOUGHT
His reply to this possibility is hardly compelling:
But whatever may be the truth of such a view, we must remember that the
recognition of the existence of instinctive passions, as opposed to passions
founded on pleasure and pain, was an integral feature of the Treatise as it
was published by Hume.28
By instinctive passions, of course, he meant non-hedonistic, object-directed de-
sires; those founded on original instincts. The recognition of these passions is
indeed a feature of the Treatise. To repeat, I have never denied that this is so.
What I strenuously do deny is that it is an integral feature. At best, it is a
peripheral feature in a work that is predominantly hedonist; at worst, it is a
late insertion that contradicts the assertions of full-blown hedonism made in the
surrounding text.
Lest it be objected that my interpretations of any of the relevant passages
in Hume are somewhat crude, I shall say explicitly that I consider this to be a
virtue of my view. The direct evidence in favour of my position involves utterly
straightforward readings of Hume’s texts, taking what he says entirely at face
value. If opponents would challenge this position with careful glosses on Hume’s
remarks, or subtle re-readings of the texts, that in itself is already a presumption
against their alternative. Perhaps earlier passages can, with sufficient ingenuity,
be re-interpreted in the light of later claims, or later claims in the light of earlier,
so as to minimise any appearance of substantial difference. But by far the more
likely interpretation is that Hume genuinely changed his mind.
For there is nothing inherently improbable in the developmental story that
I have told in these chapters. It is not surprising that Hume should have begun
life as a hedonist and an egoist. These were popular views at the time, held in
particular by Hobbes and Locke (or at least, it was widely and plausibly held that
this was Hobbes’s view). No one doubts the important influence that these writers
had on Hume in general, and there is no reason why this influence should not
28McGilvary (1903, ibid.).
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have extended to this point in particular. Nor is it surprising that Hume should
then have changed his mind upon being confronted with Butler’s arguments; for
these arguments are indeed persuasive.
Nor is there anything unduly uncharitable about my interpretation. I have
charged Hume, it is true, with endorsing a false view in the Treatise, and moreover
with being inconsistent about it. These might seem like harsh criticisms. But
once we take into account the whole picture, they are quite the contrary. Of
course Hume was a hedonist to begin with. There is no shame in that: many
very intelligent people were at the time. It is easy for us to see the falsehood
of this position now, but we have the benefit of Butler’s brilliant insight, not to
mention Hume’s own very clear presentations of it in his later work, and almost
three centuries for these arguments to have sunk into the collective philosophical
consciousness. As for Hume’s inconsistency in the Treatise, this is surely very
much to his credit. It shows that he was prepared to wrestle with his inherited
commitments, in the light of persuasive arguments against them, and that he
was able to be moved by these arguments. And ultimately, of course, he himself
cleared up the inconsistencies that I have identified, and came down firmly on
Butler’s side, even against his own earlier self.
The significance of Butler’s contribution to the egoism debate has been
widely acknowledged.29 But Hume deserves his place in this story too, as the
first convert to Butler’s cause, who then quickly succeeded him as its best and
clearest defender. Though it was Butler who first had the insight, therefore, the
significance of Hume’s agreement should not be understated. Hume seems to
have been the only other notable philosopher of the period who actually got But-
ler’s point, and realised just how important it was; even Hutcheson, recall, didn’t
cotton on. This is all the more impressive when we realise that Hume started life
on the other side of the debate, and would have been initially hostile to Butler’s
conclusion in a way that Hutcheson was not.
29See Broad (1965, ch. 3), Nagel (1970, ch. 9), Blackburn (1998, ch. 5), Sober (2000).
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I have the sense that for some scholars there is a strong emotional resis-
tance to the idea that Hume’s thought might have developed during his adult
years, which goes along with a deep reverence for his early Treatise. And I an-
ticipate that, where I have charged the Treatise with errors or inconsistencies,
many will be eager to leap to its defence (perhaps preferring Garrett’s moderate
interpretation, for example, to my comparatively hard-line one). But quite why
this attitude has arisen, or what sustains it, I do not know. If it is the love of
Hume, leading to an aversion to the idea that he can ever have put a foot wrong,
then I suggest that it is misplaced. The best philosophers are those who correct
their mistakes; those who make none to begin with do not exist. And so when
I criticise the Treatise, it is not with a view to throwing mud at that work, in
order to make the later work shine by comparison. It is the love of Hume, and of






Superstition and the Passions
Taking my project now to be sufficiently motivated by the preceding argument, I
turn in this second part of the thesis to the study of Hume’s mature philosophy
of emotion as a whole, as presented in the Four Dissertations. I will run through
the topics that Hume addresses more or less in textual order (naturally skipping
over matters that have already been discussed in Part 1). This takes us through
a number of important Humean topics: superstition, hope and fear, association-
ism, the relationship between reason and passion, the causal interaction of the
passions, art and the passions, and the reply to the relativist about taste.
I begin, in this chapter and the next, with superstition and its causes (notably
the passions of hope and fear). My position is perhaps best summed up by
highlighting my opposition to an emphasis on the distinction between philosophy
and psychology, between reasons for belief and causes of belief. As we will see,
Hume was no stranger to this distinction. But it was his custom to run the
discussion of these two things together—for example in his famous argument
about induction, or in his criticism of belief in miracles—and the Natural History
of Religion is no exception. This latter work is generally viewed as Hume’s
major contribution to religious psychology. This would be fine by itself, but the
implication (and often it is more than just an implication) is that it contains
nothing of interest regarding the philosophy of this subject. On the contrary, I
will argue that this dissertation also includes a vital part of Hume’s attack on the
rationality of religious belief.
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7.1. Reasons and causes
It used to be thought that Hume’s interest in religion derived mainly from a
desire for notoriety, and that his post-Treatise attacks on Christian orthodoxy
were intended chiefly to excite some controversy and to boost book sales.1 We
now know better. Hume’s interest in religion was with him from the start, and if
his sceptical views were downplayed in the Treatise, this was only from prudence
or a desire not to offend. This interest, furthermore, is no small or detachable
aspect of his thought; on the contrary, a plausible case can be made for it being
the driving force behind his whole philosophy.2
Precisely because of its centrality, however, not to mention the sensitive
nature of the topic, there is no single work laying out Hume’s views on religion
systematically, and students of this aspect of his philosophy are obliged to garner
evidence from several different texts. Keith Yandell lists the Natural History
of Religion, the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, sections 10 and 11 of
the first Enquiry (Of Miracles and Of a Particular Providence and of a Future
State), and the three essays Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, Of Suicide, and Of
the Immortality of the Soul.3 J. C. A. Gaskin also includes—“less obviously”—
the moral Enquiry and the History of England for their moral attacks on religion,
and of course the Treatise.4
Given the scattered nature of this material, it is desirable to have some frame-
work in which to place Hume’s philosophy of religion, some way both of bringing
the relevant texts together, and of classifying their distinct but complementary
contributions to Hume’s overall critique. We owe the standard framework—
indeed, the only framework, so far as I am aware—to Gaskin.5 On Gaskin’s
1See for example Selby-Bigge (1893/1975, pp. xi-xii).
2See Russell (2008) and Millican (2002b, forthcoming).
3Yandell (1990, p. 4).
4Gaskin (2009, pp. 484-5). Gaskin notes that the Treatise “does not seem to us much
concerned with religion [because] our sensitivities regarding what would constitute an attack
on religion are much weaker than those of Hume’s contemporaries” (ibid.). Those wanting to
enhance their sensitivities in this regard should read Russell (2008).
5Gaskin (1988, 2009).
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view, the key distinction is that between reasons for belief and causes of belief
(where the latter may happen to be good reasons, but need not be):
Suppose we put the fundamental question thus: Why does anyone believe
in God or gods, or cleave to the teachings of such theistic religions as Chris-
tianity or Islam? The answer may be given (nonexclusively) in terms of
either reasons or causes, and it is under this division that Hume’s exami-
nation of religion begins to look like a comprehensive critique rather than
a collection of challenging but discrete sections.6
On this understanding, Hume’s explicit discussions of religion divide into those
examining the causes of religious belief (primarily the Natural History of Religion,
but also perhaps the earlier essay Of Superstition and Enthusiasm), and those
criticising the arguments in support of it (sections 10 and 11 of the first Enquiry,
the posthumous essays Of Suicide and Of the Immortality of the Soul, and of
course the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion).
The distinction between reasons and causes was certainly familiar to Hume,
and he even draws it himself in the context of religious belief, in the introduction
to the Natural History :
As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, there
are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit, that
concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human
nature. (N Intro, p. 33)
He goes on, seemingly, to restrict his attention in this work to the latter question
only: “What those principles are, which give rise to the original belief, and what
those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation, is the subject of our
present enquiry” (ibid.). On the face of it, this is clear support for Gaskin’s
framework.
As the reader will probably have guessed, however, I have been setting this
framework up with a view to knocking it down. The distinction between rea-
sons and causes, between philosophy and psychology, seems to me an extremely
6Gaskin (2009, p. 485).
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unhelpful one to use in carving up Hume’s critique of religion. I do not believe
that this distinction structured Hume’s own thoughts on the matter, and in §7.2
below I will examine the alternative distinction that I believe did. Immediately,
however, what troubles me about Gaskin’s framework is that it encourages a
blinkered interpretation of the Natural History.
This work obviously does provide (the main part of) Hume’s account of
the causes of religious belief, and so it certainly is a contribution to the study of
religious psychology. In fact, Gaskin if anything understates the importance of the
psychological context of the Natural History ; in §7.3 I will go further in insisting
on the relevance of Hume’s work on the passions in completing his account of the
origin of religious belief (a key component of my Unity Thesis). What I object
to, however, is the suggestion that this work is an examination of causes at the
expense of reasons:
[T]he account is of the causes and conditions that “naturally” produce
religion (as, for example, the presence of air and water “naturally” produces
rust on iron) without reference to any reasons that can be produced in favor
of or against the religion in question.7
Rather, I want to insist that it is a work of psychology and philosophy, containing
an important part of Hume’s overall attack on the rationality of religious belief
in addition to the discussion of its causes.
Though my focus here is obviously on the Natural History, the point gen-
eralises. Hume was perfectly well aware of the distinction between reasons and
causes (as we have seen), but the Natural History is by no means unique among his
works in running the discussion of these two things together. I am thinking here
particularly of Hume’s famous argument concerning induction, but also—more
relevantly in the present context—section 10 of the first Enquiry, Of Miracles.
7Gaskin (2009, p. 483). I am focusing on Gaskin here for exegetical convenience, because I
also want to highlight his framework and offer an alternative to it. But he is by no means alone
in this restricted interpretation of the Natural History. On the contrary, this is the mainstream
view. For example, “the Natural History of Religion... was essentially a sociological enquiry
into the origin of religion” (Jenkins 1992, p. 8); “Hume’s purposes in ‘The natural history’ were
not fundamentally critical” (Falkenstein 2003, p. 1).
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This essay suffers from precisely the opposite problem facing the Natural History :
being placed on the side of reasons rather than causes, its part 1 argument tends
to receive considerably more attention than the psychological discussion of part 2.
This latter, as well as being relevant to part 1, complements Hume’s account of
the causes of religious belief given in the Natural History. At the end of this
chapter (§7.5), I will also argue that the argument of the Natural History is an
important complement to the argument in Of Miracles.
7.2. Superstition and true religion
Before arguing directly for my claim that the Natural History of Religion con-
tributes to Hume’s discussion of reasons as well as causes, it is well to have my
alternative distinction for structuring Hume’s critique of religion in place. The
dichotomy that I propose instead is that between truth and falsehood. Since
philosophers and theologians naturally disagreed about religious truth, it was es-
tablished eighteenth-century practice to distinguish between “true” and “false”
religion, and to demean the latter with the name of “superstition”. Hume latched
onto this practice, verbally at least, openly criticising “superstition” on both
moral and rational grounds, while ostensibly endorsing “true religion”.8
It is doubtful whether these endorsements of true religion were sincere, and
it is also unclear how much Hume would be committed to even if they were. It is
possible, however, to place some definite upper and lower bounds on the notion
as it is deployed by Hume. The least that Hume’s true religion involves, first, is
the belief in an intelligent author of nature; or, at the very least, the belief that
“the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy
to human intelligence” (D 12.33, p. 227). As an upper bound, meanwhile, what it
presumably cannot include is the belief that this author of nature ever intervenes
in the natural order once it has been set up. That true religion precludes all
such particular divine intervention is suggested by the argument in support of it,
which is premised precisely on the absence of any such interference:
8See Bell (1999) for a discussion of this practice, and of Hume’s appropriation of it for his
own irreligious ends.
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Many theists, even the most zealous and refined, have denied a particular
providence, and have asserted, that the Sovereign mind or first principle of
all things, having fixed general laws, by which nature is governed, gives free
and uninterrupted course to these laws, and disturbs not, at every turn,
the settled order of events by particular volitions. From the beautiful
connexion, say they, and rigid observance of established rules, we draw the
chief argument for theism; and from the same principles are enabled to
answer the principal objections against it. (N 6.2, p. 52)
Within these two constraints, however,—the belief in invisible, intelligent
power, but the denial that it is among the immediate causes of particular events—
there remains much room for manoeuvre. Cleanthes’ quite precise statement of
(what he takes to be) true religion falls within these bounds:
[It] represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and
powerful; who created us for happiness, and who, having implanted in us
immeasurable desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and
will transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those
desires, and render our felicity compleat and durable. (D 12.24, p. 224)
But, for all I have said so far, true religion might also be consistent with the
author of nature being indifferent to good and evil (what Philo maintains is the
most probable hypothesis; D 11.15, p. 212), and with the mortality of the soul
and the absence of any future state (as Hume argues in Of the Immortality of
the Soul and section 11 of the first Enquiry). On top of this, there is also the
question, prompted by Gaskin’s rather rich interpretation of the notion,9 about
the “proper office of religion”, which, according to Cleanthes, “is to regulate the
heart of men, humanise their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and
obedience” (D 12.12, p. 220). Should this “proper office of religion” be built into
Hume’s concept as well, as Gaskin maintains?
It is wrong, I think, to expect a definite answer to the question of how thick or
thin Hume’s notion of true religion is. For when Hume is attacking superstition,
9Gaskin (1988, p. 188).
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he is deliberately vague about the alternative; as well he might be, since true
religion is in this context the face-saving escape route that he is strategically
offering to his orthodox readers. The less he says about it here, the more likely
such readers are to align themselves with it, and therefore to acquiesce in Hume’s
anti-superstitious arguments. And when Hume is not attacking superstition,
meanwhile, but directly considering how much should go into true religion, the
concept will necessarily be subject to much give and take, along with the flow
of the arguments. This is particularly clear in the Dialogues concerning Natural
Religion, which is after all a debate between three characters who all have very
different opinions on what counts as true in matters of theology.10
However that may be, the two limitations that we can confidently place on
Hume’s true religion—that it includes the belief in (something like) an intelligent
author of nature, but one who does not interfere with creation once it is set up—
are really all we need to make the concept a useful one. For they enable us to
explain both why true religion and superstition are classified together under the
broader heading of religious belief, and how they chiefly differ from one another.
Superstition is like true religion in as much as the superstitious also believe in
invisible, intelligent power. It is unlike true religion, however, in that the super-
stitious believe that this invisible power is among the immediate causes of certain
natural phenomena, and not just (or not even, depending on the superstition)
the initial intelligent cause of the whole frame of nature.
If we replace Gaskin’s distinction between reasons and causes with this dis-
tinction between superstition and true religion, a different way of framing Hume’s
discussions of religion emerges that is, I suggest, both less distorting of what he
says and closer to his own way of seeing things. On this suggestion, Hume’s
discussions of religion divide into those explicitly attacking superstition on both
moral and intellectual grounds (Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, Of Miracles, the
10For example, Demea speaks of “true Theists” at D 4.2 (p. 159), only to have Cleanthes claim
immediately afterwards that such as Demea has in mind are really atheists without knowing it
(D 4.3, p. 159). Philo once refers to “the true system of Theism” in an argument to the effect
that it is inconsistent with Cleanthes’ principles (D 5.2, p. 165).
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Natural History of Religion, Of Suicide, and Of the Immortality of the Soul),11
and those examining true religion with a view to seeing how much should go into
it (Enquiry section 11, the Dialogues). The difference in content between these
sets of works is also reflected by a striking difference in style: when discussing true
religion, Hume is notably more cautious and guarded, using the dialogue form to
distance himself from the debate and from his own controversial opinions; while
in the other texts he speaks his mind directly in his own voice.
In the early essay, Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, Hume ostensibly criticises
enthusiasm as well as superstition, both under the guise of “corruptions of true
religion” or “species of false religion” (SE 1-2, p. 73). Given my intention to
frame Hume’s critique of religion in terms of the superstition/true religion divide,
something ought to be said about where enthusiasm fits into this picture. The
obvious move, perhaps, is to include it alongside superstition, as a variation of
the false religions that Hume openly attacks. But this would be to miss the
irony in Hume’s essay. For although he begins by claiming that superstition and
enthusiasm are both “pernicious” (SE 2, p. 73), albeit in different ways, as we
proceed it quickly becomes apparent that he was not in earnest when he described
the consequences of enthusiasm in this way.
The essay draws three comparisons between superstition and enthusiasm.
The first is that “superstition is favourable to priestly power, and enthusiasm
not less or rather more contrary to it than sound reason and philosophy” (SE 5,
p. 75). But since Hume himself was obviously no friend to priestly power, this
is really an attack on superstition that leaves enthusiasm shining by comparison.
The second is that “religions, which partake of enthusiasm are, on their first rise,
more furious and violent than those which partake of superstition; but in a little
time become more gentle and moderate” (SE 7, p. 76). There is something of a
criticism of enthusiasm in this, certainly, but on the whole the ensuing discussion
emphasises how moderate and harmless the enthusiasts are now, in contrast with
the superstitious:
11In Of Miracles and Of the Immortality of the Soul Hume in fact ends by endorsing super-
stition (having first argued that it is irrational), on the grounds either of faith (E 10.40, p. 130)
or of revelation (IS 1, 45, pp. 590, 598). But these endorsements are obviously ironic.
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Superstition, on the contrary, steals in gradually and insensibly; renders
men tame and submissive; is acceptable to the magistrate, and seems in-
offensive to the people: Till at last the priest, having firmly established
his authority, becomes the tyrant and disturber of human society, by his
endless contentions, persecutions, and religious wars. (SE 8, p. 78)
The third and final comparison is that “superstition is an enemy to civil liberty,
and enthusiasm a friend to it” (SE 9, p. 78). Here, even the pretence at criticising
enthusiasm has disappeared altogether.
It is thus with a mild qualification that I place enthusiasm, for Hume, on
the side of true religion rather than false, notwithstanding his ironic claim to
the contrary at the start of this essay. The qualification is a consequence of the
point already made about Hume’s notion of true religion being vague (indeed
deliberately so). Because of this, we cannot definitively say whether enthusiasm
should count as a part of it or not. Nor, to be clear, am I suggesting that Hume
was himself an enthusiast; he wasn’t. But the superstitious—who are represented
by Demea in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, and correspond to the
rationalists or Platonists—are his primary target. In his works they are subject
to several fierce and open attacks, on both moral and rational grounds. The
enthusiasts, on the other hand, were much more acceptable to him (though he was
of course sceptical of their metaphysics). Their representative in the Dialogues is
Cleanthes, and they correspond to the sentimentalists or Stoics.
To return to the central issue, the only direct textual evidence in favour
of Gaskin’s framework is the introduction to the Natural History, which on the
surface does seem to carve things up in the same way that Gaskin does. But
Hume’s apparent setting aside of the question of reasons here was most likely
just a device to disarm any orthodox readers. Reading between the lines, we can
see that the distinction between superstition and true religion is once again at
play:
As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance,
there are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit,
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that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in
human nature. Happily, the first question, which is the most important,
admits of the most obvious, at least, the clearest solution. The whole
frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer
can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the
primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion. But the other question,
concerning the origin of religion in human nature, is exposed to some more
difficulty. (N Intro, p. 33)
The discussion that Hume is setting aside here is not in fact the rational basis of
religion in general, but only the rational basis of “genuine Theism”. And while
he allows that the basis of this belief is sound, nothing at all has been said about
the reasonableness of superstitious belief.
7.3. Hope and fear
What the above shows is that the introduction to the Natural History of Religion
at least does not rule out the possibility that this work will contain an attack
on the rationality of (superstitious) religious belief in addition to a discussion of
its causes. When we come to look at the text directly, in §§7.4 and 7.5 below,
we will see that it actually does contain just such an attack. Before turning to
this argument, however, the text must be placed in its proper context, as part of
Hume’s philosophy of emotion. It is the aim of the present section to lay out this
background.
In the Natural History itself, Hume tells us that superstition would never
have arisen but for the passions:
It must necessarily, indeed, be allowed, that, in order to carry men’s atten-
tion beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference
concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some pas-
sion, which prompts their thought and reflection; some motive, which urges
their first enquiry. (N 2.5, p. 38)
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But, Hume continues, “what passion shall we here have recourse to, for explaining
an effect of such mighty consequence?” (ibid.). His answer is the passions of hope
and fear: “the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works
of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the
incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind” (N 2.4, p. 38).
I will look at the details of Hume’s account in the next section. First, how-
ever, we need to acquaint ourselves with these two components of it, hope and
fear.12 The importance of these passions in Hume’s account is clear and explicit
in the Natural History itself. As if to ensure that no one would miss the connec-
tion, Hume also originally published this work in a volume bound up with the
Dissertation on the Passions immediately following it, a dissertation that begins
with his account of the direct passions, with a particular emphasis on hope and
fear: “None of these passions seem to contain anything curious or remarkable,
except Hope and Fear, which, being derived from the probability of any good
or evil, are mixed passions, that merit our attention” (P 1.7, p. 3). It is strik-
ing that commentaries on Hume seldom follow Hume’s own example and discuss
these things together.
Before looking at what Hume says about the passions of hope and fear, we
must take a step back to look at joy and grief or sorrow (Hume uses these last
two terms interchangeably); for these, as we will see presently, are the ingredients
of the mixed passions of hope and fear. On the one hand, joy and sorrow are
simply pleasant and painful passions respectively, regarding some fact, present or
past; the joy of a magnificent feast (T 2.1.5.1, p. 285), for example, or regarding
the birth of a son (T 2.3.9.14, p. 441; P 1.21, p. 6), or the sorrow at losing a
law-suit (ibid.). On the other hand, however, Hume also thinks of joy and sorrow
12These passions are also at the heart of Hume’s earlier and sketchier account in Of Supersti-
tion and Enthusiasm, where he attributes superstition to fear and other negative passions, and
enthusiasm to hope and other positive emotions (SE 2-3, pp. 73-4). In the Natural History, with
its focus on superstition, the emphasis is accordingly on fear rather than hope: “Agitated by
hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity,
the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in
this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure
traces of divinity” (N 2.5, p. 39; my emphasis).
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as pleasures and pains regarding imagined situations, possibly future. “When
good is certain or very probable,” he tells us, “it produces joy”, and likewise for
evil and sorrow (P 1.4, p. 3; my emphasis; cf. T 2.3.9.5, p. 439).
Hume’s idea that we experience joy in response to possible future pleasures as
well as actual present ones seems to me somewhat puzzling. There is a precedent
for the idea in Locke: “Joy is a delight of the Mind, from the consideration of
the present or assured approaching possession of a Good” (1690, p. 231; second
emphasis mine).13 This Lockean precedent, however, does not render the notion
any the less problematic. I am not troubled by the idea that the anticipation of
a future joy, as well as the present experience, can be or give rise to a kind of
pleasure. What troubles me is the suggestion that there is one single passion—
joy—for both of these cases. It seems to me only natural to distinguish joy
from (let us say) excitement. The possession of a certain book will give me
joy; having ordered it, I am pleasantly excited. But these are two very different
feelings. Similarly with sorrow and (let us say) apprehension: loss of the book
will make me sad, while consideration or anticipation of this loss instead makes
me apprehensive.
Joy and sorrow are, for Hume, the ingredients of the mixed passions of hope
and fear (P 1.10, p. 4). As one might expect, however, it is the anticipatory sort
of joy and sorrow that Hume has in mind here, what might less misleadingly be
termed (as above) excitement and apprehension respectively.
With this point cleared up, the next most remarkable feature of Hume’s
account is the perhaps surprising extent to which reason is involved in the pro-
duction of these passions. Hope and fear, for Hume, are not unthinking “gut
reactions”, but rather felt responses to the intellectual exercise of weighing up
probabilities:
13Locke’s definition of sorrow, by contrast, is restricted to real evil: “Sorrow is uneasiness in
the Mind, upon the thought of a Good lost, which might have been enjoy’d longer; or the sense
of a present Evil” (ibid.). But it is easy to see how one might extend the pleasant case to the
unpleasant one, as Hume does.
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Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, by
which the mind is not allowed to fix on either side; but is incessantly tossed
from one to another, and is determined, one moment, to consider an object
as existent, and another moment as the contrary. ... Suppose, then, that
the object, concerning which we are doubtful, produces either desire or
aversion; it is evident, that, according as the mind turns itself to one side or
the other, it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow [excitement
or apprehension]. ... According as the probability inclines to good or evil,
the passion of grief or joy [apprehension or excitement] predominates in
the composition; and these passions being intermingled by means of the
contrary views of the imagination, produce by the union the passions of
hope or fear. (P 1.8-10, pp. 3-4; cf. T 2.3.9.10-2, pp. 440-1)
Given the extent to which reason is involved in the production of these passions,
and the role that these passions then have in the generation of religious belief,
it should, I hope, be immediately doubtful that Hume’s account of the causes of
this belief should be straightforwardly separable from the question of the reasons
that might be given in support of it. At the very least, we have grounds for
approaching the matter with an open mind. When we do approach the matter,
in the next two sections, I will indeed argue that the two are intimately bound
up with each other.
7.4. The origin of polytheism and monotheism
The origin of polytheism, Hume argues, lies in mankind’s ignorance of the true
causes of the several ills that face them, and in their natural tendency to “conceive
all beings like themselves” (N 3.2, p. 40). Thus the “unknown causes” become
intelligent agents (albeit invisible), with powers much greater than our own, but
with “thought and reason and passion” just like us (N 3.2, p. 41). What motivates
this postulation of invisible intelligence, Hume says, is not “speculative curiosity...
or the pure love of truth”, but rather “the anxious concern for happiness, the
dread of future misery, the terror of death” (N 2.5, p. 38). Our hopes and fears
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give us a very pressing need to know what causes “the various contrary events of
human life” (ibid.), so that we can gain some control over them.14
As we have seen, Hume does not consider hope and fear to be immediate un-
thinking emotional responses. On the contrary, they are mediated by judgments
of probability, i.e. of cause and effect. It is only to be expected, therefore, that
reasoning concerning cause and effect is going to be relevant for Hume here, and
that his discussion is not likely to be purely descriptive or psychological. Sure
enough, Hume is quite clear and explicit that this first form of religious belief is
contrary to the evidence:
Could men anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least most
intelligible philosophy, they would find, that these causes are nothing but
the peculiar fabric and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies
and of external objects; and that, by a regular and constant machinery, all
the events are produced, about which they are so much concerned. But
this philosophy exceeds the comprehension of the ignorant multitude, who
can only conceive the unknown causes in a general and confused manner;
though their imagination, perpetually employed on the same subject, must
labour to form some particular and distinct idea of them. (N 3.1, p. 40)15
Polytheism, as far as Hume is concerned, is thus bad science. There is nothing a
priori objectionable about it; the belief in invisible, intelligent power is perfectly
consistent and possible. Hume makes this point particularly clear in the ambitious
claim that “the whole mythological system is so natural, that, in the vast variety
14Hume does not think that we arrive at the belief in invisible, intelligent power from some
desire to explain the world around us, but from the much more basic need for control (or at least
the illusion of it). The contrary interpretation was suggested by Yandell (1990), but refuted
very thoroughly by Ferreira (1995).
15This passage is reminiscent of one in the first Enquiry : “A peasant can give no better
reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right:
But an artist easily perceives, that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the
same influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust,
which puts a stop to the whole movement” (E 8.13; p. 87; cf. T 1.3.12.5, p. 132). Superstitious
believers are in the same epistemic situation as the peasant; but instead of searching for the
grain of dust they allow their imaginations to conjure up an idea of some invisible supernatural
agent responsible for keeping watches ticking (or at least with the power to stop them).
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of planets and worlds, contained in this universe, it seems more than probable,
that, somewhere or other, it is really carried into execution” (N 11.1, p. 65). We
needn’t take this suggestion about the existence of gods on other planets too
seriously. Toning down the rhetoric, we nevertheless have the important point
that the existence of supernatural agents is, for Hume, an unproblematic a priori
possibility. “The chief objection to it with regard to this planet,” he goes on, “is,
that it is not ascertained by any just reason or authority” (N 11.2, p. 65).
In offering his account of the psychological causes of polytheism, therefore,
Hume has been unable to refrain from saying that this particular brand of su-
perstition is irrational. The argument here is presumably very obvious to many
twenty-first-century readers. But, obvious or not, it is an argument against the
rationality of (one form of) religious belief. Certainly Hume is pursuing a psy-
chological investigation in the Natural History ; but that isn’t the only thing he
is doing.
Monotheism differs from polytheism only in the insistence that there is but
one true God. Hume charts the emergence of such forms of superstition in the
felt need to flatter one deity above all the others, because this particular god
is supposed to be in charge either of the believers’ own nation, or of all the
other gods (N 6.5, p. 53). Eventually, after sufficient exaggeration of the praises
bestowed on this god, all others are seen as vain pretenders. And perhaps this
supreme deity will even be credited with creating the world, in which case his
votaries “coincide, by chance, with the principles of reason and true philosophy”
(N 6.5, p. 54). But as long as this deity, however supreme, is still supposed to
disturb “the settled order of events by particular volitions” (N 6.2, p. 52), the
belief is unjustified, founded on “irrational and superstitious principles” (N 6.4,
p. 53; my emphasis).
7.5. The miraculous and the momentous
To be clear, it is not just that the religious beliefs in question (both polytheistic
and monotheistic) have, as a matter of historical fact, been founded on irrational
150 CHAPTER 7. SUPERSTITION AND THE PASSIONS
principles, while there might be other paths to these beliefs that are rational.
The only rational path that Hume countenances to religious belief ends in true
religion, which only allows for the existence of a non-interventionist god. The
superstitious, however, believe in the existence of at least one divinity who in-
terferes in the settled order of things, and this belief is not just arrived at by
irrational principles, according to Hume, but is itself irrational, since all the
evidence available points to natural causes of the contentious phenomena.
This a posteriori argument that there is no evidence for supernatural in-
tervention will doubtless call to mind Hume’s famous (and much more widely
discussed) argument against the testimonial evidence of miracles, in section 10
of the first Enquiry. Perhaps it will even be thought that, when Hume claims
that there is no evidence of supernatural intervention in the Natural History, he
is merely recalling that argument; for of course testimony of miraculous events
purports to be just that. The Natural History is not simply referring back to an
argument given elsewhere, however, but offering a different argument of its own.
In doing so, furthermore, it is filling an important gap that would otherwise be
left in Hume’s attack on religion, as I now explain.
Perhaps it is easily forgotten that the superstitious see the work of super-
natural agency, not just in miraculous events, but also in natural events that
are suitably momentous. Droughts are nothing miraculous, but they are of such
devastating consequence that the superstitious are apt to see them as the result
of divine wrath. It is no miracle, either, that someone should recover from a
potentially (but not necessarily) fatal illness, but when a superstitious friend has
been praying for this very thing, they will readily see the hands of a particular
providence at work:
Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar, why he believes
in an omnipotent creator of the world; he will never mention the beauty of
final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant... He will tell you of the sudden
and unexpected death of such a one: The fall and bruise of such another:
The excessive drought of this season: The cold and rains of another. These
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he ascribes to the immediate operation of providence: And such events,
as, with good reasoners, are the chief difficulties in admitting a supreme
intelligence, are with him the sole arguments for it. (N 6.1, p. 52)
The issue in the case of purported miracles is not whether supernatural
agency was responsible, but whether the supposed miracle actually took place.
Thus Hume’s argument in Of Miracles is designed to show that reports of miracu-
lous events are never sufficiently credible, given the antecedent unlikelihood of the
event reported, to establish that it genuinely occurred. The issue in the present
case, on the other hand, is not whether the event hoped for or dreaded really took
place, but whether anything divine was directly responsible. Hume’s argument in
the Natural History, accordingly, does not attempt to undermine the reliability
of testimony. Rather, Hume points to the observed order and regularity in the
world: when we “anatomize nature” more closely, we discover that the causes of
these momentous events are in fact “nothing but the peculiar fabric and structure
of the minute parts of [our] own bodies and of external objects; and that, by a
regular and constant machinery, all the events are produced, about which [we]
are so much concerned” (N 3.1, p. 40).
Thus we see that Hume’s psychological discussion of the causes of religious
belief is intimately bound up with the philosophical issue of the arguments or
evidence in support of it. The distinction between reasons and causes, while
itself perfectly legitimate and known to Hume, just is not a distinction that can





In the previous chapter, I argued against viewing the Natural History of Religion
as concerned exclusively with the causes of religious belief and not at all with its
rational credentials. I also argued, in general, against framing Hume’s critique
of religion in terms of this distinction, preferring instead the distinction between
superstition and true religion. In this chapter, I aim to provide some additional
support for these claims, and in various ways to complete my picture of the first
of Hume’s four dissertations. I shall do this through a series of comparisons:
between Hobbes and Hume, between polytheism and monotheism, between my
own interpretation and some others, and finally between the earlier and the later
Hume on this matter.
8.1. Hobbes on the origin of religious belief
In part 1, chapter 2 of his Leviathan, Hobbes briefly attributes “the greatest
part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past” to the “ignorance of how to
distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense” (1651,
p. 18). His point, simply enough, is that vivid imaginings and daydreams may
pass for reality, giving rise to a belief in all manner of fanciful things. Towards
the end of chapter 11, however, and in chapter 12, he sets out in more detail what
he takes to be the main causes of religious belief.
Polytheism, first, is attributed by Hobbes to the ignorance of natural causes
and fear regarding an uncertain future:
153
154 CHAPTER 8. SOME COMPARISONS
[T]hey that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet
from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that
hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose,
and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand
in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as
also in the time of unexpected good successe, to give them thanks; making
the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. (1651, p. 75)
Fear, thinks Hobbes, is the inevitable upshot of our ignorance, since we are of
course so very concerned for our own future. And fear must needs have its object:
“therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of
their good, or evil fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible” (1651, p. 76).
The similarities with Hume’s account of the origin of polytheism are striking.
There is no explicit mention by Hobbes of our natural tendency towards anthro-
pomorphism, but some such idea seems to be implicit later on in his explanation
of our behaviour towards supernatural agents:
[F]or the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers invisible, it can
be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use
towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Considerate
Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, as-
suring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. (1651, p. 78).
Otherwise the two key components of Hobbes’s account—ignorance of natural
causes, and fear for an uncertain future—are exactly the same as in Hume’s
account. Hume’s discussion is much longer than Hobbes’s, and his theory is
worked out more fully, with more offered by way of evidence. But the basic
account itself was not new with Hume.1
1Before he worked out his account in more detail, Hume presented, in Of Superstition and
Enthusiasm, an explanation of the origin of superstitious belief more closely in line with Hobbes:
“The mind of man is subject to certain unaccountable terrors and apprehensions, proceeding
either from the unhappy situation of private or public affairs, from ill health, from a gloomy and
melancholy disposition, or from the concurrence of all these circumstances. In such a state of
mind, infinite unknown evils are dreaded from unknown agents; and where real objects of terror
are wanting, the soul, active to its own prejudice, and fostering its predominant inclination,
finds imaginary ones, to whose power and malevolence it sets no limits” (SE 2, pp. 73-4).
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Regarding monotheism, however, Hobbes and Hume differ more significantly.
According to Hobbes, the belief in monotheism has a more respectable explana-
tion, namely curiosity satisfied by the cosmological argument that there must be
a unique first cause:
But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may
more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of
naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the
feare of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any
effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate
cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge
himselfe profoundly into the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this,
that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First
Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that
which men mean by the name of God[.] (1651, p. 77)
Hume, as we have seen, suggested instead that reason was no more the origin
of monotheism than it was of polytheism. Rather, it arises out of this more
primitive superstition, and in much the same way: the idolatrous “are guided to
that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure incapable, but
by the adulation and fears of the most vulgar superstition” (N 6.5, p. 54).
For this reason, Hume devotes the first section of the Natural History to
arguing that polytheism was prior to monotheism. This is a claim that Hobbes
had no need to make or defend. In this, and in the attendant account of the origin
of monotheism, we have one of Hume’s most significant original contributions to
the psychology of religious belief.
8.2. Comparisons between monotheism and polytheism
It is well known that Hume’s objections to superstition were moral as well as
intellectual, a point that I already made in passing in the previous chapter, but
have not yet sufficiently emphasised. In particular, it has not escaped scholarly
notice that the Natural History, in addition to offering an account of the causes of
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religious belief, also spends some time discussing what Hume saw as its pernicious
moral effects.2 This is the focus of most of sections 9-12 (for the remaining part,
see §8.3 below), in which Hume compares monotheism and polytheism in various
respects, typically pertaining to morality, and with the former almost always
coming off the worse of the two. In section 14 he then argues explicitly for the
“[b]ad influence of popular religions on morality” (N 14, title, p. 81).
Given this moral dimension to the text, it is clear (even by Gaskin’s own
admission) that this work is not solely concerned with causes. The distinction
between reasons and causes, indeed, leaves no room at all for a discussion of
religion’s effects, on morality or anything else. When we see the Natural History
instead as part of Hume’s overall attack on superstition, however, everything falls
very neatly into place; for this attack is comprehensive, challenging superstition
from the point of view of both reason and sentiment.
If the introduction to the Natural History is intended to be disarming, by
giving the impression that what follows will concern only causes and not reasons,
the introductions to Hume’s other attacks on superstition are typically more
forthright:
I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument... which, if just, will,
with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of super-
stitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world
endures. (E 10.2, p. 110)
One considerable advantage, that arises from philosophy, consists in the
sovereign antidote, which it affords to superstition and false religion...
[S]uperstition, being founded on false opinion, must immediately vanish,
when true philosophy has inspired juster sentiments of superior powers.
(Su 1, pp. 578-9)
That the corruption of the best things produces the worst, is grown into a
maxim, and is commonly proved, among other instances, by the pernicious
2See Penelhum (1975, p. 173-4), Gaskin (1988, chapter 11), Webb (1991), Ferreira (1999).
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effects of superstition and enthusiasm, the corruptions of true religion.
(SE 1, p. 73)
This last quotation, from the essay Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, also sets
the tone for the comparisons between polytheism and monotheism in the Natural
History. Hume dresses up this latter, thinly-disguised attack on monotheistic
religions with the same maxim—“that the corruption of the best things begets
the worst” (N 11.1, p. 65)—politely allowing that monotheism in the form of true
religion is better than pagan idolatry, while enabling him to pull no punches in
his criticism of its superstitious corruptions.
The importance of the Natural History in Hume’s overall attack on the moral-
ity of superstition should not be overlooked, any more than in his overall attack
on its rationality. It is of course in the moral Enquiry that Hume develops his own
secular account of moral distinctions, without which this attack would have no
solid foundation. And it is in the moral Enquiry that Hume uses this foundation
to argue that the “monkish virtues” of “[c]elibacy, fasting, penance, mortification,
self-denial, humility, silence, solitude” are really vices (M 9.3, p. 270). But the
Natural History provides a very important addition to this argument, by offering
an explanation of why the superstitious are led to the practice of these monkish
virtues:
The duties, which a man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely owing
to his benefactor or children; nor can he be wanting to these duties, without
breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination
may prompt him to the performance: A sentiment of order and moral
obligation joins its force to these natural ties: And the whole man, if truly
virtuous, is drawn to his duty, without any effort or endeavour. ... In all
this, a superstitious man finds nothing, which he has properly performed for
the sake of this deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the divine
favour and protection. He considers not, that the most genuine method
of serving the divinity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures. He
still looks out for some more immediate service of the supreme Being, in
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order to allay those terrors, with which he is haunted. And any practice,
recommended to him, which either serves to no purpose in life, or offers the
strongest violence to his natural inclinations; that practice he will the more
readily embrace, on account of those very circumstances, which should
make him absolutely reject it. It seems the more purely religious, because
it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or consideration. (N 14.6,
pp. 82-3)
Because there are, in human nature, motivations to moral behaviour that do
not involve any reference to the divine (as argued in the moral Enquiry), such
behaviour is only coincidentally motivated (if at all) by the desire of pleasing God.
In order to demonstrate their devotion, therefore, and to secure divine favour,
the superstitious must needs pursue actions that are in no way recommended
by, or are perhaps even contrary to, our natural benevolent instincts: “if he [the
superstitious man] fast a day, or give himself a sound whipping; this has a direct
reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No other motive could engage
him to such austerities” (ibid.).
Where the moral Enquiry offers a criticism of the monkish virtues, therefore,
the Natural History turns this into a criticism of superstition, by arguing that
the former are the natural consequence of the latter. The connection between
superstition and the monkish virtues is observed in the moral Enquiry, but it is
only in the Natural History that it is explained.
8.3. The bull-rush argument
Most of Hume’s comparisons between polytheism and monotheism in the Natural
History are moral, as we have seen above. Section 11, however, compares the two
“[w]ith regard to reason or absurdity” (N 11, title, p. 65). (This was the exception
that I had in mind in my qualification at the start of §8.2, page 156.) What Hume
has to say about polytheism in this connection was already noted in passing in
the previous chapter (§7.4, page 148): he takes it to be a straightforward a
priori possibility, and therefore not inherently absurd, but one that happens to
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be contradicted by the evidence. Yet again, monotheism comes off worst from
the comparison, for it frequently lands itself in a priori absurdity in addition to
involving claims that are contrary to experience.
Hume provocatively suggests that an “appetite for absurdity and contradic-
tion” (N 11.3, p. 66) is almost inevitably coincident with popular theology:
If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines
would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be
raised: Mystery affected: Darkness and obscurity sought after: And a
foundation of merit afforded to the devout votaries, who desire an op-
portunity of subduing their rebellious reason, by the belief of the most
unintelligible sophisms. (ibid.)
Hume doesn’t mention any such “sophisms” explicitly, or spell out the arguments
of “rebellious reason” against them; but the insinuation is already clear enough.
There are as many a priori objections to monotheistic superstitions, Hume thinks,
as there are absurdities associated with them.
Hume is admittedly pessimistic about the persuasive force of these a priori
objections. In a memorable passage, he writes that “[t]o oppose the torrent of
scholastic religion by such feeble maxims as these, that it is impossible for the
same thing, to be and not to be, that the whole is greater than a part, that two
and three make five; is pretending to stop the ocean with a bull-rush” (N 11.5,
p. 66). But there is no denying that this bull-rush, though it only contradicts some
forms of superstition, is another part of Hume’s general attack on the rationality
of religious belief.
It seems to me that the a posteriori argument against superstition that Hume
offers alongside his account of its causes, which targets belief in momentous but
non-miraculous events (recall §§7.4 and 7.5), is intrinsically rather more inter-
esting than the bull-rush argument of section 11. But this latter argument is of
indirect interest, in providing the nail in the coffin of Gaskin’s framework and
his interpretation of the Natural History as a purely psychological work. When
we view Hume’s dissertation in this way, the bull-rush argument becomes eerily
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invisible. But there it is all the same, together of course with the moral critique.
When we replace Gaskin’s distinction with that between superstition and true
religion, meanwhile, and see the Natural History as just one more of Hume’s sev-
eral works aimed at criticising the former on both moral and intellectual grounds,
we can comfortably make sense of the text in its entirety.
8.4. Hume’s agnosticism and Hume’s atheism
Though mine seems to be a minority view, I am not altogether alone in thinking
that the Natural History of Religion contributes to Hume’s discussion of reasons
as well as causes. Recently Peter Kail has defended precisely this claim:
The prevalent view is incorrect. NHR [the Natural History of Religion] is
a philosophically important and powerful component in Hume’s campaign
against the rationality of religious belief.3
Kail’s reasons for thinking this, however, are quite different from my own. And
while I welcome the conclusion, I disagree with the argument that gets him there.
I am anxious, therefore, to distance myself from Kail’s position.
According to Kail, the Natural History constitutes Hume’s argument against
a view that Kail calls “rational fideism”: “the position that it is rational to
maintain religious belief in the absence of evidence or arguments in its favour”.4
The kernel of Hume’s supposed argument is that some causal explanations of
belief are destabilizing, in the sense that they give one a reason to suspend the
belief in question in the absence of any evidence in support of it (for example,
believing something merely because of being told by a habitual liar); and that
Hume’s explanation of religious belief is of this kind. Furthermore, Kail thinks
that Hume’s attack on religion is incomplete without an argument against the
rational fideist. For although Hume argues elsewhere that there is no evidence
3Kail (2007b, p. 191).
4Kail (2007b, p. 195).
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for religious belief, this does nothing to upset the fideist who thinks it is rational
to believe even in the absence of such evidence.
There seem to me to be two objections to the suggestion that Hume was
offering this argument in the Natural History. The first is the obvious one: that
if he was offering it, he certainly had a curiously secretive way of doing so. The
rational fideist is never mentioned or even alluded to by Hume as a target, nor
does he ever so much as hint at the crucial premise in Kail’s argument (that his
explanation of the causes of religious belief is destabilizing in Kail’s sense). The
argument may well have been inspired by Hume, but Kail is unable to produce
any textual evidence that shows Hume himself actually rehearsing it. The case is
quite different, note, with the a priori bull-rush argument noted in the previous
section, and the a posteriori argument that I looked at in the previous chapter;
uncovering those arguments required no imagination on my part, but emerged
from a simple exercise in comprehension.
The second difficulty for Kail is that this argument against rational fideism,
were Hume to endorse it, would involve conceding too much to his opponents.
For Hume does not in fact believe that there is an absence of evidence in the
present case: as we have seen, he is quite explicit in the Natural History that
the evidence is against the existence of any supernatural intervention: “Could
men anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least most intelligible
philosophy, they would find, that these causes are nothing but the peculiar fabric
and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external objects”
(N 3.1, p. 40). In Hume’s attack on superstition, therefore, there is quite simply
no gap for the rational fideist to move into.
Kail is not the first commentator to have read arguments into the Natural
History of Religion that are not actually there. Gaskin himself, though a major
promoter of the idea that this work is concerned exclusively with causes, does
at least allow that Hume’s psychological story has philosophical implications, in
forming the basis of a reply to the argument from common consent:
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[A]n adequate account of the causes of religious belief, though not itself
philosophy, is an essential complement to [Hume’s] philosophical thinking
about religion. If, as Hume seems to conclude, the arguments of natural re-
ligion are bad or establish only a hesitant and highly attenuated conclusion,
and if the authenticity of revelation is suspect, then an appeal will almost
inevitably be made by the believer to the argument from general consent:
why is it that religious belief is and always has been so very prevalent?5
My objection to this suggestion is exactly the same as to Kail’s. While Hume
might have used the account of the origins of religious belief given in the Natural
History as the basis of a reply to the argument from common consent, there is
no line of text in this work where he actually does, or even so much as hints at
the possibility. Furthermore, to repeat, Hume doesn’t merely maintain that the
arguments in favour of superstition are suspect or unsuccessful; he also insists
that there is positive evidence in the other direction, in the form of the observed
regularities in nature.
The situation is analogous in the two essays Of Suicide and Of the Immor-
tality of the Soul, where Hume doesn’t only criticise the arguments in favour of
life after death and the immorality of suicide, but offers positive arguments for
the opposite conclusions. In the latter, for example, he writes that “[t]he physical
arguments from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul;
and these are really the only philosophical arguments, which ought to be admit-
ted with regard to this question, or indeed any question of fact” (IS 30, p. 596).
His position is not that there is an absence of evidence. His position is that the
evidence tells against superstition.
There is a general sense—and it might be this that underlies the assumption
common to Kail and Gaskin that I am here opposing—that Hume tended more
towards agnosticism than outright atheism. After all, isn’t that the appropriate
stance for a Sceptic to take? There may be some truth to this; I do not have the
space or the need to delve into the matter deeply here. But whatever we ought
5Gaskin (1988, p. 183).
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to say about this, we must start with the distinction between superstition and
true religion. If there is any sense in which Hume was agnostic, it only concerns
true religion. When it comes to superstition, as I have said, he is openly and
unequivocally opposed to it all the way down. Perhaps true religion (in some
attenuated form) is consistent with the known facts, and with a just sense of
morals. But superstition, for Hume, is in accordance with neither.
8.5. The three Enquiries
Before moving on from the Natural History of Religion, it is time to bring out
explicitly what has only been implicit in the discussion of this chapter and the
previous one, namely the evidence that this dissertation offers in support of my
Unity Thesis and Difference Thesis. Regarding the Unity Thesis, the point is
perhaps already obvious. Hume’s account of the origin of superstition depends
crucially on the passions of hope and fear, which receive their explanation, in turn,
in the Dissertation on the Passions. Thus without Hume’s philosophy of emotion,
his account of the causes of religious belief remains incomplete. And there is a
value to appreciating this context too, since an attention to the role of reason in
the generation of hope and fear can help to undermine the popular thought that
Hume’s explanation of religious belief is devoid of rational implications.
If we keep Hobbes in mind, we should not be at all surprised by the fact that
Hume published the Natural History of Religion together with the Dissertation
on the Passions. Quite aside from the particular connection between these two
works, namely the passions of hope and fear, this combination was not new with
Hume. In part 1 of the Leviathan, Hobbes offers his account of motivation and the
passions (mainly in section 6) before applying it to the phenomenon of religious
belief (predominantly in section 12). The Four Dissertations are the same in
this respect, save only that Hume presents the religious application before the
background psychological theory. In claiming that these things belong together
in Hume, I am not suggesting anything idiosyncratic on his part.
164 CHAPTER 8. SOME COMPARISONS
The contribution that the Natural History makes to the Difference Thesis,
meanwhile, should be equally obvious, though not from the preceding discussion.
Hume did not change his mind about anything offered in this dissertation, so far
as I can discover. But the simple fact is that he added a considerable amount
that is nowhere to be found in the Treatise. And additions, no less than changes,
constitute substantial differences. This might seem like too crude a point to
bother mentioning at all. Given the extraordinarily disproportionate amount of
attention that is lavished on the Treatise, however, at the expense of Hume’s later
works, it is well worth making.
Of course, the addition of the Natural History only counts as a difference
between Hume’s earlier and later philosophy of emotion on the assumption of my
Unity Thesis. And it might be thought that I am somewhat overstating the case
here. Even if it is allowed that Hume’s account of the causes of religious belief has
close ties to his philosophy of the passions, the fact is that the Natural History
includes more than just this account. There is also the bull-rush argument, for
example, and the moral critique of superstition. Don’t these show that this
dissertation cannot really be thought of as a part of Hume’s Enquiry concerning
the Passions?
As I see things, however, the fact that the Natural History oversteps the
bounds of the philosophy of emotion in these ways only serves to strengthen
my hypothesis, for two reasons. First, this is exactly the pattern that we see
when moving from Books 1 and 3 of the Treatise to the two Enquiries, with the
addition of the attack on belief in miracles in section 10 of the first Enquiry (not to
mention the cautious discussion of true religion in section 11), and the criticism
of the monkish virtues in section 9 of the moral Enquiry. The psychological
discussion in part 2 of section 10 of the first Enquiry is no more out of place in
a Humean enquiry concerning the understanding, than the philosophical aspects
of the Natural History are in a Humean enquiry concerning the passions.
Secondly, these philosophical aspects of the Natural History complement
the two Enquiries in important ways, notably in the argument against belief in
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momentous events that parallels the more famous one concerning miracles (recall
the previous chapter, §§7.4 and 7.5), and in the criticism of the bad influence of
superstition on morality for which the groundwork was laid in the moral Enquiry
(recall §8.2 above). My Unity Thesis focuses on the integration of the Four
Dissertations amongst themselves, but what we have seen of the Natural History
in this chapter suggests that they have a tight connection with Hume’s mature
philosophy as a whole. The Four Dissertations are not only united with each
other by their shared concern for the passions; they are also closely connected




The Intentionality of the Passions
Back in §3.1, I insisted that the passions, for Hume, are not bodily sensations,
but sentiments (a term that is nicely ambiguous between “feeling” and “opin-
ion”), and that we should resist the temptation to classify Hume as a crude non-
cognitivist about emotions. In this chapter—before turning, in the next chapter,
to Hume’s famous views on the relationship between reason and passion—I will
expand on this claim. I will also examine more fully Hume’s theory of the double
relation of sentiments and ideas (first introduced in §4.1), arguing that an error
surrounding this theory in the Treatise prompted Hume to make his account of
some of the passions even more cognitivist in his later work.1
9.1. Cognition and the passions
“Cognition” has become a somewhat technical term, with many philosohpers
using it slightly different ways. I shall try to be as clear as possible about the
sense that I attach to it. I have in mind three closely related mental powers that
seem to come as a package, and which many animals have, but human beings
in a particularly high degree. The central one is conscious awareness, both of
oneself and of one’s surrounding environment (together with the ability to identify
aspects of the latter as things of a certain kind; food, shelter, predator, potential
1I first presented this argument in Merivale (2009), and my opinion has not changed since
then. In some respects the present discussion is briefer; in others, I hope, it is a little clearer
and more refined.
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mate, and so on). The surrounding powers are the retention of this awareness
in the form of memory, and the the imaginative ability to anticipate, or more
generally to speculate about the unobserved (past and present, as well as future).
This speculation may involve deductive inferences, in such animals as are capable
of them, but in general I would place much greater emphasis on induction in this
connection. Certainly I mean to exclude abstract (mathematical, philosophical)
reasoning from my concept of cognition; this strikes me as a quite different ability,
unique to human beings, and a much later evolutionary development. However
that may be, it is only the kinds of cognitive powers that we have in common
with other animals that matter in the context of the present discussion.
An extreme non-cognitivist view of the passions would see them simply as
bodily sensations, or at any rate as akin to bodily sensations in respect of their
relationship to cognition. On this view, saying that I am happy because you
are here, is just like saying that I am warm because the heating is on. In both
cases, there is an external stimulus, and contact with that stimulus causes a
certain feeling. The room that I am in is hot, and consequently I have a feeling a
warmth. Just so, I see that you are here, and consequently experience a feeling of
elation; or I see a snake, and consequently experience a feeling of fear; and so on.
Hume’s placement of the passions alongside sensations, in the broader category
of impressions or sentiments, invites the thought that he was an extreme non-
cognitivist of this sort. And indeed, many have been attracted to something very
like this interpretation.2
Perhaps the most immediate problem for this extreme view is that cognition
seems to be necessarily or at least typically involved in the causal processes that
give rise to emotions, in a way that it is not for bodily sensations. I need not be
aware that the heating is on in order to feel warm; the temperature will have this
effect on me regardless. But I do need to be aware that you are here for this fact
to make me happy. Furthermore, errors in cognition can give rise to emotions,
something for which there is nothing analogous in the case of bodily feelings. If I
don’t realise that you have left, I may continue to be glad that you are here; or I
2Pitcher (1965), Solomon (1977), Deigh (1994), Zemach (2001).
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may be glad when someone tells me that you’re here, although in fact you are not.
Finally, we also have emotional responses to imagined possible situations. For
example, I can hope that you will come, or be pleased by the thought that you
might, even though you haven’t come yet, and even if you don’t end up coming
at all. Sometimes, then, cognition is the sole cause of our emotions; and even
when there is some external stimulus, cognition seems generally to be a necessary
intermediary.3
All of this, however, is something Hume is in complete agreement with.
We have seen the evidence for this already, but may now draw attention to it
explicitly. Hume in fact holds the very strong view that cognition is always
the immediate cause of almost all of the passions. (The exceptions are some—
but not all—of our original, object-directed desires, which are caused, insofar as
they have a cause at all, simply by our motivational make-up; see §9.4 below.)
Joy and sorrow are caused by the ideas of whatever it is that we are glad or
unhappy about. Hope and fear are caused by judgments of probability (recall
§7.3).4 Pride, humility, love, and hatred are caused by associations of sentiments
and ideas (recall §4.1; I will examine this aspect of Hume’s view again in §9.5
below). Malice and envy are caused by comparisons of ourselves with others. And
pity and generosity are caused by the sympathetic communication of passions,
a process which crucially involves awareness of oneself, of the other person, and
an idea of the passion being communicated. Kames, as we may recall from §3.1,
defined a sentiment as a “thought prompted by passion” (1762, vol. 1, p. 311).
For Hume, meanwhile, passions or sentiments—aside from the few exceptional
desires mentioned above—could be accurately described as feelings prompted by
thought. In this respect, at least, Hume was not the extreme non-cognitivist that
he is so often considered to be.
3Generally, but maybe not always. Perhaps, for example, there is an immediate fear reaction
to certain common and particularly dangerous stimuli that bypasses any conscious awareness
or classification of the threat. Such a reaction would presumably be quicker than one mediated
by cognition, and therefore come with an obvious evolutionary benefit. This is of course not
to deny that a cognitively mediated response, though more costly, has some compensating
advantages: it would function more widely and reliably, and adapt to a changing environment.
4Thus there is, for Hume, no immediate fear response of the sort hypothesised in note 3
above. I am inclined to think that Hume’s view was probably too cognitivist in this respect.
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It is one thing to hold that the passions are caused by cognition, but what
about the inherent nature of the passions themselves? Opinions on this matter
can vary enormously, both in kind and in sophistication. It will be sufficient
for present purposes to have two fairly crude views in place for consideration, at
different ends of the cognitivist/non-cognitivist spectrum. The simplicity in my
statement of these views is quite deliberate: we should be wary of saying too
much here on Hume’s behalf, for the truth is that he never thought the matter
through in any detail himself. Nevertheless, it is profitable to imagine what he
might have been able to say, consistently with his explicit commitments, even if
only to better acquaint ourselves with those other commitments.
Cognitive states—be they states of present awareness, memories, or spec-
ulations concerning the unobserved—are all about something or other (real or
imagined). They are intentional states. When I am aware that you are here, my
awareness has a certain intentional content; this content is, as we might say, that
you are here. I take it for granted that the passions also have intentional content,
specifically the same intentional content that their immediate cognitive causes
have. When I am glad because you are here, I am also glad that you are here.
Unfortunately, Hume is often thought to have denied this surely undeniable fact.
I will argue in the next section that he did not.
More interesting in this connection is the question of how or in what way
the passions have this intentional content. It is in their different answers to this
question that my two somewhat crude views about the nature of the passions
distinguish themselves. The view at the non-cognitivist end of the spectrum holds
that the passions have intentional content only in a derivative way, by virtue of
being appropriately related to the cognitive state that causes them (a state which
presumably has that content in an intrinsic, non-derivative way). Perhaps merely
being the effect of this cognitive state is enough, though that seems unlikely; a
plausible first stab might be to add that one must also be aware of this causal
connection. I see that you are here, I feel glad, and I realise, furthermore, that
my joy is the result of your presence; thus my feeling comes to be about the fact
that you are here, by a causal connection, and a conscious association.
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The more cognitivist view, by contrast, holds that the passions have inten-
tional content in their own right, and in exactly the same way that cognitive states
do. It holds, in fact, that the passions themselves actually are special kinds of
cognitive states. The difference between merely being aware that you are here,
on this view, and being glad that you are here, does not consist in the addition
of some separate feeling (such as the non-cognitivist view proposes). Rather, the
difference is in the manner of my awareness: I can be aware of your presence in
an emotionally neutral or indifferent way, or I can be aware of your presence in a
glad way.
Translating these alternative views as well as possible into Humean terms,
we may safely say that Hume’s ideas are cognitive states that have intrinsic
intentional content. The question, then, is whether sentiments or passions have
intentional content only derivatively, by virtue of being appropriately related
to some idea, or whether they have some intrinsic intentional content, in the
same way that ideas do. This is the question that I want to address in the
remainder of this chapter. The answer to it is not, as we will see, a simple either-
or matter. In the Treatise, I will argue, Hume held that the intentionality of the
passions was entirely derivative. In the Dissertation on the Passions, however, he
made some steps in the direction of a more cognitivist view, insisting that some
of the passions—namely the double-relation passions (pride, humility, love, and
hatred)—have some intrinsic intentional content.
9.2. The representative quality argument
I said above that Hume does not deny the intentionality of the passions, but
before going any further I need to justify this preliminary claim. For there is one
particular (and famous) passage from the Treatise in which he appears to deny
precisely this. Following Phillips,5 I will refer to this as Hume’s representative
quality argument :
5Phillips (2005, p. 308).
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A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence,
and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of
any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually
possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to
any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot
high. ’Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be
contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the
disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they
represent. (T 2.3.3.5, p. 415)
The logic of this argument is, I trust, sufficiently clear. Just in case, we can
reconstruct it perhaps even more clearly as follows:
1. To be contradictory to truth and reason is to be a representation or copy
of something, but “disagree” with that thing (i.e., presumably, to be an
inaccurate representation).
2. Passions are not representations or copies of anything (let alone inaccurate
ones).
3. A fortiori, then, passions are not contradictory to truth and reason.
The difficulty arises from the second premise: that a passion “contains not
any representative quality”, or that, in having an emotion, I have “no more a
reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than
five foot high”. Phillips objects to this premise by reading it as a denial of the
intentionality of the passions: “Hume is wrong to think that passions cannot
represent: anger, his own example, typically has cognitive content (one is angry
with a person, institution, etc.)”.6 Baier is even more forthright, dismissing this
whole paragraph as “very silly” on the grounds of this interpretation of the second
premise.7 Many others have read the premise in the same way, some to complain
about it, and some merely to observe that this was Hume’s view.8
6Phillips (2005, p. 311).
7Baier (1991, p. 160).
8Kenny (1963/2003, p. 17, n1), Millgram (1995, p. 87), Prinz (2004, pp. 11,52), Garrett
(2006, p. 303), Penelhum (2009, pp. 250-1).
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I can certainly see why the wording of Hume’s second premise gave rise to this
interpretation. In context, however, it seems to me that there is a much better
interpretation available. On this alternative reading, Hume is not denying that
the passions have intentional content, but rather, denying that they are truth-apt.
This makes much better sense of the last sentence of Hume’s argument, where he
says that for something to be contradictory to truth and reason is for it to disagree
with the object that it is supposed to represent. Why this talk of disagreement,
if Hume is simply denying that the passions have any objects at all? The point,
I suggest, is not that anger isn’t directed at anything; the point is rather that it
isn’t a copy, that it isn’t representation of anything with which it might disagree.
Beliefs are representations of some part of the world in this sense, and because of
that they can be false representations (and hence contrary to truth and reason).
Hume is simply claiming, in this argument, that the passions are not like that ;
he is not suggesting that they are not about anything at all.
Hume restates this argument at the start of Book 3 (explicitly describing it
as a repetition of the earlier argument). In this second presentation, it is even
more apparent that this is what Hume meant by the troublesome premise:
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists
in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to
real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of
this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can
never be an object of our reason. Now ’tis evident our passions, volitions,
and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement;
being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no
reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. ’Tis impossible, there-
fore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary
or conformable to reason. (T 3.1.1.9, p. 458)
Again, the logic is surely perfectly clear, but for even more transparency we might
represent it thus:
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1. To be conformable/contrary to reason is to be true/false (because reason is
the discovery of truth and falsehood).
2. Truth/falsehood consists in agreement/disagreement with reality.
3. Passions, volitions, and actions are not susceptible of this agreement or
disagreement (so they are not truth-apt).
4. Passions, volitions, and actions, therefore, are neither conformable nor con-
trary to reason.
This is indeed essentially the same argument as before. There are, however,
a few noteworthy differences. First, Hume adds his explicit definition of reason
as the discovery of truth and falsehood, which is presumably there to motivate
the claim that being conformable (or contrary) to reason is a matter of being true
(or false). Secondly, he splits up his first premise into two. Where in Book 2 he
said directly that for something to be contrary to reason was for it to disagree
with the object that it is supposed to represent, he now inserts falsehood as a
middle term: for something to be contrary to reason is for it to be false, and for
something to be false is for it to disagree with the object that it is supposed to
represent. This second difference surely makes my preferred interpretation of the
troublesome premise inescapable.
There are two further differences not directly relevant to the present point,
but which might as well be brought out for clarity. In Book 2, Hume focuses
on being contrary to reason: passions cannot be false, and therefore cannot be
contrary to reason. In Book 3, he draws the obvious complementary conclusion
as well: passions cannot be true either, and so can be neither contrary nor con-
formable to reason. And not only passions, but volitions and actions as well,
which likewise are not truth-apt. I take it that there is nothing different about
the logic here, and that if any one of these inferences works, then they all do.
It is simply that, by beefing up the premises in the Book 3 presentation, the
conclusion is correspondingly more meaty.
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I am not presently interested in the merits of Hume’s representative quality
argument (though I will have something to say on this head in §10.5). The
point to take away from the present section is that Hume, in this argument, did
not deny that the passions have intentional content.9 This is the only passage,
furthermore, in which he even appears to be denying this. Elsewhere, he seems,
like any normal person, to take the intentionality of the passions for granted.
In section 1 of the Dissertation alone, for example, he talks of trembling at the
prospect of torture (P 1.17, p. 5), of feeling anxious upon the account of a sick
friend (P 1.19, p. 5), of being aﬄicted for the loss of a law-suit, or joyful for the
birth of a son (P 1.21, p. 6).
To be clear, I take it that the representative quality argument does not
even commit Hume to the view that the intentionality of the passions is merely
derivative, the upshot of being related in some appropriate way to an idea. As it
happens, I believe that this was Hume’s view (see §9.3), but not for this reason.
For suppose that one holds the alternative, more cognitivist view, according to
which passions are themselves cognitive states (but emotional ones, rather than
bare or indifferent ones). On this view, there is a sense—a very trivial sense—in
which the passions are truth-apt and within the jurisdiction of reason: they are
true or false when the corresponding bare cognitive state is true or false. But the
point of Hume’s argument is not to deny this. In fact, he explicitly allows that
the passions can be contrary to reason in this trivial sense:
According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, ’tis only in
two senses, that any affection can be call’d unreasonable. First, When a
passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on
the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Sec-
ondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient
for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and
effects. (T 2.3.3.6, p. 416)
9A fuller defence of this claim is given in Weller (2002); Cohon (1994, pp. 188-9) seems to
agree as well, although Weller, curiously, cites her as an opponent.
176 CHAPTER 9. THE INTENTIONALITY OF THE PASSIONS
The point is rather that the passions can never be contrary to reason in any further
and characteristically emotional way. What Hume has in mind is obviously what
is distinctive about the passions, as opposed to the corresponding bare cognitive
states: the feeling or manner of the awareness. It is this aspect of emotional life,
according to Hume, that has no counterpart in external reality against which it
might be measured as true or false, as conformable or contrary to reason. This
view (surely a very plausible one) is not only consistent with the intentionality of
the passions, but also consistent with the more cognitivist understanding of this
intentionality as intrinsic rather than derivative.
9.3. Simple and complex
This being said, I take it nevertheless that Hume’s view of the intentionality of
the passions is best understood—in the Treatise, at least—as a derivative rather
than an intrinsic matter. This is because of his insistence that the passions are
simple perceptions, rather than complex ones. A passion that was intrinsically
intentional in nature would presumably be complex, consisting both of the aware-
ness (which it has in common with bare, unemotional states), and of the feeling
or manner of this awareness. But this does not seem to have been Hume’s view;
his position was that the essence of an emotion was feeling alone.
The simple/complex distinction is first drawn in the second paragraph of the
Treatise, immediately following the distinction between impressions and ideas:
There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient
to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas.
This division is into Simple and Complex. Simple perceptions or impres-
sions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The
complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts.
Tho’ a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together
in this apple, ’tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least
distinguishable from each other. (T 1.1.1.2, p. 2)
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Near the start of Book 2, meanwhile, Hume states explicitly that the passions
are simple rather than complex:
The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impres-
sions, ’tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just
definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. (T 2.1.2.1, p. 277)
The specific examples are pride and humility, but he says that the same is true
“of any of the passions” (my emphasis). At the start of part 2, furthermore, he
repeats the point with regard to love and hatred:
’Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and
hatred ; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without
any mixture or composition. (T 2.2.1.1, p. 329)
Hume does allow that the passions can mix with one another, and in this way
form “compound” emotions (T 2.2.3.1, 2.2.11.1, pp. 347, 394). Hope and fear, for
example, are both mixtures, in different proportions, of joy and sorrow (T 2.3.9.16,
pp. 442-3; recall §7.3); respect and contempt are mixtures, respectively, of love
with humility, and hatred with pride (T 2.2.10.3, p. 390); love between the sexes
is a mixture of affection, the pleasure of beauty, and sexual desire (T 2.2.11.1,
p. 394). But these compound mixtures are not complex in the present sense:
Ideas may be compar’d to the extension and solidity of matter, and impres-
sions, especially reflective ones, to colours, tastes, smells and other sensible
qualities. Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow’d with a kind
of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other, and are capable of
forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture. On the
other hand, impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union;
and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them
may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which
arises from the whole. (T 2.2.6.1, p. 365)
Thus the mixture of love and humility, for instance, does not give rise to a complex
passion, but to a simple and uniform impression of respect; as a mixture of red
and green light does not give rise to a red-green complex, but to yellow.
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In the passages quoted above, where Hume says that pride, humility, love,
and hatred are all simple impressions, he also insists that simplicity entails inde-
finability, since a definition (of a complex perception) is just an enumeration of
its component parts.10 (Presumably, then, Hume’s reduction of the compound
mixtures into their ingredients are not definitions in the strict sense of that term.)
“The utmost we can pretend to,” Hume goes on, “is a description of them, by an
enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them” (T 2.1.2.1, p. 277), i.e. their
causes and effects.11
9.4. The double-relation passions
It is at this point, however, that matters become rather more complicated, and
rather more interesting. The first thing that we need to put in place is Hume’s
distinction between the causes and the objects of the passions. He draws this
distinction only in the case of the double-relation passions: “The object of pride
and humility is self: The cause of the passion is some excellence in the former
case; some fault, in the latter. The object of love and hatred is some other person:
The causes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults” (P 2.3, p. 7). We
can perhaps get a clearer idea of what Hume is getting at with this distinction
by looking at the main passions that he discusses side by side, and in a canonic
form:
Joy I am glad because of something good.
Sorrow I am sad because of something bad.
Hope I am hopeful because something good may happen.
10“Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enu-
meration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them” (E 7.4, p. 62).
11That the passions are simple impressions in the Treatise is, to my mind, beyond all question.
The evidence that we have just seen is as clear and unambiguous as textual evidence can be. It
is surprising, therefore, to find quite a few people denying it; Dietl (1968), Sutherland (1976),
Inoue (2003), Alanen (2006). I shall not discuss these alternative interpretations here, as I have
criticised them in detail elsewhere (Merivale 2009, pp. 192-5, 198-200). For now, I will simply
let Hume’s explicit claims to the contrary speak for themselves.
9.4. THE DOUBLE-RELATION PASSIONS 179
Fear I am afraid because something bad may happen.
Generosity I am glad because you are glad.
Pity I am sad because you are sad.
Malice I am glad because you are worse off than me.
Envy I am sad because you are better off than me.
Pride I am proud of myself because I have/did something good.
Humility I am ashamed of myself because I have/did something bad.
Love I love you because you have/did something good.
Hatred I hate you because you have/did something bad.
Everything on the right-hand side of the “because” in these presentations of the
passions is, for Hume, the cause of the sentiment on the left-hand side. In the
case of the double-relation passions, however, there is also something else on
the left-hand side, namely oneself or another person. This is the object of these
passions.
As I have said, Hume only explicitly draws this object/cause distinction in
the case of the double-relation passions. On his behalf, however, I am tempted
to draw it in the case of desires as well, and to say that the objects of desire are
indeed objects in the sense of this distinction, rather than causes. Thus:
Benevolence I want you to be happy because I love you.
Anger I want you to be miserable because I hate you.
Gratitude I want you to be happy because you did something nice for me.
Resentment I want you to be miserable because you did something mean to me.
If this is right, then it may further be noted that, while every desire must have
an object, some have no cause (in the appropriate sense):
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Parental love I want my children to be happy.
Ambition I want power.
Vanity I want praise.
These desires do have a cause in another sense, but that cause is simply our
general sentimental make-up: I want power because I’m ambitious; I want praise
because I’m vain.12 These are the exceptions that I had in mind in §9.1 above,
when I noted that some desires are not immediately caused by cognition.
I am going to make a controversial claim shortly about the double-relation
passions, and their relationship with their objects. Insofar as the parallel holds,
it seems to me that the same ought to apply to desires and their relationship
with their objects. The only textual evidence that I have for my claim about
the double-relation passions, however, comes from what Hume says specifically
about these sentiments. I mention the similarity merely because it seems to
me quite striking. But it is a flimsy basis on which to infer anything about
Hume’s understanding of desire in this regard. I will remain entirely silent on the
relationship between desires and their objects, because I cannot find any text on
which to base any firm conclusions on this matter.
Be that as it may, with this distinction in place I can start to approach my
controversial suggestion. Since the passions are all very clearly simple perceptions
in the Treatise, I assume, for the reasons given in the previous section, that their
intentionality is a matter of standing in some appropriate relationship to an idea,
and not an intrinsic feature of the feelings themselves. This goes both for the
causes of the passions and for their objects. And indeed, Hume is most explicit
about the simplicity of emotions in the case of the double-relation passions, the
only ones (except perhaps desires) that have objects as well as causes.
In the Dissertation on the Passions, however, Hume’s view appears to be
quite significantly different. I assume he still thought the intentionality that the
12I am thinking of vanity here as it occurs in the moral Enquiry. In Treatise Book 2 and
the Dissertation, vanity does have a cause in the appropriate sense: we want praise because it
reinforces our good opinion of ourselves. Recall §5.3.
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passions derive from their causes was an extrinsic, relational matter, for there
is nothing to suggest otherwise. In the case of the double-relation passions and
the intentionality associated with their objects, however, matters are different.
Recall, first, the two Treatise passages quoted in the previous section, about the
simplicity and indefinability of these passions:
The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impres-
sions, ’tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just
definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. (T 2.1.2.1, p. 277)
’Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and
hatred ; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without
any mixture or composition. (T 2.2.1.1, p. 329)
And let us add to this, for good measure, his claim that the “sensations” associ-
ated with pride and humility “constitute their very being and essence” (T 2.1.5.3;
p. 286). Now compare these very strikingly different claims in the Dissertation
on the Passions :
Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplish-
ment or possession, which we enjoy: Humility, on the other hand, is a
dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.
Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his ac-
complishments or services: Hatred, the contrary. (P 2.1-2, p. 1)
Inclined as I am to take things at face value, and open to the possibility that
Scotsmen can change their minds, these seem pretty clearly to me to be precisely
the sorts of definitions that Hume had earlier maintained were not possible. Pride
is a satisfaction in ourselves, and humility is a dissatisfaction in ourselves; love
is a complacency in another, and hatred a displeasure in another. And where in
the Treatise the satisfaction or dissatisfaction alone was said to be the essence
of pride and humility, in the Dissertation we are told that what is “essential
to pride” is “to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satisfaction”
(P 2.4, p. 7; my emphasis).
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To spell this out, my suggestion is that, on Hume’s mature view, the double-
relation passions are now complex perceptions, consisting both of an awareness of
self or another and the manner of this awareness (a satisfaction or dissatisfaction).
They are themselves cognitive states, ways of being aware of oneself or someone
else. It may be that feelings of joy, for example, are not intrinsically about the
good things that prompt them. If so, it would be possible—logically, at least,
if not psychologically—to have a feeling of joy not prompted by anything, and
not about anything. In the same way, it may be that feelings of pride are not
intrinsically about the good qualities or actions that give rise to them, in which
case it would be possible to have such a feeling in the absence of the usual cause:
simply to feel proud, without that pride being because of any particular thing
that we have or have done. But it is not possible, on the present suggestion, to
have a feeling of pride that is not intrinsically about oneself. Feeling proud just
is thinking of oneself in a certain way (a positive way). And similarly for the
other double-relation passions.13
One advantage of this interpretation of Hume’s later account of the double-
relation passions is that it corrects what was a very strange and counterintuitive
feature of Hume’s position in the Treatise. Hume’s later view, on my face-value
interpretation of what he says, is surely right. It is impossible to feel love or
hatred that is not love or hatred for someone, and it is impossible to feel pride
or humility that is not a satisfaction or dissatisfaction with oneself. I can see
grounds for debate about the intentionality that the passions derive from their
causes, and whether this is intrinsic or a matter of being appropriately related
to an idea. With the intentionality that the double-relation passions derive from
their objects, however, it is very difficult to see any appeal whatsoever in Hume’s
earlier position.
I am by no means alone in this reaction. Indeed, the counterintuitiveness of
this aspect of the Treatise account is quite a common source of complaint. Here,
for example, is A´rdal’s clear statement of the objection:
13Insofar as the parallel with desire holds, it would be similarly impossible to have a desire
that is not a desire for something. It may however be possible to have a desire for something
for no reason; or perhaps better, simply because that’s the sort of person that one is.
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Hume thinks of the relation of pride and its object as a contingent relation.
One might be proud and yet not think of oneself... But, contrary to Hume’s
view, one must insist that it would be logically absurd to suggest that a
man might have the passion of pride, and, at the same time, that the object
of this pride... is another and not the person himself. Hume, who in most
places appears to think of pride as a form of self-valuing, ought to have
seen that ‘to think highly of oneself because of y’ and ‘to be proud of y’ are
two ways of saying almost the same thing, and that the relation to oneself
is a logical aspect of pride without which it could not be pride at all.14
I sympathise very much with A´rdal’s criticism. But I sympathise more with
Hume, whose own clear and express wishes have since been ignored by genera-
tions of philosophers, who “have taken care to direct all their batteries against
that juvenile work, which the Author never acknowledged, and have affected to
triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it”
(Ad 1777, p. 2). Hume’s mature statement of his considered position, meanwhile,
continues to be ignored.
9.5. The double relation theory (again)
Hume may or may not have had something like A´rdal’s objection in mind when
he made this revision to his Treatise account of the double-relation passions.
I can find nothing to suggest that he did, but it seems a perfectly plausible
motivation. However, there is another potential reason for the change as well,
and we can say with rather more confidence that this would have been an effective
consideration for Hume. The double-relation passions are of course so named
because Hume endeavours to account for them with his theory of the double
relation of sentiments and ideas. This theory is almost certainly the aspect of
Hume’s philosophy of emotion that he was most proud of, both when he wrote
Book 2 of the Treatise and when he came to rework it into the Dissertation on
the Passions, for it dominates both of these works. But there is a very significant
14A´rdal (1966, pp. 23-4).
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(and frequently overlooked) problem with the Treatise presentation of this theory,
and it stems from the fact that the double-relation passions are not intrinsically
about their objects. By changing his mind on this matter, however, Hume thereby
fixed his theory.
It is perhaps easiest to bring out this point by explaining first how the double
relation theory works according to the Dissertation account, with the double-
relation passions being intrinsically about their objects, in the same way that
ideas are intrinsically about their content. In the causes of pride, for example,
Hume discovers two crucial features: first, they are good things, that give rise to
pleasure, or joy, or some such positive emotion; and second, they are in some way
associated with oneself (more than with anyone else, or no one at all). These
things, when we encounter or think about them, therefore have a natural tendency
to make us think about ourselves, because of the association of ideas. They also
make us feel good, and feeling good about something has a natural tendency
to make us feel good about other things as well, because of the association of
sentiments. Put these two things together, and add to them the mutual assistance
of these associative principles, and the more or less inevitable result is that these
things make us feel good about ourselves.
The important point here is that, for this causal story to make sense, pride
and the other double-relation passions all have to be on the far end of two kinds
of relation: a relation of ideas and a relation of sentiments. That is to say, they
have to be complex perceptions, comprising both an idea component (awareness
of self or another) and a sentiment component (satisfaction or dissatisfaction). If
pride, in and of itself, is simply a feeling of objectless satisfaction, then the whole
thing falls apart. For a start, there is then nothing to distinguish it from love;
but more importantly there is no reason why it should be excited specifically by
things that are related to oneself. And similarly for the other three.
That at least is the basic idea. Now for the gory detail. In the Treatise, the
idea of self is not an intrinsic component of the passion of pride, but is merely
related to it externally. As we will see, Hume is not perhaps entirely clear on the
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nature of this relationship, but what he mostly says is that the idea is a causal
consequence of the passion. For example:
The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or pro-
ductive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that
passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self.
Here then is a passion plac’d betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces
it, and the other is produc’d by it. (T 2.1.2.4, p. 278)
Or again, a few sections later:
[N]ature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition
fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride:
To this emotion she has assign’d a certain idea, viz. that of self, which it
never fails to produce. (T 2.1.5.6, p. 287)
But if the idea of self is the effect of pride, then there is no association of ideas
that ends with this emotion. A potential cause of pride, being appropriately
related to me, may cause me to think of myself by the association of ideas. But
now that I am thinking about myself, how is the feeling of pride supposed to
follow? The feeling of pride, Hume says, isn’t an effect of the idea of self, it’s a
cause of it. So once I’m thinking of myself, I’ve already gone a step too far. The
story sounds vaguely all right when you don’t look at it too closely, but when you
start to think about the detail—about the exact chain of events in the overall
process—the whole thing falls apart.
We might propose to get around this problem by saying instead that the idea
of self produces the feeling of pride, rather than the other way round. There is
even some oblique textual evidence that Hume was tempted by this view himself
(although the statements quoted above to the opposite effect are much clearer
and more direct). For example, when first drawing the distinction between the
causes and objects of pride and humility, Hume writes that “tho’ that connected
succession of perceptions, which we call self, be always the object of these two
passions, ’tis impossible it can be their cause, or be sufficient alone to excite
186 CHAPTER 9. THE INTENTIONALITY OF THE PASSIONS
them” (T 2.1.2.3, p. 277-8; my emphasis). This naturally suggests that it is
sufficient when joined with other circumstances. Perhaps more clearly, Hume
later writes:
In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate,
viz. the cause or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is
the real object of the passions. (T 2.1.6.5, p. 292)
This gives the impression that Hume thought pride was produced by a combina-
tion of its cause (in his technical sense) and its object.
On this alternative reconstruction of the theory in the Treatise, we do get
a little further. The details break down as follows: first, the cause produces
both the idea of self (by the association of ideas), and a separate pleasure; and
next, the separate pleasure has a tendency to produce pride (by the association
of ideas), while the idea of self also has a tendency to produce pride (for reasons
unknown). Putting the two things together at the second stage, pride is the more
or less inevitable result.
This is certainly an improvement on our first attempt. But the situation
is far from ideal. Not only is it inconsistent with Hume’s remarks about pride
producing the idea of self (rather than the idea of self producing pride), but it also
doesn’t square with everything that Hume says about the workings of the theory
itself. The theory is supposed to depend, we may recall, not only on the two
principles of association, but also on their mutual assistance. The problem with
this second reconstruction is that there can be no such collaboration, because
the association of ideas has already done its job at the first stage, before the
association of sentiments gets to work at stage two. The principle of mutual
assistance states that the two associative principles “very much assist and forward
each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur
in the same object” (T 2.1.4.4, p. 284). But on the present proposal they don’t
concur in the same object: the association of ideas prompts the idea of self, while
the association of sentiments prompts the entirely distinct feeling of pride.
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To return to where we started, there is only one way in which the two asso-
ciative principles can concur in the same object, and that is if the object that they
both concur in is a complex perception, part sentiment and part idea. That is
precisely the view suggested most naturally by Hume’s definitions of the double-
relation passions in the Dissertation, as feelings of self-satisfaction and the like.
This view is both more plausible in its own right, and makes better sense of the
double relation theory. I submit that it was for this second reason, at least, if
not also for the first, that Hume changed his mind when he came to revisit his




Undoubtedly the most famous thing that Hume wrote about the passions is that
“[r]eason is, and ought only to be [their] slave” (T 2.3.3.4, p. 415). This remark
is a victim of its own success. Moral philosophers since have been so taken with
the project or either confirming or refuting it, that the discussion in which it
appears has become increasingly divorced from its original context. For example,
Charles Pigden’s recent collection devoted to this topic contains only two passing
references to Samuel Clarke, and no mention at all of Nicolas Malebranche, though
these were Hume’s principal targets.1 Its contributors seem content to study
Hume’s argument without so much as a glance in the direction of the views that
it was intended to refute.
In this chapter, I mean to inject some much-needed historical context back
into this discussion, examining first the views of Malebranche and Clarke, and
then of Hutcheson. Having done so, making sense of Hume will be a comparatively
straightforward matter. I also have another point to make in support of my
Difference Thesis. The substance of Hume’s view of the relationship between
reason and passion did not change after the Treatise, so far as I can see, but the
way in which he argues for it did. In particular, the famous representative quality
argument, which I examined in §9.2, is abandoned. I will argue that this is an
improvement rather than a loss.
1Pigden (2009). The references to Clarke are on pages 7 and 213, where his name is men-
tioned, but nothing more.
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10.1. Malebranche against the passions
In §1.1, I introduced Hutcheson’s criticism of Clarke’s moral rationalism, but
quickly set it to one side, the better to focus on the egoism debate. Now is the
time to pick it up again and look at it more closely. To understand the view
that Hume followed Hutcheson in opposing, however, the best place to start—
according to Hume’s own account of the matter—is not with Clarke, but with
Malebranche: “Malebranche, as far as I can learn, was the first that started
this abstract theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by Cudworth,
Clarke, and others” (M 3.34, n12, p. 197).
Malebranche’s two major influences were St. Augustine and Rene´ Descartes.2
From the latter he inherited—among many other things—the doctrine of the real
distinction between mind and body, and its attendant conception of the mind as a
non-extended, thinking thing. From the former he inherited—again among other
things—a neo-Platonic conception of the doctrine of Original Sin, according to
which God is our only true good and is to be loved above all things, the corporeal
world is to be shunned as leading us away from this sole good, and our close
connection with our bodies (which draws us so strongly in the wrong direction)
is God’s punishment to all mankind for Adam’s eating of the apple. It is the
Augustinian strand of Malebranche’s thought that is of interest here, for it is this
that dominates his treatment of the passions. Furthermore, it was precisely this
sort of view that Hume was reacting against in his famous discussion of reason
and passion.
Malebranche’s most extended examination of the passions is to be found in
book 5 of his De la Recherche de la Ve´rite´ (1675), but for a slightly fuller picture
we must begin with book 4. This preceding book discusses what Malebranche
calls the “natural inclinations” of the mind, which are the purely mental aspects of
the will, untainted by bodily interference. They stand to the passions as thought
stands to sensation or imagination (p. 337).
2Nadler (2006, p. 1).
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Because Malebranche’s God loves himself above all else, and because he
creates our wills in the image of his own, Malebranche concludes that our primary
natural inclination must be towards God or his glory:
It is an unquestionable truth that God can have no other principal end for
His operations than Himself... Since the mind’s natural inclinations are
undoubtedly the constant impressions of the Will of Him who has created
and preserves them, it seems to me that these inclinations must be exactly
like those of their Creator and Preserver. By their very nature, then, they
can have no other principal end than His glory[.] (p. 226)
Since God’s creation participates in his goodness, however, God may have as a
secondary end the preservation of his creatures: “God wills His glory, then, as His
principal end and the preservation of His creatures only for His glory” (p. 226).
Again, our natural inclinations follow suit: “since God unceasingly imprints in
us a love like His own... He also provides us with all those natural inclinations
that... necessarily dispose us toward preserving our own being and the being of
those with whom we live” (p. 267).
For reasons that are somewhat obscure (or which at any rate have so far
escaped my understanding), God’s self-love manifests itself in us as “the love
of the good in general” (p. 267), rather than as the love of God (though for
Malebranche, I take it, God is the only truly good thing, which perhaps goes
some way towards explaining the switch). Whatever its basis, this love that we
have of the good in general does not force us to love only what is in fact good;
we cannot love what we do not think is good, but God has left us free to make
mistakes in this regard: “the power of loving badly, or rather of loving well what
we should not love at all, depends on us, because as free beings we can and do in
effect determine toward particular, and consequently false, goods the good love
that God unceasingly imprints in us” (p. 267).
The passions, now, are for Malebranche the chief causes of precisely these
sorts of errors. He does allow that they have a useful purpose, namely the preser-
vation of the body, by directing us towards things that are good for it:
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The senses and the passions were given to us only for the good of the body.
Sensible pleasure is the mark that nature has attached to the use of certain
things in order that without having to bother with a rational examination
we might use them for the preservation of the body[.] (p. 359)
On the whole, however, the passions do us more harm than good. The inclination
that they give us towards the good of the body might have been fine by itself,
if only we could remember that “we are not our body; it is a thing belonging to
us” and that “[t]he good of our body is therefore not our good” (p. 359). But
since the Fall of Adam, “God has withdrawn from us” (p. 360), weakening our
connection with him and what is truly good, and strengthening our tie to our
bodies.
As a result of God’s departure, we are now in constant peril of such sinful
things as the love of strawberries (my example, not Malebranche’s, but this really
does seem to be his position). For we mistakenly think that strawberries (or
whatever else it might be) are the causes of our pleasure, not realising that they
are merely the occasions on which God chooses to give us pleasure (a reference to
Malebranche’s occasionalist view of causation). We mistakenly think that they
are good for us and not just good for our bodies. And so we direct our love where
it should not be directed (e.g. at strawberries), thereby exciting God’s righteous
anger:
We can and must love what is capable of making us sense pleasure, granted.
But it is for this reason that we must love only God, because only God
can act in our soul and because sensible objects can do no more than
move our sense organs. But what difference does it make, you will ask,
where these pleasant sensations come from? I only want to enjoy them.
Ingrate, take a look at the hand heaping goods upon you! You exact unjust
rewards from a just God; you would have Him reward you for the crimes
you commit against Him, and at the same time you commit them... But
death will corrupt this body, and God, whom you have made serve your
unjust desires, will mock you when His turn comes and then will make you
serve His own just wrath. (pp. 359-60)
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The mind, for Malebranche, lies “between God and body, between good and
evil, between that which enlightens it and that which blinds it, that which sets
it in order and that which disrupts it, between that which can make it perfect
and happy and that which can make it unhappy and imperfect” (p. 363). The
passions, as we have seen, are the emissaries of the body. They drag us away
from God and true felicity; they “involve us in error with regard to the good”
and “they must be resisted continuously” (p. 357). Reason, by contrast, is the
emissary of God. The free consent of our wills must therefore shun the passions
and follow instead our God-given reason:
This consent must be regulated and kept free in spite of all the efforts of the
passions. Only to God should it subjugate its freedom; it should surrender
only to the voice of the Author of nature, to inner certainty, to the secret
reproaches of reason. (p. 357)
Hume’s famous discussion of reason and passion in the Treatise (Of the influencing
motives of the will, T 2.3.3, pp. 413-8) begins with an outline of the view that he
is opposing:
Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk
of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and
assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to
its dictates... The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former
have been display’d to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy,
and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on. (T 2.3.3.1,
p. 413)
Samuel Clarke was certainly one of Hume’s targets in this argument, and I will
turn to his view presently. But I trust it is clear from this summary that Male-
branche was also firmly in his sights.3
3There is growing support these days for the extremely counterintuitive suggestion that
Malebranche was a major positive influence on Hume, and that, notwithstanding their very
great theological differences and “big picture” opposition, Hume got many of his particular
ideas from this source. Thus Peter Kail, for example, sees Hume as “using Malebranchian
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10.2. Clarke against the passions
Hume’s other major target here, as I have said, was Samuel Clarke. Clarke’s views
on this matter are expounded at the start of his Discourse on the Unchangeable
Obligations of Natural Religion (the second of his two sets of Boyle Lectures,
delivered in 1705 and first published in 1706). The essence of his view, as stated
in the contents, is this:
That from the Eternal and Necessary Differences of Things, there naturally
and necessarily arise certain Moral Obligations, which are of themselves
incumbent on all Rational Creatures, antecedent to all positive Institution,
and to all Expectation of Reward and Punishment. (1706, p. 588)
That these obligations are incumbent on all rational creatures, antecedent to
any expectation of reward and punishment, is of course an anti-egoist view; and
Clarke devotes much of his discussion to a criticism of Hobbes. These arguments
of his are not of any present interest, however, first because it is his rationalism
rather than his anti-egoism that we are concerned with here, and secondly because
Hume was also an anti-egoist (at least after the Treatise), as we have already seen
at length.
The summary proposition just quoted refers to the necessary differences of
things as the source of moral obligations, but when we get down to the details
Clarke also speaks more simply of “the nature of things”. One might safely
assume that the differences between things simply follow from their individual
natures, so that on one level this distinction does not really matter. But the
distinction does seem to be playing a role in Clarke’s account, since natures
and differences appear to ground distinct moral obligations. Thus we are told
materials to arrive at conclusions that are squarely antithetical to those fundamental to the
religious dimension of Malebranche’s philosophy” (2008, p. 55). See also Wright (1983), Jones
(1982), Lennon (1997), James (2005), Kail (2005, 2007a), Schmitter (2012). It seems to me that
the similarities between these two thinkers, even at the level of detail, have been overstated (for
a discussion of one such issue, see §12.2), and I would gladly see a return to the natural view
of them as simply opponents, more or less all the way down. But I am content here merely to
place Malebranche in the opposing camp on the central issue of the relationship between reason
and passion.
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first that “there is a Fitness or Suitableness of certain Circumstances to certain
Persons, and an Unsuitableness of others; founded in the nature of Things”; and
then that “from the different relations of different Persons one to another, there
necessarily arises a fitness or unfitness of certain manners of Behaviour of some
Persons towards others” (p. 608). The immediate example given to illustrate this
latter kind of obligation is theological:
That God is infinitely superior to Men; is as clear, as that Infinity is larger
than a Point, or Eternity longer than a Moment : And ’tis as certainly Fit,
that Men should honour and worship, obey and imitate God, rather than
on the contrary in all their Actions indeavour to dishonour and disobey
him[.] (p. 608)
To illustrate the former kind of obligation, meanwhile, Clarke writes:
In like manner; in Mens dealing and conversing one with another; ’tis
undeniably more Fit, absolutely and in the Nature of the thing itself, that
all Men should indeavour to promote the universal good and welfare of All ;
than that all Men should be continually contriving the ruin and destruction
of All. (p. 609)
However they are founded—whether on the differences or just the natures of
things—these “fitness” facts are at the core of Clarke’s moral philosophy.
To begin with, Clarke offers no argument for this highly dubious deduction
of the fitness of certain sorts of behaviour from the differences or natures of
things. He simply asserts that “[t]hese things are so notoriously plain and self-
evident, that nothing but the extremest stupidity of Mind, corruption of Manners,
or perverseness of Spirit, can possibly make any Man entertain the least doubt
concerning them” (p. 609). He goes on to accuse Hobbes of some such failing.
Later, however, when he turns to examine some particular moral obligations, we
do get more by way of argument. For example, he offers the following justification
for the principle of equity, that every man must “deal always with another, as
he would reasonably expect that Others should in like Circumstances deal with
Him” (p. 619):
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Whatever relation or proportion one Man in any Case bears to another; the
same That Other, when put in like Circumstances, bears to Him. Whatever
I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for Me; That, by the
same Judgment, I declare reasonable or unreasonable, that I in the like
Case should do for Him. And to deny this either in Word or Action, is as
if a Man should contend, that, though two and three are equal to five, yet
five are not equal to two and three. (p. 619)
There are further arguments for some additional example obligations, but an
examination of these would involve us in more detail than is presently required.
For what it’s worth, this argument—which has a familiar rationalist appeal—
strikes me as unsuccessful. All that it shows, if it shows anything at all, is that
one judgment concerning what is reasonable or unreasonable follows from another
such judgment. But this is beside the point: the question is where the first
judgment came from, and whether, in particular, it can be deduced from the
eternal differences or natures of things. Humeans of course deny that any such
deduction is possible.
The final piece of Clarke’s view is that the fitness of certain sorts of behaviour
gives rise to an obligation on all rational agents to behave in that way. The
argument at this point again strikes me as far from persuasive:
Wherefore all rational Creatures, whose Wills are not constantly and regu-
larly determined, and their Actions governed, by right Reason... but suffer
themselves to be swayed by unaccountable arbitrary Humours, and rash
Passions; by Lusts, Vanity and Pride; by private Interest, or present sensual
Pleasures; These, setting up their own unreasonable Self-will in opposition
to the Nature and Reason of Things, endeavour (as much as in them lies)
to make things be what they are not, and cannot be. Which is the high-
est Presumption and greatest Insolence, as well as the greatest Absurdity,
imaginable. ’Tis acting contrary to that Understanding, Reason and Judg-
ment, which God has implanted in their Natures on purpose to enable them
to discern the difference between good and evil. (pp. 613-4)
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First, it is unclear why agents who indulge their rash and lusty passions, however
unreasonable this behaviour may be, are thereby endeavouring “to make things
be what they are not, and cannot be”. That might be their intention, I suppose,
but surely most of the time nothing is further from their (our) minds. Secondly,
there is the merest assertion, without any supporting argument, that such an
endeavour is immoral. This assertion is hard to credit, however, not least because
the supposed endeavour is necessarily—and obviously—doomed to failure.
The contrast in the above quotation between “right Reason” and “rash Pas-
sions”, and the identification of the former as the source of all good behaviour and
the latter of all evil, is a general theme throughout this section. God, in Clarke’s
design, cannot but act reasonably; lesser intelligent beings, however, may “wil-
fully and perversely allow themselves to be over-ruled by absurd Passions, and
corrupt or partial Affections” (p. 612). Such “wilful Passions or Lusts,” together
with negligent misunderstanding, “are... the only Causes which can make a rea-
sonable Creature act contrary to Reason” (p. 613). Clarke, like Malebranche, is
one of Hume’s main targets, being a paradigm case of a philosopher “to talk of
the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert
that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates”
(T 2.3.3.1, p. 413).
10.3. Hutcheson against the rationalists
As noted in §1.1, Hutcheson’s first work, An Inquiry into the Original of Our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, prompted an objection from the rationalist Gilbert
Burnet, who appealed to the views of Clarke and Wollaston. This objection, in
turn, prompted Hutcheson’s subsequent Illustrations on the Moral Sense, with
its sentimentalist attack on moral rationalism. This attack, as we will see in the
next section, gave Hume much material for his own views on the matter.
Hutcheson’s first move, which we also briefly saw in §1.1, is to distinguish
between moral motivation and moral approbation, and consequently between what
he calls exciting and justifying reasons:
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When we ask the Reason of an Action we sometimes mean, “What Truth
shews a Quality in the Action, exciting the Agent to do it?” Thus, why
does a Luxurious Man pursue Wealth? The Reason is given by this Truth,
“Wealth is useful to purchase Pleasures.” Sometimes for a Reason of Ac-
tions we shew the Truth expressing a Quality, engaging our Approbation.
Thus the Reason of hazarding Life in just War, is, that “it tends to pre-
serve our honest Countrymen, or evidences publick Spirit:” The Reason
for Temperance, and against Luxury is given thus, “Luxury evidences a
selfish base Temper.” The former sort of Reasons we will call exciting, and
the latter justifying. (1728, p. 138)
This would seem to be a variant of the distinction between reasons that explain
why someone does something, and reasons that show why someone should do
something. Notable modern variants include the popular distinction between
motivating and normative reasons,4 and Bernard Williams’ distinction between
internal and external reasons.5
Hutcheson’s criticism of moral rationalism proceeds on these two separate
fronts. I will restrict my attention here to the first front, the case of exciting
reasons. Although there is of course a close connection between the two, exciting
reasons and motivation belong within the philosophy of emotion, while justifying
reasons and approbation are more a topic for moral philosophy. This same divi-
sion is also reflected very clearly in Hume’s own texts, where the issue of exciting
reasons is taken up in the Dissertation on the Passions (section 5, pp. 24-5),
and that of justifying reasons in the moral Enquiry (appendix 1, pp. 285-94).
As space here is limited, and the latter would take me too far from my present
concern, I will focus on the Dissertation topic. (When turning to Hume himself,
I will be forced to glance in the direction of morals and approbation; but still my
primary focus is on motivation.)
4Smith (1994, pp. 94-8), Parfit (1997, p. 99), Dancy (2000, pp. 1-5).
5Williams (1981). It seems to me, incidentally, that Williams set up the question in the
wrong way, by asking whether there are any external reasons (and notoriously answering, of
course, in the negative). At least in the eighteenth century, however, the question dividing
sentimentalists and rationalists concerns not the existence but the basis of these things: are
they grounded in reason, in perception of the moral facts, or in sentiment, in non-rational
feelings of approval and disapproval? See Blackburn (2010).
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Regarding exciting reasons or motivation, then, Hutcheson’s core argument
is very simple:
As to exciting Reasons, in every calm rational Action some end is desired
or intended; no end can be intended or desired previously to some one
of these Classes of Affections, Self-Love, Self-Hatred, or desire of private
Misery, (if this be possible) Benevolence toward others, or Malice: All
Affections are included under these; no end can be previous to them all;
there can therefore be no exciting Reason previous to Affection. (1728,
p. 139)
By a “calm rational Action”, Hutcheson means one in which reason and reflection
is involved, as opposed to one in which passion alone moves us suddenly and
thoughtlessly (see below). By urging that the passions or affections are necessary
even in these cases (to fix the ends of action), therefore, he is urging that they
are necessary in all cases.
What Hutcheson is offering here is the first clear presentation of what is now
widely known (rather unfairly) as the “Humean” theory of motivation. According
to this account, there is no motivation without some end which the action is
believed to further somehow (as a probable means to that end, a constitutive
part, or whatever it might be); and there is no end without some affection or
desire. As the formula goes, motive equals belief plus desire.6 On this view,
reason and sentiment both play a necessary role, and accordingly Clarke’s talk of
the combat between reason and passion is dismissed as incoherent:
We have indeed many confused Harangues on this Subject, telling us, “We
have two Principles of Action, Reason, and Affection, or Passion (i.e.
strong Affection): the former in common with Angels, the latter with
Brutes: No Action is wise, or good, or reasonable, to which we are not
excited by Reason, as distinct from all Affections; or, if any such Actions
as flow from Affections be good, ’tis only by chance, or materially and
6See e.g. Smith (1994, pp. 92-125), who offers in essence the same argument as Hutcheson
did for the “Humean” theory.
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not formally.” As if indeed Reason, or the Knowledge of the Relations of
things, could excite to Action when we proposed no End, or as if Ends
could be intended without Desire or Affection. (1728, p. 139)
Hutcheson accounts for this confusion by acknowledging that particular violent
affections can sometimes prevent us from thinking clearly:
Perhaps what has brought the Epithet Reasonable, or flowing from Rea-
son, in opposition to what flows from Instinct, Affection, or Passion, so
much into use, is this, “That it is often observed, that the very best of our
particular Affections or Desires, when they are grown violent and passion-
ate, thro’ the confused Sensations and Propensities which attend them, do
make us incapable of considering calmly the whole Tendency of our Actions,
and lead us often into what is absolutely pernicious, under some Appear-
ance of relative or particular Good.” This indeed may give some ground
for distinguishing between passionate Actions, and those from calm Desire
or Affection which employs our Reason freely: But can never set rational
Actions in Opposition to those from Instinct, Desire or Affection. (1728,
p. 175)
Here we see why Hutcheson restricted his attention earlier to cases of “calm
rational Action”. Even in these cases, where reason is operating at its full, the
agent must still have some end that is the object of their desire. Affection or
sentiment must always play a role.
The debate between Hutcheson and the rationalists, it seems to me, is fun-
damentally about how to divide up the mind, and how to conceptualise human
nature and agency at the most basic level. Malebranche and Clarke were operat-
ing with a hierarchical division of human psychology, with reason (mind, spirit)
firmly on the top, and passion (body, matter) firmly on the bottom. Each of these
two components, moreover, formed for them a complete and fully-functioning
unit, capable of acting on its own account. For these thinkers, there is thus a
constant battle in the soul between our higher self and our lower self, our angel
and our devil.
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Hutcheson, however, (and Hume after him, as we will see in the next section)
operated with a fundamentally different view of the distinction between reason
and passion, what we might call a specialisation view. On this understanding,
there is no hierarchy: the rational and passionate components are on the same
level. But more than this, the components are distinguished, not by their different
position in the hierarchy, but by their different psychological roles, with each one
having a necessary and indispensable part to play in motivation and agency:
roughly, reason to gather the information, and sentiment to set the goals.
Hutcheson (and Hume after him) also thought, of course, that sentiment was
responsible for evaluating the goals that it set. This is not to say that reason has
no role to play here; but the final verdict is down to feeling. As Hume neatly
puts it in the moral Enquiry :
The final sentence... which pronounces characters and actions amiable or
odious, praise-worthy or blameable... depends on some internal sense or
feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species... But in
order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment
of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should
precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant
comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts
fixed and ascertained. (M 1.9, pp. 172-3)
But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to in-
struct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it
is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility
is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to
us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite
a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the
useful above the pernicious tendencies... Here, therefore, reason instructs
us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction
in favour of those which are useful and beneficial. (M App1.3, p. 286)
It seems to me that this is a separate matter—although it is of course very closely
related—and as I have said my focus here is on the issue of motivation more than
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approbation. A proper examination of the latter is a large project in its own
right, and well beyond the scope of this thesis.
To emphasise the distinctness of these two issues, notwithstanding their close
relationship, note that it is possible to agree with Hutcheson and Hume in the
motivational case, while disagreeing in the case of approbation.7 It is possible,
that is to say, to hold that reason and sentiment must work together to generate
motivation, in the way that Hutcheson proposed, but to think that reason alone
is sufficient to produce moral approbation and disapprobation. The thought here,
roughly, would be that there is information available about what is morally right
and wrong, about what one should and should not pursue or avoid, and that
reason can deliver this information.
For what it’s worth, I have a suspicion that Hutcheson and Hume, though
they both very clearly rejected this view, did so for rather different reasons.
Hume rejected it because he believed that there was simply no such information
to be had; but Hutcheson, or so I suspect, rejected this view because he thought
that there was such information, but that we arrived at it through the direct
perception of our moral sense, rather than through reason.
10.4. Hume against the rationalists
Hume’s anti-rationalism with regard to motivation was, as far as I can see, not
significantly different from Hutcheson’s. It also remained the same throughout
his life. Given what we have seen of Hutcheson in the previous section, therefore,
making sense of Hume’s remarks on this matter—both in section 2.3.3 of the
Treatise, and section 5 of the Dissertation—is now an almost entirely straight-
forward matter. The reason why I say almost will emerge at the end of this
section.
Section 2.3.3 of the Treatise begins with an introductory paragraph calling
attention to the talk of the combat between reason and passion, and the ten-
7This, in fact, is precisely the view adopted in recent times by Smith (1994).
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dency of many philosophers and moralists—Hume obviously had Malebranche
and Clarke in mind, as we have seen—to give the preference to reason. Hume
then announces his intention “to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy” (T 2.3.3.1,
p. 413). Section 5 of the Dissertation omits this introduction, diving straight into
the main point:
It seems evident, that reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the judgment
of truth and falsehood, can never, of itself, be any motive to the will, and
can have no influence but so far as it touches some passion or affection.
Abstract relations of ideas are the object of curiosity, not of volition. And
matters of fact, where they are neither good nor evil, where they neither
excite desire nor aversion, are totally indifferent; and whether known or
unknown, whether mistaken or rightly apprehended, cannot be regarded
as any motive to action. (P 5.1, p. 24; cf. T 2.3.3.2-3, pp. 413-4)
Hume doesn’t explicitly say here—as Hutcheson did—that passions or desires are
necessary to set the ends or goals of action, but one can safely assume that this
is what he thought.
Incidentally, the distinction appealed to here—between relations of ideas
and matters of fact, which Hume had earlier drawn in the first Enquiry (E 4.1-2,
pp. 25-6)—was also anticipated by Hutcheson in the context of the reason/passion
debate:
Reason denotes either our Power of finding out Truth, or a collection of
Propositions already known to be True. Truths are either Speculative, as
“When we discover, by comparing our Ideas, the Relations of Quantities, or
of any other Object, among themselves;” or Practical, as “When we discover
what Objects are naturally apt to give any Person the highest Gratifications
or what means are most effectual to obtain such Objects.” (Hutcheson &
Burnet 1735, p. 18)
The truths on Hutcheson’s practical side in this quotation are perhaps surprisingly
narrow (as Hume’s matters of fact are not), but that was presumably just because
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of the motivational context of the argument, in which truths about means to given
ends are particularly salient.
At this point in the Treatise, Hume says that, “[a]s this opinion may appear
somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other
considerations” (T 2.3.3.4, p. 415). He then produces his famous representative
quality argument (familiar from §9.2), and two follow-on paragraphs in the same
vein (T 2.3.3.5-7, pp. 415-7). This material is not repeated in section 5 of the
Dissertation, and I consider this fact to be significant. I will have more to say
about it in the next section, but for now let us stay with the common aspects of
the earlier and later discussions.
Hume’s next move, in both the Treatise and the Dissertation, is to offer
an explanation or reinterpretation of the talk of the combat between reason and
passion, one that is consistent with his specialisation view of the relationship
between these two faculties. Here again, Hume apparently drew on Hutcheson
for inspiration, for his account similarly turns on a distinction between calm
and violent passions. The specifics of Hume’s suggestion, however, are slightly
different. Where Hutcheson had claimed that the violent passions sometimes
prevent us from thinking clearly, and so to that extent do genuinely interfere
with reason, Hume says instead that his opponents confound reason with calm
desire, because these two things feel the same (T 2.3.3.8, p. 417).
Hume’s explanation here calls to mind the earlier distinction, drawn at the
start of Treatise Book 2, between calm and violent emotions (recall §3.4). As I
said when discussing this earlier distinction, however, these two things should be
kept apart. The first is a distinction between the passions (or violent emotions)
and the calm emotions of moral and artistic approval and disapproval. This latter
contrast, meanwhile, is not a distinction between types of passion. Rather, the
point is that any passion can vary in its felt intensity, sometimes occurring more
“violently” and sometimes more “calmly”.
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Most familiar in this context is Hume’s talk of the “force” or “violence” of a
passion (e.g. T 2.1.4.4, 2.2.11.1, 2.3.4.1, pp. 284, 394, 418-9; P 6.3, 6.6, pp. 26, 27).
But Hume also often speaks in terms of an increase of the passion itself, rather
than an increase in its violence (e.g. P 1.12, 6.3, 6.6, 6.11, pp. 4, 26, 27, 28), about
the “heightening” or “raising” of an emotion (e.g. P 2.9, 6.1, 6.3, pp. 8, 26; Tr 27,
pp. 224-5), and about variations in “quantity” or “degree” (e.g. P 1.12, 2.21, 2.25,
2.28, 2.41, 2.42, 2.47, pp. 4, 11, 12, 15, 16). While it would be a mistake to suppose
that Hume had different properties in mind for these different metaphors,8 it is
important to be aware that he conceived of this singular property in (at least)
two different ways: as akin to “violence” or “turbulence” (P 5.3, p. 24) on the
one hand, and as akin to “degree” or “quantity” on the other. This point will be
important in a later chapter (§12.3).
Section 5 of the Dissertation and section 2.3.3 of the Treatise then end with
essentially the same paragraph, save for a few insignificant stylistic changes. In
this paragraph Hume draws attention to one further point that Hutcheson didn’t
make: “The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction
of the will entirely to one of these principles [i.e. calm general desires or violent
passions], and supposing the other to have no influence”; but, says Hume, people
in general are moved both by “the view of the greatest possible good” and by
“present uneasiness” (P 5.4, p. 24; T 2.3.3.10, p. 418). This point puzzled me
for some time, first because it just seems so obviously true, but also because
neither Malebranche nor Clarke had ever denied it. Their position was not that
we are moved by only one of the competing principles (a position that would
after all make a nonsense of the idea that there is a constant combat between
them). Rather, their claim was that we should be moved by only one of them.
This puzzling paragraph was the reason for my qualification at the start of this
section, when I said that understanding Hume’s remarks concerning motivational
anti-rationalism was almost an entirely straightforward matter.
8Aside from the fact that Hume deploys the different metaphors with considerable freedom
and variety, with no hint of any underlying pattern, “violence” and “degree” appear to be
fairly explicitly equated at T 2.2.2.22 (p. 343-4), in a passage that does not reappear in the
Dissertation on the Passions.
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So far as I am aware, no one has yet remarked on the curious nature of this
concluding paragraph; attention, no doubt, has been drawn away by the other
provocative things that Hume says in this context, especially in the Treatise
presentation. Perhaps I thus have the honour of venturing the first explanation.
In any case, the only way that I have been able to make sense of the comment is to
suppose that it is aimed, not at Clarke or Malebranche, but at Locke. For Locke
appears to have oscillated on precisely this point: in the first edition of his Essay,
he wrote that “the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will” (1690,
p. 251n); but in the second edition he said that “upon second thoughts I am
apt to imagine [that what determines the Will] is not, as is generally supposed,
the greater good in view: But some (and for the most part the most pressing)
uneasiness a Man is at present under” (1694, pp. 250-1). Hume’s midway position
on this matter seems obvious; but I suppose if Locke had swung from one extreme
to the other, then the obvious point needed to be made.
This solution to the puzzle is not perfect, for Hume describes the view that he
is rejecting as a common error of metaphysicians, and presents his rejection in the
context of an attack that is obviously directed at Malebranche and Clarke. Thus
we should expect it to be a point of agreement among all or most rationalists,
rather than an error peculiar to Locke. Nevertheless, it is the most satisfying
explanation that I have been able to come up with; I would gladly be persuaded
by a better one.
10.5. The representative quality argument (again)
Section 5 of the Dissertation does not contain anything that was not already
present in section 2.3.3 of the Treatise. However, when examining the former in
the light of the latter, one cannot help but be struck by the very glaring omissions:
all the best-known parts of the Treatise have been removed. This includes the
representative quality argument already looked at in §9.2, but also the notorious
claim that “[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (T 2.3.3.4,
p. 415), and the several provocative illustrations of the anti-rationalist position:
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’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to
the scratching of my finger. ’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my
total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly
unknown to me. ’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own
acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection
for the former than the latter. (T 2.3.3.6, p. 416)
I suppose that the standard thought, insofar as anyone has given this curious fact
any consideration at all, is that Hume made these striking cuts simply in order
to keep things short. But a little reflection shows this explanation to be most
unlikely. Section 2.3.3 of the Treatise was not long to begin with. If section 5 of
the Dissertation had simply repeated it in its entirety, it would still have been
the shortest section in this later work. As it is, section 5 is radically shorter than
all of the other sections, and less than half the length of its Treatise ancestor.
Considerations of space are thus not a plausible explanation, and we must look
for some other reason for Hume’s drastic editing of his earlier work.
The conclusion of Hume’s first argument in this section of the Treatise, the
argument that is repeated in the Dissertation, is that “reason alone can never
produce any action, or give rise to volition” (T 2.3.3.4, p. 414); or that “reason...
can never, of itself, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but so
far as it touches some passion or affection” (P 5.1, p. 24). This is very clearly
a point about motivation, as I was of course assuming in the previous section.
It is not, to be explicit, a point about approbation; and although Hume held an
exactly parallel view in the case of approbation, and these two anti-rationalist
theses are of course very closely related, they are nevertheless distinct claims (as
I have already insisted).
In Hume’s later work, the distinction between motivation and approbation
is firmly in his grasp, and he tackles the two topics separately. The question of
approbation first comes up, after the Treatise, in the essay The Sceptic, in which
Hume makes his anti-rationalist stance very clear (at least if we take him to be
in agreement with his Sceptic, which I do). It then comes up again, of course, in
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the moral Enquiry. The question of motivation, meanwhile, is addressed in the
Dissertation on the Passions, which is entirely silent on the matter of approbation.
This is all very clear and straightforward.
In section 2.3.3 of the Treatise, however, Hume rather confusingly runs these
two things together, attempting to take on his rationalist opponents on both
fronts simultaneously. The representative quality argument is his case for denying
that reason alone gives rise to approbation, its conclusion being that passions
cannot be “contradictory to truth and reason” (T 2.3.3.5, p. 415), “contrary
to reason” (T 2.3.3.6, p. 416), or “unreasonable” (T 2.3.3.7, p. 416), except in a
trivial and uninteresting sense (i.e. when they are founded on some false belief). I
suppose that one might be able to interpret this as a conclusion about motivation
rather than approbation, but that would be a fairly serious strain on the words.
The obvious interpretation of Hume’s thinking in these passages is that reason
does have an evaluative role in human psychology—it can evaluate beliefs as
either true or false—but that this evaluative role does not extend to classifying
passions and desires as morally right or wrong.
One very good reason why Hume should have removed this argument from
the Dissertation on the Passions, then, is that it doesn’t belong there: it belongs,
if anywhere, in the moral Enquiry. But this is in fact only half of the explanation,
for, most curiously, it isn’t in the moral Enquiry either. Hume didn’t just move
the representative quality argument in his later work; he abandoned it. And he
abandoned it, I believe, for a very good reason, namely that it isn’t a very good
argument.
To see this, let us take a closer look at the argument again, in as clear a form
as possible:
1. To be conformable or contrary to reason is to be either true or false respec-
tively (because reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood).
2. Passions are not truth-apt.
3. Therefore, passions can be neither conformable nor contrary to reason.
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The argument is obviously valid. It may even be sound. Nevertheless, it is
a terrible argument for anti-rationalism, because the premises simply assume—
without attempting to explain or justify—far too much of what is to be proved.
As arguments go, it amounts to little more than a bare assertion of the claim to
be established.
Given the obvious validity of the argument, rationalists wishing to escape
its conclusion must deny at least one of the premises. But why shouldn’t they do
this? Hume has given us little or nothing in support of either. It is agreed on
both sides of this debate that passions and desires can be morally right or wrong.
The question concerns not the reality of this distinction, but its foundation:9
Clarke says that reason alone determines which side of the line things fall on,
while Hume insists that sentiment has the final say. Suppose that you agree with
Clarke, and that you agree with the second premise of Hume’s argument (that
the passions are not truth-apt). In this case you will of course deny that the
only way for something to be contrary to reason is for it to be false. You will say
that things can be contrary to reason either when they are false or when they
are morally wrong. Or suppose instead that you agree with Hume’s first premise;
now you will obviously deny the second. You will say that passions can be true
or false: they are true or false precisely when they are morally right or wrong. (I
take it that the first line of defence is the more natural one, but this second is a
logical possibility too.)
Hume and his fellow Humeans will not accept either of these rationalist
responses to the argument, of course, and there is nothing in these considerations
to persuade them that they should. But that is not the point. The point is that
there is nothing in Hume’s argument to persuade anyone that they shouldn’t. The
argument simply doesn’t touch on the controversy at all. Hume helps himself to
9Following the uncharitable interpretation of the Treatise as “sapping the Foundations of
Morality, by denying the natural and essential Difference betwixt Right and Wrong, Good and
Evil” (L 19, p. 425), Hume was at pains to make this point very clear in the introduction to
the moral Enquiry (M 1.2-3, pp. 169-70).
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his preferred views of reason and truth in the premises, from which his anti-
rationalist conclusion trivially follows. But the debate concerns whether these
are indeed the right views of reason and truth. And so it was with very good
reason, in my opinion, that Hume did not repeat this argument, either in the
Dissertation on the Passions or in the moral Enquiry.
Chapter 11
The Chemistry of the Passions
In this chapter and the next, I look at section 6 of the Dissertation on the Passions
together with the third of the four dissertations, Of Tragedy. As we will see, these
two parts of the Four Dissertations very clearly belong together: in the former
Hume introduces a general principle in his philosophy of emotion, which in the
latter he then applies to a particularly intriguing case, namely the pleasure that
we take in tragic art. This close connection between these two dissertations makes
an important contribution to my Unity Thesis. The present topic also provides
yet another point in support of my Difference Thesis, since in the Treatise Hume
had offered a quite different account of this paradoxical pleasure.
11.1. Two overlapping theories
As we saw in the previous chapter (§10.4), Hume held that the passions can
differ in their felt intensity, a difference that is conceived of both in terms of the
quantity of the passion, and in terms of its force or violence. This idea is most
familiar in the context of Hume’s treatment of the relationship between reason and
passion, and in particular his claim that philosophers have mistaken calm desires
or passions for reason, giving rise to the mistaken belief that there is a combat
between reason and passion (P 5.2-3, p. 24). Hume’s interest in the intensity of
the passions extends beyond this one anti-rationalist point, however, and he is
also concerned in general with the causes of these felt differences. Thus, having
made the anti-rationalist point in section 5 of the Dissertation on the Passions,
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Hume then proceeds in section 6 to “enumerate some of those circumstances,
which render a passion calm or violent, which heighten or diminish any emotion”
(P 6.1, p. 26).
In Book 2 of the Treatise, the parallel discussion constitutes the core of part 3,
taking up five of this final part’s ten sections (T 2.3.4-8, pp. 418-38). Section 5
discusses the effects of custom, section 6 looks at the influence of the imagination,
while sections 7 and 8 examine the effects of distance in time and space. Hardly
anything from these sections remains in the Dissertation on the Passions, but this
later work does reproduce section 4 more or less in its entirety. In this section
(which becomes section 6 of the Dissertation), Hume introduces and defends his
conversion principle: “It is a property in human nature, that any emotion, which
attends a passion, is easily converted into it... The predominant passion swallows
up the inferior, and converts it into itself. The spirits, when once excited, easily
receive a change in their direction” (P 6.2, p. 26; cf. T 2.3.4.2, pp. 419-20).1
Section 1 of the Dissertation on the Passions, meanwhile, contains Hume’s
account (examined in §7.3) of the generation of hope and fear from the mixture,
in different proportions, of joy and sorrow. Having given this account, Hume
then briefly expands it into a general theory concerning the mixing of “contrary”
passions (i.e. one positive and one negative):
In contrary passions, if the objects be totally different, the passions are
like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on
each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the passions are like
an alcali and an acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other. If the
relation be more imperfect, and consist in the contradictory views of the
same object, the passions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled,
never perfectly unite and incorporate. (P 1.24, p. 6)
1This name for the principle seems to have been coined by Margaret Paton (1973, p. 121).
It or something like it has since been used by most people writing on the topic: Hill (1982),
Feagin (1983), Packer (1989), Schier (1989), Budd (1991), Yanal (1991, 1992), Neill (1992,
1998), Leibowitz (1993), Galgut (2001). I used to call it the “principle of the predominant
passion” myself (Merivale 2011), taking my cue from Immerwahr (1994). I had a reason for this
idiosyncrasy: I felt that the emphasis on conversion, at the expense of Hume’s other ways of
describing the process (one passion swallowing up another, the spirits changing direction), was
unfortunate. But I now think that the conversion idea probably is the most important after
all, and in any case I have got tired of all those extra syllables.
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The third of these principles is the one responsible for the production of hope
and fear. Hope, on this chemical analogy, is like oil with a dash of vinegar, while
fear is like vinegar with a dash of oil.
Hume does not say very much about the first two principles, in either the
Treatise or the Dissertation. In the case of contrary passions concerning the
same object cancelling each other out, he offers nothing at all beyond a bare
statement of the principle (P 1.22, p. 6; cf. T 2.3.9.15, p. 442). In the case
of contrary passions concerning different objects having no effect on each other,
he merely offers one illustration: “when a man is aﬄicted for the loss of a law-
suit, and joyful for the birth of a son, the mind, running from the agreeable to
the calamitous object; with whatever celerity it may perform this motion, can
scarcely temper the one affection with the other, and remain between them in a
state of indifference” (P 1.21, p. 6; cf. T 2.3.9.14, pp. 441-2).
Section 1 then ends with a hint of a fourth principle, concerning the mixture
of any two passions, not just a positive and a negative: “The effect of a mixture
of passions, when one of them is predominant, and swallows up the other, shall
be explained afterwards” (P 1.25, p. 6). This is of course a reference ahead to
section 6, and to the conversion principle that I have already introduced. Thus
this principle belongs in the overlap between two of Hume’s general theories:
concerning the mixture of passions, and concerning the causes of the violent
passions. The two topics overlap, straightforwardly enough, because the effect
of mixing two passions sometimes is precisely an increase in the force of one of
them.
These two overlapping theories together form what I like to call Hume’s
account of the chemistry of the passions, since his metaphors and analogies in
this context are predominantly chemical and hydraulic. I have already looked at
Hume’s account of hope and fear, and, as I said above, Hume says very little about
his other two principles concerning the mixing of contrary emotions. That leaves
the conversion principle on the mixture side. As for the causes of the violent
passions, I will hereafter restrict my attention to this same principle. It will
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become clear presently why this principle is of particular importance to me here.
Furthermore, it is the only aspect of the general theory that Hume continued to
discuss in detail after the Treatise, and so it makes sense that a study of Hume’s
later philosophy of emotion should exhibit the same bias.
The conversion principle is of considerable importance for both my Unity
Thesis and my Difference Thesis. The principle itself was already present in
Book 2 of the Treatise (T 2.3.4.2, pp. 419-20), and Hume’s discussion of it in the
Dissertation differs only in superficial points of style. It was only after writing
the Treatise, however, that Hume came to realise that his principle might be
applied to the curious phenomenon of the pleasure that we take in tragic art (see
§§11.4 and 11.5 below). He develops this application, furthermore, not in the
Dissertation on the Passions, but in the following dissertation Of Tragedy. One
could hardly wish for a clearer case of unity among the Four Dissertations.
11.2. Du Bos
Hume’s dissertation, Of Tragedy, is very familiar to philosophers of art for its
presentation of one of the canonic solutions to the paradox of art and negative
emotions. Put simply, the puzzle is this: why do we so much enjoy and appreciate
things in art (tragedy, horror, blood and gore) that we find so unpleasant in real
life? Hume motivates his own famous answer to this question with a brief look
at the earlier solutions offered by Jean-Baptiste Du Bos and Bernard Le Bovier
de Fontenelle. Probably because of Hume’s criticisms, these solutions have since
disappeared from the debate (though Hume’s account continues to receive much
attention). In the case of Fontenelle, I am not persuaded that this is any great
loss. The case of Du Bos, however, is different.
Du Bos’s principal work for our purposes (he also wrote some historical
books) is the two-volume Re´flexions Critiques sur la Poe´sie et sur la Pein-
ture (1719).2 This work contains a wealth of interesting psychological and art-
2An English translation by Thomas Nugent was published in 1748; I will give quotations
and page numbers from volume 1 of this translation (I have no occasion to refer to volume 2).
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historical observations, together with intriguing suggestions in the philosophy
of art and art criticism. On another occasion, it would merit closer attention;
for now, I will restrict my attention to just the introduction and the first three
sections of volume 1.
The initial aim of this first volume is “to explain what the beauty of a
picture or poem chiefly consists in” (1748, p. v). The nature of the pleasure
that we receive from poetry and painting, Du Bos thinks, is on the face of it
rather puzzling, because a great deal of the time it bears a striking resemblance
to sorrow and other unhappy feelings: “The arts of poetry and painting are never
more applauded, than when they are most successful in moving us to pity” (p. 1).
This is of course the familiar paradox of art and negative emotions. Du Bos might
even have been the first person to formulate this paradox in modern terms.3
Du Bos’s own solution, put forward in section 3, depends on an interesting
view of human psychology developed in sections 1 and 2. The core of this view
is that many of the emotions that we typically view as negative or painful in fact
have a good deal to recommend them. The first point made in support of this
is something that we have already seen Hume’s appropriation of (§4.4), namely
the idea that “one of the greatest wants of man is to have his mind incessantly
occupied” (p. 5). So strong is this desire, according to Du Bos, that we will often
seek out great pain in order to satisfy it: “The heaviness which quickly attends
the inactivity of the mind, is a situation so very disagreeable to man, that he
frequently chuses to expose himself to the most painful exercises, rather than be
troubled with it” (p. 5).
In section 2, Du Bos then turns more particularly to the emotions that we
experience “upon seeing our fellow creatures in any great misfortune or danger”
(p. 10). Although he begins by saying that these emotions have nothing to
recommend them beyond the general relief from “ennui” introduced in section 1,
his subsequent elucidation of the sorts of relief that they provide, and of what
exactly it is that we enjoy about this emotional stimulation, could to my mind
be just as well viewed as additions to the basic general point. I shall not dwell
3See Livingston (2013, pp. 401-4).
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here on the details of Du Bos’s examples. Some depend on more morally dubious
sides of human nature, such as the pleasure that we take in public executions
(p. 10), in bull-fights (p. 18), or in the Roman gladiatorial battles (p. 12). Others
are more innocent, however, such as the thrill of tight-rope walking (pp. 11-2) or
gambling (pp. 19-20).
Having argued that many negative experiences, for all their undoubted neg-
ativity, also have much to recommend them—emotional stimulation, the thrill of
danger and high stakes, satisfaction of our bloodlust (whether we approve of this
desire or not)—Du Bos then introduces his account of the pleasure of poetry and
painting. What these art forms offer us, he says, are artificial experiences with
all of these pleasant effects, but none of the usual drawbacks:
Since the most pleasing sensations that our real passions can afford us,
are balanced by so many unhappy hours that succeed our enjoyments,
would it not be a noble attempt of art to endeavour to separate the dismal
consequences of our passions from the bewitching pleasure we receive in
indulging them? Is it not in the power of art to create, as it were, beings of
a new nature? Might not art contrive to produce objects that would excite
artificial passions, sufficient to occupy us while we are actually affected by
them, and incapable of giving us afterwards any real pain or aﬄiction?
(p. 21)
The crucial idea here, which was hinted at in the previous sections, but
now appears more clearly, is that in real life our emotional reactions to tragic,
dangerous, and horrific events are mixed, containing both positive and negative
aspects; but unfortunately the negative aspects are so strong that they typically
drown out the positive. What poetry and painting do, thinks Du Bos, is present
us with “imitations” of these events. And an imitation of this sort, because it is
only fictional, “does not affect our reason, which is superior to the illusory attack
of those sensations, ... [but] affects only the sensitive soul” (p. 23). As such, it
is able to induce the pleasurable feelings in isolation, untainted by the pain that
attends them in real life:
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The pleasure we feel in contemplating the imitations made by painters
and poets, of objects which would have raised in us passions attended
with real pain, is a pleasure free from all impurity of mixture. It is never
attended with those disagreeable consequences, which arise from the serious
emotions caused by the object itself. (p. 24)
Du Bos is not entirely explicit in listing these “disagreeable consequences”, and a
more careful and thorough interpretation would disentangle what he takes to be
the positive and the negative aspects of our experience. But that is more than
I have the space (or the need) for here, and I trust that the above has given a
sufficient sense of the overall structure, at least, of Du Bos’s solution.
11.3. Fontenelle
Du Bos’s Re´flexions is a substantial book, containing several astute psychological
observations, and an intriguing and well thought-out solution to the paradox of
art and negative emotions. By contrast, Fontenelle’s similarly titled Re´flexions
sur la Poe´tique (1742) is a medium-sized essay, containing just a single paragraph
discussing this particular puzzle. This is the paragraph that Hume quotes, in his
own (perfectly good) translation, in Of Tragedy :
“Pleasure and pain,” says he [Fontenelle], “which are two sentiments so
different in themselves, differ not so much in their cause. From the in-
stance of tickling, it appears, that the movement of pleasure, pushed a
little too far, becomes pain; and that the movement of pain, a little mod-
erated, becomes pleasure. Hence it proceeds, that there is such a thing as
a sorrow, soft and agreeable: It is a pain weakened and diminished. The
heart likes naturally to be moved and affected. Melancholy objects suit
it, and even disastrous and sorrowful, provided they are softened by some
circumstance. It is certain, that, on the theatre, the representation has
almost the effect of reality; yet it has not altogether that effect. However
we may be hurried away by the spectacle; whatever dominion the senses
and imagination may usurp over the reason, there still lurks at the bottom
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a certain idea of falsehood in the whole of what we see. This idea, though
weak and disguised, suffices to diminish the pain which we suffer from the
misfortunes of those whom we love, and to reduce that aﬄiction to such a
pitch as converts it into a pleasure. We weep for the misfortune of a hero,
to whom we are attached. In the same instant we comfort ourselves, by
reflecting, that it is nothing but a fiction: And it is precisely that mixture
of sentiments, which composes an agreeable sorrow, and tears that delight
us. But as that aﬄiction, which is caused by exterior and sensible objects,
is stronger than the consolation which arises from an internal reflection,
they are the effects and symptoms of sorrow, that ought to predominate
in the composition.” (Tr 7, pp. 218-9)
In this quite long paragraph, Fontenelle does not seem to me to offer a coherent
explanation of the phenomenon, but rather presents a few different ideas (which
are not obviously consistent with each other). The first is an echo of Du Bos’s
idea that we have a strong desire for emotional stimulation of all kinds, and that
ostensibly negative emotions may in truth be more desirable than is often thought;
to repeat: “The heart likes naturally to be moved and affected. Melancholy
objects suit it”.
A second idea in this paragraph also has some similarities with Du Bos’s
account. This is the idea that the fictional nature of the events depicted weakens
or softens the emotions, and that a passion that is typically painful, in fact be-
comes pleasurable when it is thus softened. Du Bos too, as we have seen, thought
that the fictional nature of the events neutralised the unpleasant aspects of the
experience. For Du Bos, however, our real-life experience combines pleasant with
unpleasant emotional responses, and what the fictional case does is simply neu-
tralise the unpleasant; for Fontenelle, at least according to this second idea, there
is no pleasure until the falsehood of what we are seeing weakens the otherwise
purely painful response. For Du Bos, the real-life reaction is mixed, and the ar-
tificial reaction is pure; for Fontenelle, both reactions are pure, but one is purely
painful and the other purely pleasant.
There also seems to be yet a third idea towards the end of Fontenelle’s
paragraph, where he suggests that our experience at the theatre is not after
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all purely pleasant, but is rather a mixture of pleasure and pain, an “agreeable
sorrow” that combines the sadness with the comforting thought that what we are
seeing is not real. I leave to others the task of rendering this idea consistent with
the rest.
11.4. Hume’s change of mind
Though he does not name them explicitly in his early work, Hume had presumably
read Du Bos and Fontenelle when he wrote the Treatise. For in a couple of
passages in Book 1 he shows an awareness of the paradox of art and negative
emotions, and gestures at a (somewhat vague) solution that contains elements of
both of these earlier accounts:
We may add to this a remark; that in matters of religion men take a plea-
sure in being terrify’d, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who
excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life,
where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing
can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and ’tis only in dramatic
performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure. In
these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and
the passion, being soften’d by the want of belief in the subject, has no more
than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention.
(T 1.3.9.15, p. 115)
There is no passion of the human mind but what may arise from poetry;
tho’ at the same time the feelings of the passions are very different when
excited by poetical fictions, from what they are when they arise from belief
and reality. A passion, which is disagreeable in real life, may afford the
highest entertainment in a tragedy, or epic poem. In the latter case it lies
not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid: And has no other
than the agreeable effect of exciting the spirits, and rouzing the attention.
(T 1.3.10.10, p. 630-1)
At some point after writing the Treatise, however, Hume evidently gave the matter
more thought, and came to be dissatisfied with this account. The result was the
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third of the four dissertations, Of Tragedy, in which he abandons his earlier tacit
allegiance to Du Bos and Fontenelle, and offers a very different account of his
own.
Hume’s later objection to Du Bos is disappointing. To begin with, his sum-
mary of Du Bos’s solution mentions only the point about our strong desire for
emotional stimulation of all kinds (Tr 3, p. 217). While his endorsement of this
point (Tr 4, p. 217) should be taken entirely at face value (we may recall that
Hume appealed to the same principle in his account of the love of family relations;
§4.4), he makes no mention whatsoever of Du Bos’s additional discussions of the
inherent pleasures of gruesome spectacles, or of the thrill of risk and danger. More
importantly, he completely ignores the core of Du Bos’s actual solution, namely
that the artificial passions aroused by art are pleasures purified from their usual
negative aspects, by virtue of the fictional nature of the events depicted.
The extent of Hume’s objection is simply this:
There is, however, a difficulty in applying to the present subject, in its full
extent, this solution, however ingenious and satisfactory it may appear. It
is certain, that the same object of distress, which pleases in a tragedy, were
it really set before us, would give the most unfeigned uneasiness; though
it be then the most effectual cure to languor and indolence. (Tr 6, p. 218)
As a criticism of Du Bos, this is simply beside the point.4 Du Bos after all
explicitly agrees, as for example here:
The massacre of the innocents must have left most gloomy impressions in
the imaginations of those, who were real spectators of the barbarity of the
soldiers slaughtering the poor infants in the bosom of their mothers, all
imbrued with blood. (1748, p. 24)
The point of Hume’s objection seems to be that the desire for emotional stim-
ulation by itself cannot explain the phenomenon; we also need to be told, at
4Cf. Livingston (2013, p. 405).
11.4. HUME’S CHANGE OF MIND 221
the very least, what the effective difference is between art and real life. Why
are we so delighted in the former case, when we are so distressed in the latter?
Whatever one thinks of the ultimate success of Du Bos’s account, he does at least
have an answer to this question: art works are imitations, and as such they affect
only our sensation and imagination, not our reason; they excite only artificial
emotions that have none of the negative consequences that go along with their
real-life counterparts.
When Hume then introduces Fontenelle’s account as offering an “addition”
to Du Bos’s that speaks to this objection (Tr 6, p. 218), by locating the key
difference between art and real life in the fictional nature of the former, his
unfairness to Du Bos becomes yet clearer. For Du Bos, as we have seen, the
key difference between imitations and real life is precisely that the former are
fictional. Fontenelle’s supposed “addition” was thus already in Du Bos’s account
to begin with.
Be that as it may, Hume goes on to make short work of Fontenelle’s novel
idea that a pain weakened becomes pleasant: “You may by degrees weaken a
real sorrow, till it totally disappears; yet in none of its gradations will it ever
give pleasure” (Tr 10, p. 221). He is similarly dismissive of the suggestion that
the fictional nature of art works is the key feature that distinguishes them from
reality:
The pathetic description of the butchery, made by Verres of the Sicilian
captains, is a masterpiece of this kind: But I believe none will affirm, that
the being present at a melancholy scene of that nature would afford any
entertainment. Neither is the sorrow here softened by fiction: For the
audience were convinced of the reality of every circumstance. (Tr 8, p. 219)
With this remark Hume does after all give us (though apparently unintentionally)
a genuine criticism of Du Bos, as well as of Fontenelle. The comment, something
of an aside in Hume’s dissertation, raises to my mind a substantial issue, to which
I will return in the next section.
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Given the general ineffectiveness of Hume’s criticisms—this one point aside—
it seems to me unlikely that Hume changed his mind on this topic because of these
worries. They are not, on inspection, very compelling reasons for abandoning the
ideas hinted at by Fontenelle, or the theory carefully developed by Du Bos. It
seems possible, therefore, that Hume simply hit upon his own new solution, and
then hunted around for objections to these earlier writers so as to motivate it.
There is also a third and potentially more interesting possibility, however, namely
that Hume had another reason for wanting a different explanation, a reason that
is not brought out in his explicit and rather weak objections. I will tentatively
suggest such a reason in the next section.
11.5. Hume’s later account
What is most distinctive about Hume’s later explanation of the pleasure that we
take in tragic art, when compared to Du Bos’s and Fontenelle’s, is the introduction
of a completely new set of emotional responses: responses to the artwork itself,
rather than to the events that it depicts, such as our delight in its beauty and
in the skill of the artist. With these (positive) emotions now in the picture,
Hume is able to apply his conversion principle. The negative passions arising
from the events themselves, Hume says, are converted into or swallowed up by
the predominant feelings of delight evoked by the artistry:
The genius required to paint objects in a lively manner, the art employed
in collecting all the pathetic circumstances, the judgment displayed in dis-
posing them: the exercise, I say, of these noble talents, together with the
force of expression, and beauty of oratorial numbers, diffuse the highest
satisfaction on the audience, and excite the most delightful movements.
By this means, the uneasiness of the melancholy passions is not only over-
powered and effaced by something stronger of an opposite kind; but the
whole impulse of those passions is converted into pleasure, and swells the
delight which the eloquence raises in us... The impulse or vehemence, aris-
ing from sorrow, compassion, indignation, receives a new direction from the
11.5. HUME’S LATER ACCOUNT 223
sentiments of beauty. The latter, being the predominant emotion, seize the
whole mind, and convert the former into themselves, at least tincture them
so strongly as totally to alter their nature. (Tr 9, pp. 219-20)
If Hume had only engaged properly with Du Bos here, there would have been a
nice contrast to be drawn between their solutions. As we have seen, Du Bos’s
position is that in the real life case there is a mixture of pleasure and pain, in
which the pain predominates; while in the artistic case, the painful aspects are
removed. Hume however holds that the real life case is purely painful, while in
the artistic case there is a mixture of pleasure and pain in which the pleasure
predominates (before ultimately “swallowing up” the pain).
In the Treatise, when Hume introduces Du Bos’s idea of the strong desire
for emotional stimulation of all kinds, he attributes it (without mentioning Du
Bos by name) to those “who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature”
(T 2.2.4.4, p. 352). He is in this way implicitly placing Du Bos in the wider group
(which includes the egoists) of those who “give us a mean opinion of our nature”
(DM 2, p. 81; recall §2.3). This points to the important Hobbesian context of
Du Bos’s solution. As Hume was no doubt aware, Hobbes had earlier expressed
some closely related ideas:
[F]rom what Passion proceedeth it, that men take pleasure to behold from
the shore the danger of them that are at Sea in a tempest; or in Fight,
from a safe Castle to behold two armies charge one to another in the field?
It is certainly, in the whole sum, Joy ; else men would never flock to such
a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both Joy and Grief : for as there is
novelty and remembrance of our own Security present, which is delight : so
there is also Pity, which is Grief: But the Delight is so far predominant,
that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery
of their friends. (1651, p. 114)
Whether Du Bos was directly inspired by Hobbes, I do not know, but there is a
striking similarity in that both claim our experience in such cases is a mixture of
pleasure and pain. Du Bos also discusses the same two examples of watching a
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shipwreck from the shore, and a battle from a castle (1733, p. 13; 1748, p. 11).
There is nothing in that to tie Hobbes directly to Du Bos—the examples are from
Lucretius’s poem De Rerum Natura5—but the common source is significant in
itself. Lucretius’s poem is an explication of Epicurean philosophy (indeed, it is
one of our major sources of the ideas of this school), and both Hobbes and Du
Bos are recognisably influenced by the Epicurean tradition in their psychological
theories.
This context makes Hume’s rejection of Du Bos’s solution—indeed, his com-
plete failure to engage with it properly—potentially more intelligible. As I argued
extensively in Part 1 of this thesis, Hume’s philosophy of emotion underwent a
major change after the Treatise away from egoism and the Epicurean tradition,
and towards sentimentalism and the rival Stoical tradition. I suggested at the
end of the previous section that Hume may have abandoned his earlier solution to
the paradox of art and negative emotions simply because he came up with a novel
one that seemed better. But I also suggested a more interesting possibility: that
he later had other reasons for disliking Du Bos’s account that he did not make
explicit. One possible such reason is his general attempt to disassociate himself
from Hobbes and Epicurus, and to offer more morally palatable psychological
explanations of the phenomena that he was investigating.
Returning to the other unanswered question from the previous section—of
what the crucial distinguishing feature of artworks is, that makes our response
different from what it would be in real life—the obvious first thought, given what
we have now seen of his solution, is that Hume’s answer ought to be simply
that it is an artwork. The difference in reactions, thinks Hume, is down to the
addition of some positive emotions, but these are not in any way a response to
the fictional nature of the events depicted (the events need not even be fictional).
Rather, they arise because the events are depicted so beautifully, with such great
skill and artistry.
5“’Tis sweet, when on the might sea the storm winds rouse the main, / To watch from shore
another toil with all his might in vain: / Not that the hurt of others can to us delightful be, /
But that we like to look on ills from which ourselves are free. / Sweet is it too to view in line
the mighty strife of war / Arrayed across the plains when we from danger stand afar.” (Baring
1884, p. 55)
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This is certainly right as far as it goes. On closer inspection, however, it
cannot be the whole of Hume’s answer, for the following reason. Supposing that
some work of art evokes pleasant emotions because of its beauty, and negative
emotions because of its content, it is still an open question which of these two
sets of emotions will be predominant in the mixture. In some cases, Hume says,
the negative feelings dominate, and all the eloquence in the world will only serve
to make us feel worse:
Who could ever think of it as a good expedient for comforting an aﬄicted
parent, to exaggerate, with all the force of elocution, the irreparable loss,
which he has met with by the death of a favourite child? The more power
of imagination and expression you here employ, the more you encrease his
despair and aﬄiction. (Tr 21, p. 223)
More examples are given in the following paragraphs: Cicero’s rhetorical skill
in describing Verres’ massacre delights the audience, but only distresses Verres
himself all the more (Tr 22, p. 223); Clarendon overlooks the death of King
Charles I in his history of the civil war, because “[h]e himself, as well as the
readers of that age, were too deeply concerned in the events” (Tr 23, p. 223);
the English theatre depicts too much blood and gore, creating a sense of horror
that no amount of artistry can overcome (Tr 24, p. 224); even our sorrow at
seeing virtuous characters suffer at the hands of the vicious predominates over
any feelings of beauty, unless softened by having the virtue turn into a courageous
despair, or the villains receive their proper punishment (Tr 25, p. 224).
Though this shows that a positive reaction to the beauty and brilliance of
the artwork cannot be the sole difference, however, it does not show us what the
crucial missing factor is. What is different about the cases in which this positive
reaction predominates, as opposed to those in which it only serves to increase
our pain? Having thus excited the reader’s curiosity, I will follow Hume’s advice





In the previous chapter, I placed Hume’s conversion principle in its context,
and looked at how Hume came to apply it to the paradox of art and negative
emotions. I ended with an unanswered question: what is it that makes one
passion predominant over another? Why is it, for example, that for most of us
the pleasure of Cicero’s rhetoric is heightened by the horrific subject matter of
Verres’ massacre, while for Verres himself the shame and terror is heightened
by the rhetoric? This is one of three main interpretative questions regarding
Hume’s principle. The other two concern the nature of the process itself (how
the predominant and subordinate passions interact), and its end result (what
becomes of these two passions after their interaction).
In this chapter, I offer answers to each of these questions. It will be con-
venient to tackle the middle question first, concerning the nature of the process
itself, since this question is both easier to answer, and has an impact on the an-
swers to the other two questions. From the outset I should say that we cannot
assume, simply because we want answers to these other two questions, that Hume
himself had precise answers in his own mind. I will initially proceed on the basis
of this assumption, and see which answers are best supported by the text. In the
final section, however, I will argue that Hume was not in fact quite so clear on
these matters as we might have wished.1
1I have presented much the same view before in answer to the third question (what becomes
of these two passions after their interaction); see Merivale (2011). Here I extend my answer to
include the first question as well (what makes one passion predominant over the other).
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12.1. Swallowing up: passions or emotions?
Hume’s statement of his conversion principle includes three images or metaphors:
It is a property in human nature, that any emotion, which attends a pas-
sion, is easily converted into it; though in their natures they be originally
different from, and even contrary to each other... The predominant pas-
sion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself. The spirits, when
once excited, easily receive a change in their direction; and it is natural to
imagine, that this change will come from the prevailing affection. (P 6.2,
p. 26; cf. T 2.3.4.2, pp. 419-20)
The first image invoked is that of the conversion of one passion into another. This
is perhaps the most important idea; certainly it is the one that has dominated
discussions of Hume’s view, and indeed given the principle its familiar name. I will
say more about this idea in §12.3 below. The second image is a meal metaphor:
Hume talks of the predominant passion “swallowing up” the subordinate. The
third is a gesture at the underlying physiology: the spirits are said to receive a
change in their direction. I will say more about this last in §12.2.
The meal metaphor does not seem especially puzzling or problematic, and
I have nothing to say about it directly. It is well to be aware of it, at least,
for it will prove helpful when turning to consider what happens to the passions
following their interaction (see §12.4). But in itself it does not seem to raise any
interpretative questions. This metaphor does however provide the occasion for
settling an important preliminary issue.
The issue in question arises from an influential suggestion by Alex Neill.2
Neill’s idea is that it is not the subordinate passion itself that is swallowed up
by the predominant, in Hume’s process, but rather a distinct item called an
“emotion” that “attends” the subordinate passion. The textual springboard for
this idea is Hume’s very first statement of the principle: “It is a property in
2Neill (1998).
12.1. SWALLOWING UP: PASSIONS OR EMOTIONS? 229
human nature, that any emotion, which attends a passion, is easily converted
into it” (P 6.2, p. 26).
Interesting though this suggestion is, it does not seem to be supported by
the text. As we saw in chapter 3, Hume does sometimes use “emotion” as a more
general term than “passion”, to refer to all secondary impressions (including the
moral and critical sentiments). But as this distinction is seldom Hume’s focus, for
the most part the words are effectively just stylistic variants. Many passages are
suggestive of this straightforward interpretation, but perhaps the clearest piece
of evidence comes from a revision that Hume made to a paragraph from Treatise
Book 2:
Thus a man, who, by any injury from another, is very much discompos’d
and ruﬄed in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent,
impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially if he can discover
these subjects in or near the person, who was the object of his first passion.
(T 2.1.4.4, p. 284)
The repetition of “passion” at the end here is somewhat inelegant, as Hume him-
self no doubt realised later. For in the corresponding passage in the Dissertation
on the Passions it is avoided by using “emotion” instead:
Thus, a man, who, by an injury received from another, is very much dis-
composed and ruﬄed in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of
hatred, discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially,
if he can discover these subjects in or near the person, who was the object
of his first emotion. (P 2.8, p. 8)
This provides clear evidence that these terms are just stylistic variants.3
3There is one other change in this paragraph that I have hidden from the above quotations:
in the Treatise, Hume spoke of the person in question as the “cause of the first passion” (my
emphasis), rather than the object of this passion. This was clearly an error, and one that
Hume corrected in the Dissertation on the Passions (from its very first edition): recall that the
passion of hatred, like all the double-relation passions, has a person for its object, not its cause
(§9.4). Since this is a potentially misleading matter of substance, Millican and I have corrected
it in our on-line edition of the Treatise, from which I am quoting throughout this thesis.
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Since Hume never explicitly draws a distinction between “passions” and
their attendant “emotions”, and since there was no such standard distinction
that would have been familiar to Hume’s readers, particularly strong evidence
is required to suggest that Hume really was operating with some such contrast
in mind. Neill’s evidence, however, is all perfectly consistent with the more
straightforward synonymy interpretation. For example, is it unsurprising that
Hume should say “any emotion, which attends a passion, is easily converted into
it” (P 6.2, p. 26), rather than use the more clumsy expression “any passion,
which attends a passion”. Moreover, Neill seems to have misread this passage:
the emotion in question is said to attend the predominant passion, but Neill’s
interpretation requires that it attends the subordinate.
The effective synonymy of these two words in the present context is further
established by the fact that Hume refers to the subordinate item, the thing that
is converted or swallowed up, as both a “passion” and an “emotion”. Neill ac-
knowledges one place in which Hume refers to the subordinate item as a passion
(T 2.3.4.2, p. 420; cf. P 6.2, p. 26), but goes on to say that this “is in fact very
much an exception to the rest of his talk about affective conversion”, in which
“emotion” is the more common term.4 But Neill’s selective quotations in support
of this claim are not representative. In the Dissertation on the Passions and Of
Tragedy combined, the tally is in fact exactly equal, with the subordinate item
being referred to as a “passion” five times and an “emotion” five times.5 The
relevant section of the Treatise (T 2.3.4, pp. 418-22), which includes most of the
Dissertation’s references, does not alter this picture.6 Thus Neill’s proposal is
not borne out by the text.
4Neill (1998, p. 345).
5The “subordinate” or “inferior” item is termed a “passion” three times (P 6.2, p. 26; Tr 13,
27, pp. 221, 224). The item that stands in the relevant relation to the predominant passion,
meanwhile, when it is not explicitly labelled as “subordinate”, is termed a “passion” twice
(P 1.25, 6.4; 6, 27) and an “emotion” five times (P 6.2, 6.3, 6.6, 6.8, pp. 26, 27; Tr 14, p. 221),
bringing the total to five a piece.
6The item said to be “converted” or “transfused” into the predominant passion is called an
“emotion” twice (T 2.3.4.2, 2.3.4.5, pp. 419, 421) and a “passion” twice (T 2.3.4.2, 2.3.4.7,
pp. 420, 421). There is a fifth reference to the “inferior emotion” (T 2.3.4.3, p. 420).
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12.2. Movements in the spirits
Hume’s reference to “spirits” in connection with his conversion principle is to be
understood in the context of the physiological theory of the time. In the sec-
ond century, Galen had hypothesised that food was converted into natural spirit
by digestion, which latter was then carried (by the veins) to nourish the body’s
tissues. It was also sent to the heart, where—mixed with air breathed into the
lungs—it was converted into vital spirit, which was transported throughout the
body by the arteries. Some of this vital spirit, when it reached the brain, was
transformed into animal spirits, which were sent through the nervous system.
These animal spirits served a two-way communicative purpose: to send informa-
tion from the sense organs to the brain, and to send instructions from the brain
to the muscles.7
Aside from differences at the level of detail that needn’t concern us here
(chiefly concerning how the animal spirits effected these two communicative
tasks), Galen’s view of the nervous system was the standard one until Luigi
Galvani produced compelling evidence (in 1780, shortly after Hume’s death) that
electricity rather than the hypothesised animal spirits performed the communica-
tive function. (Other aspects of Galen’s view were most notably challenged by
William Harvey in 1628, who argued for the circulation of the blood, with the
heart as its pump.) It is thus no surprise to find Descartes and Malebranche
positing movements in the animal spirits as the immediate causes of the passions
(or the occasions for God to bring about the passions, for Malebranche).8 The
two had their own particular take on how the spirits managed to do this, but
otherwise this claim was simply received wisdom: all the perceptions of the mind
were presumed to be brought about in this way.
7Though Galen made some notable progress in our understanding of these matters, not all
of these ideas were original, and the three sorts of spirits were not first hypothesised by him.
For a thorough, book-length treatment of the history of this subject—from a physiologist, who
therefore may be presumed to understand it all much better than I do—see Ochs (2004).
8Descartes, moreover, was an influential early critic of Harvey, agreeing with the principle
of circulation, but rejecting the idea of the heart as a pump. See Gorham (1994).
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Hume, like any learned man of his age, was familiar with the gist of the
physiological theory of the day, as we may see particularly clearly in his essay
The Epicurean:
The stomach digests the aliments: The heart circulates the blood: The
brain separates and refines the spirits[.] (Ep 5, p. 140)
It should go without saying, however, that Hume was no physiologist. Though his
work on the passions is peppered—very lightly—with mentions of the spirits and
of movements in the spirits, in every case he is simply taking the received wisdom
for granted. With just one exception, these claims never play any indispensable
role in his psychological theories, and in the exceptional case Hume explicitly
apologises for the anomaly:
’Twou’d have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain,
and have shewn, why upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits
run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are
related to it. But tho’ I have neglected any advantage, which I might have
drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I
must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that
arise from these relations. (T 1.2.5.20, p. 60)
It may also be noted that this is in the context of Hume’s discussion of the
association of ideas; in the case of the passions, remarks about the spirits add
some nice visual imagery, but never serve any significant theoretical purpose.
In the context of the conversion principle, Hume’s talk of the spirits receiving
a change in their direction is obviously to be understood as a gesture at the
underlying physiology. But the principle itself is a psychological one, as far as
Hume is concerned, and he supports it exclusively with psychological examples;
the physiological descriptions of it do not seem to play any essential role in Hume’s
argument, as far as I can see, and might just as well be deleted.
John Wright, as part of his insistence that Malebranche was an important
positive influence on Hume, is keen on emphasising Hume’s occasional references
to animal spirits. He claims that Hume “seems to have thought that the search
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for something like the physical causes described in Cartesian psychophysiology
was directly relevant to his own activities as a moral philosopher”.9 But apart
from the isolated and apologetic example regarding the association of ideas that
we have already seen, I am aware of no textual evidence to support this surprising
claim. With regard to his Malebranchean interpretation of Hume’s association-
ism, Wright does acknowledge that “[t]his part of his account may not be entirely
explicit”.10 And again with regard to Hume’s account of personal identity: “there
is no explicit reference back to the neurophysiological account when Hume ex-
plains how we develop our idea of the continuous identical self”.11 A less ingenious
reader might rather contend that these things are entirely absent.12
Hume’s allusions to the physiology underlying his conversion principle may
provide us with some clues pertaining to the interpretation of that principle (see
§12.4 below). But it would be quite inappropriate to read them as serious at-
tempts to uncover the physical processes of the brain. Hume seems to have been
broadly familiar with the theory of the day, and that familiarity shows through
in some of his writing, but we should not read too much into this unsurprising
fact.
12.3. Conversion
This brings us to the aspect of Hume’s general description of the conversion
principle that has dominated recent commentaries: the talk of one passion “con-
verting” another into itself (P 6.2, 6.6, pp. 26, 27; Tr 9-12, 19-20, pp. 219-21,
222-3). There has been much speculation as to what Hume might have meant by
this conversion in his discussion of tragedy. The most likely candidate, I suggest,
is not quite the natural reading of the term. It is difficult to make sense of a
way in which, for Hume, a particular perception of pride (for example) might
9Wright (1983, p. 15).
10Wright (1983, p. 68).
11Wright (1983, p. 73).
12Recall §10.1, note 3.
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have previously been a different passion. It seems that all Hume really can mean
by conversion in this context is causation: when one passion is converted into
another, this amounts to the former passion causing the latter to appear (and
presumably vanishing itself in the process; see §12.4 below).
This suggestion is supported by Hume’s use of the notion in other contexts.
In section 2 of the Dissertation on the Passions, in his discussion of the causal
genesis of pride and humility, Hume writes:
Beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity
produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be placed, and whether sur-
veyed in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity belong
to our own face, shape, or person, this pleasure or uneasiness is converted
into pride or humility; as having in this case all the circumstances requisite
to produce a perfect transition, according to the present theory. (P 2.17,
p. 10; my emphasis)
The “present theory” here referred to is that of the double relation of sentiments
and ideas, according to which the pleasure or uneasiness that Hume says is con-
verted into pride or humility is a key step in the causal chain that produces these
passions (recall §§4.1 and 9.5). Although this is the only one to remain in the
Dissertation, there are more examples of this talk of conversion to be found in
Book 2 of the Treatise (e.g. T 2.1.5.5, 2.1.6.2, 2.1.12.8, pp. 286-7, 290, 327).
It doesn’t immediately follow, of course, that Hume meant the same thing
by this word in his discussion of the conversion principle; but there is a default
assumption in favour of this simple hypothesis. Moreover, there is direct evidence
of synonymy when this principle is first described, in two sentences that I skipped
over when quoting this passage at the start of the chapter (page 228):
It is a property in human nature, that any emotion, which attends a pas-
sion, is easily converted into it; though in their natures they be originally
different from, and even contrary to each other. It is true, in order to cause
a perfect union amongst passions, and make one produce the other, there
is always required a double relation, according to the theory above deliv-
ered. But when two passions are already produced by their separate causes,
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and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite; though
they have but one relation, and sometimes without any. The predominant
passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself. (P 6.2, p. 26)
Notice how Hume relates the conversion mechanism here to his theory of the
double relation of sentiments and ideas. In order to make one passion “produce”
another (cause and effect), a double relation is required between both the senti-
ment components and the idea components. But when both passions are already
present in the mind, one will be converted into the other with just a single re-
lation (meaning a relation of ideas).13 I suggest that this is not just an artful
juxtaposition: production and conversion boil down to one and the same thing,
namely, the causing of one passion by another.14
In the case of the conversion principle, the predominant passion in question
is already present in the mind. And what good, one might reasonably ask, is
a cause that only ever operates when its effect has already been produced by
independent means? To make sense of this, we need to remember Hume’s two
ways of describing the difference between calm and violent passions (§10.4). On
the one hand, it is thought of in terms of a difference in violence or turbulence;
the talk of conversion does not seem to make sense on this model, and this is
the reason for the present worry. On the other hand, however, it is also thought
of in terms of an increase in quantity, and on this model the idea of conversion
(as causation) makes perfect sense. When two passions are both present to the
mind, and one is converted into the other, this amounts to the one causing more
of the other to appear.
13To be precise, Hume says with “but one relation, and sometimes without any” (my empha-
sis). It is unclear what this further qualification is doing, however. Hume never gives us any
examples of one passion being converted into another even when their objects are unrelated.
In fact, he told us earlier that “[i]n contrary passions, if the objects be totally different, the
passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other”
(P 1.24, p. 6). It seems, therefore, that this later qualification was a slip.
14The notion of conversion, we may recall, is also present in Hume’s account of the sympa-
thetic communication of passions (§4.3). Here, however, it is not one sentiment being converted
into another, but the idea of a sentiment being converted into that very sentiment. In this case,
I take it that there is a genuine conversion, i.e. the very same thing changes from an idea into
an impression. Since impressions and ideas differ only in their felt intensity, all that is required
for this conversion is an injection of force and vivacity.
236 CHAPTER 12. THE CONVERSION PRINCIPLE
12.4. Before and after
Now that we have a sense of how Hume pictured the process itself, we may tackle
the other two questions that I posed at the start of this chapter: what determines
which of the two passions will predominate, and what happens to the passions
at the end of the process? What happens to the predominant passion at the
end of the process, at least, is obvious: the main result of the interaction is “to
give additional force to the prevailing passion” (P 6.3, p. 26). Hume states this
unambiguously, and we could have deduced it easily enough anyway from the
context that we saw in the previous chapter. This principle is one of those that
Hume offers concerning the causes of the violent emotions, and it wouldn’t belong
in this context if its effect was not an increase in force or violence. This is also
presumably the point of Hume’s talk of one passion swallowing up another: the
predominant passion is strengthened by its metaphorical meal.
The question of what happens to the subordinate passion at the end of the
process, however, is not so easily settled. Furthermore, this question has often
been thought to be particularly important for the evaluation of Hume’s account,
since there is some evidence to suggest that he supposes the mechanism utterly
annihilates these melancholy passions. We might call this the destruction in-
terpretation of the principle. This destruction interpretation, furthermore, is
sometimes thought to entail that our experience of tragic drama is entirely pain-
free. This, in turn, is believed to be incorrect as a description of the experience,
and the inevitable conclusion is that Hume’s account fails.15
Taken at face value, the talk of conversion plainly implies the death of the
passion that gets converted. This is certainly so if we give the word “conversion”
its usual interpretation, and understand Hume as saying that the subordinate
passion itself somehow turns into the predominant. But even if we understand
conversion as essentially the causing of one passion by another, as I suggest we
15See Hill (1982, pp. 323-4), Packer (1989, p. 212), and Budd (1991, pp. 103-4). Those who
don’t accuse Hume of this error still typically accept that it would be an error, and develop
interpretations explicitly designed to overcome it; Yanal (1991, 1992), Neill (1992, 1998).
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should, the natural reading is still that of a causal process involving the destruc-
tion of the cause. Nor can we dismiss this as a possibly unintended connotation of
the word, for Hume could perfectly well have chosen a causal term with no such
connotation (e.g. “produces”, “creates”). It is chiefly with a view to sidestepping
this evidence in favour of the destruction interpretation that Neill introduces his
distinction between “passions” and “emotions” (recall §12.1), urging that the
emotion is converted rather than the passion, and therefore that the subordinate
passion itself does not vanish at the end of the process. We have seen, however,
that this distinction has no convincing basis in the text.
Hume’s gesture at the underlying physiology points in the same direction.
If the stream of the subordinate passion is diverted, the spirits will no longer
“rummage” the appropriate cell and actuate the felt emotion (T 1.2.5.20, pp. 60-
1), and so it seems from this picture too that the subordinate passion is fated
to disappear. As for the meal metaphor, once again the evidence clearly points
in the same direction; for it is difficult to suppose that the subordinate passion
might live on in the belly of the predominant, so to speak.16
This evidence is all in principle defeasible. It is open to Neill, for example,
to maintain that Hume chose his general descriptions carelessly or badly, and
that he never intended these implications. This hypothesis might then be backed
up by reference to what Hume says about particular instances of his principle.
And indeed it is Neill’s position that the particular instances—with one notable
exception—point to the survival of the subordinate emotion.17 The exception
is at Tr 27 (p. 225), where Hume says that “too much jealousy extinguishes
love” (my emphasis). Neill acknowledges the exception,18 but thinks that the
other examples outweigh the evidence of this one. On inspection, however, his
arguments at this stage all rest on the supposed implausibility of applying the
destruction interpretation to the particular cases (for an example, see page 241
16Neill also reads the meal metaphor as implying the destruction of the subordinate passion
(Neill 1998, p. 344).
17Neill (1998, pp. 348ff).
18Neill (1998, p. 350).
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below), and not on any direct textual evidence. At no point does Hume in fact
say or even imply that the subordinate passion does survive the process.
It seems to me that many of Neill’s criticisms of the destruction idea are
not in fact decisive. I have argued this in detail elsewhere, and will not repeat
these arguments here.19 The present point is simply that they are philosophical
objections, not textual. Ultimately, however, I do think that Neill came very close
to putting his finger on a difficulty here that is both philosophical and textual,
and in the next section I will suggest a subtler refinement of the destruction
interpretation. For now, however, I submit that interpretation as provisionally
the best of the available options.
So much for the fate of the passions after the process. I turn now to the
question of what makes one passion predominant over the other in the first place.
To the best of my knowledge, only one answer has been given to this question
in the secondary literature, namely that the predominant passion is the more
forceful of the two.20 I agree that this is the best available answer, but it is
worth pointing to the reasons in support of this interpretative claim, since those
who have made it before seem to have done so without offering any such support
(and the quality of this evidence will also be important in §12.5 below). The
general argument runs as follows: there is only one way in which a passion can
vary (other than in its causes or objects), and that is in its force or violence; this
is therefore the only salient way in which the predominant passion might differ
from the subordinate one; and since it is absurd to suppose that the predominant
passion is the less forceful of the two, it must be the more forceful.
To this general argument we can add two specific passages from Of Tragedy.
Towards the end of this dissertation, Hume offers a handful of examples in sup-
port of the “inversion” of the conversion principle (Tr 27, p. 224), which are in
fact just examples of the principle itself, but with the predominant passion being
19See Merivale (2011).
20This answer is first given clearly and explicitly by Hill (1982, p. 322). Hill attributes it to
Paton (1973), who does seem to hint at it (pp. 127-8), but I do not myself find it obvious that
this is what she is saying. The same answer is later given by Budd (1991, p. 95).
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a passion that in other (more common) situations is subordinate. The shame of
Verres on hearing Cicero’s speech in prosecution of him, we are told, would have
been “too strong for the pleasure arising from the beauties of elocution” (Tr 22,
p. 223; my emphasis). This is what makes that painful passion predominate in
Verres’ mind; and “strength” here is presumably to be equated with “force” and
“violence”.21 Furthermore, Hume later adds that “[t]oo much jealousy extin-
guishes love” (Tr 27, p. 225; my emphasis again). Here the metaphor is that of
volume rather than violence, but, as we have seen, the underlying property is the
same.
There is a difficulty with this answer to our first question, however, one that
has to some extent been noted already by Malcolm Budd, who criticises this
aspect of Hume’s proposed solution to the problem of tragic pleasure.22 His ob-
jection, in a nutshell, is that it just isn’t plausible to suppose that the conversion
principle, thus understood, applies in the case of tragedy, because one would have
to suppose that the pleasurable passions roused by the eloquence with which the
melancholy scene is depicted are always more forceful, to begin with, than the
painful passions caused by the scene itself.
The example of Verres gives us a hint of why Hume might have thought
that the pleasurable passions are (in the appropriate cases) always more force-
ful than the painful. All Cicero’s rhetorical skill supposedly could not induce
feelings strong enough to efface Verres’ shame and guilt, which painful passions
instead predominated and thereby gained greater force as a result of the orator’s
eloquence (Tr 22, p. 223). Why is it, then, that for us Cicero’s rhetoric wins
out over the horror? The salient difference for Hume would seem to be that we
are not so intimately connected with the tragic facts. Similarly with the case of
21In one place in the Treatise Hume does distinguish between “violent” and “strong” passions,
the latter being those that have a greater influence on the will, regardless of their felt intensity
(T 2.3.4.1, pp. 418-9). But elsewhere “strength” is clearly just another term for “violence” (e.g.
T 2.2.2.23, p. 344), and the present passage makes much more sense read in this way than in the
other. It is not likely that Hume means to say here that Verres’ shame has a greater influence
on his actions or volitions than the sentiment of beauty. That may be true, but hardly seems
relevant.
22Budd (1991, pp. 96ff).
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Lord Clarendon overlooking King Charles I’s death in his history of the civil war:
“He himself, as well as the readers of that age, were too deeply concerned in the
events, and felt a pain from subjects, which an historian and a reader of another
age would regard as the most pathetic and most interesting, and, by consequence,
the most agreeable” (Tr 23, pp. 223-4; my emphasis). The difference, for Hume,
is in the distance.
This at least is how Hume might attempt to meet Budd’s objection, though
how successful such an attempt could be I leave for others to judge. For even if the
objection can be met, a broader worry would still remain regarding this aspect of
the conversion principle. This broader worry, meanwhile, is closely analogous to
a similar worry with the other aspect of this principle discussed here (the fate of
the subordinate passion), and I will therefore examine both matters in the next
section. For now, suffice it to conclude that the best reconstruction of Hume’s
principle, on the basis of the text, is as I have been arguing: the predominant
passion (i.e. the antecedently more forceful of the two) destroys the subordinate
passion, and acquires yet greater force as a result.
12.5. A subtler interpretation
The textual evidence that I offered in the previous section is far from decisive.
Hume’s metaphors certainly indicate that the fate of the subordinate passion is
to disappear, but there is only one comment that backs this up in a particular
case. It seems that the only plausible answer to the question of which passion
predominates, meanwhile, is that the predominant passion is the more forceful
of the two; but again only two particular examples back this up explicitly. I
have argued that these answers are more defensible than any alternative, but the
weakness of the evidence in any direction here suggests a subtler interpretation:
that although this might be (or should be) Hume’s considered position, he never
actually considered either of these questions very closely, so as to frame clear and
definite answers in his own mind. I shall now give some reasons for thinking that
this subtler interpretation is in fact closer to the mark.
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The main textual difficulty with the cruder interpretation that I have been
developing so far is also, it seems to me, the main philosophical difficulty with
Hume’s account. Hume wants his conversion principle to be a general psychologi-
cal principle, accounting for a range of phenomena. The particular examples that
he appeals to must therefore all have a sufficient amount in common, with these
common elements comprising the essence of the principle. It is not enough, clearly,
that the various cases all involve two passions interacting somehow. Rather, the
two passions must be distinguished in the same way every time, and the end
results for both must be the same every time.
The difficulty here is that Hume himself seems to have been somewhat lax
in meeting these requirements. Nowhere does he take the time to argue, for
any of his examples, that the subordinate passion is destroyed at the end of the
process. Nor does he ever take the time to argue, for any of his examples, that
the passion that predominates is, at the start of the process, the more forceful of
the two. In the absence of this detail, Hume’s justification of his principle falls
far short. His several examples, we can allow, are all similar at some broad level
of description. But are they similar enough? Are they really instances of the very
same phenomenon?
We have seen hints of this problem before that can now be brought out more
clearly. Neill, we may recall, thinks that in several of Hume’s particular examples
of the conversion principle it is highly implausible to suppose that the subordinate
passion is destroyed at the end of the process. (This is in the context of arguing
that Hume didn’t in fact suppose this; if I am right in thinking this argument
unsuccessful, the point now becomes an objection to Hume himself.) Take the
case of grief at a friend’s death increasing one’s love for him, for example (Tr 16,
p. 222). Neill thinks that to suppose one’s love destroys the grief in this case is
“grotesquely implausible”,23 and I am inclined to agree. But that Hume (if he was
committed to the destruction of the subordinate passion) might be wrong about
some of his examples is not so much the problem; more immediately problematic
23Neill (1998, p. 351).
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is the fact that he systematically fails to give any argument for this commitment.
I have said that the destruction interpretation is the most textually plausible
of the available options here. But if we take a step back, ultimately the most
plausible interpretation would seem to be that Hume never quite realised the
need to give a definite answer to the question of what happens to the subordinate
passion at the end of the process.
Much the same is true concerning the question of what makes one passion
predominant over the other. Budd, we have seen, comes close to appreciating the
difficulty here when he challenges the claim that, in the case of tragic pleasure,
the joys of the eloquence are always stronger than the pains of the drama. I went
some way, in the previous section, in defending Hume against this charge, but
really this is just the tip of the iceberg. For it is not enough for this to be true
in the case of tragedy; it must also be true in every case that Hume produces as
support for his principle. Hume makes no attempt, however, to argue for this in
any of the cases, and it is far from obvious that it is indeed true for them all.
Consider, for example, Hume’s claim that “when good or evil is placed in
such a situation as to cause any particular emotion, besides its direct passion of
desire or aversion, this latter passion must acquire new force and violence” (P 6.5,
p. 27; my emphasis). For this to be true, it must also be true that no passion
is ever more violent than the passions of desire and aversion; for if there were
such a passion, it would convert the desire or aversion into itself, rather than the
other way round. Or again, consider Hume’s account of why “every thing that
is new, is most affecting” (P 6.12, p. 28), namely that the passion of surprise or
wonder nourishes any emotion attending the novel object. For this to be true, it
must be the case that surprise or wonder is the weakest of all the passions; for
if something new were the object of a weaker passion, this weaker passion would
nourish our surprise, rather than be nourished by it.
None of these commitments seems particularly plausible. But again, the
immediate problem is not so much that they might be false, but rather that
Hume systematically makes no attempt to argue for them. I have suggested that
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the best answer to the question of what makes one passion predominant over
another, for Hume, is that it is the antecedently more forceful of the two. He
does more or less say as much in two places in Of Tragedy, and in any case this
seems like the only answer that Hume has available to him. But if we take a step
back, ultimately the most plausible interpretation seems to be that Hume never
really thought through this commitment fully.
Regarding both of these questions, then, concerning the status of the passions
before and after the conversion process, I submit that no definite answer can be
given. If we must give answers, then the view best supported by the text seems
to be that the predominant passion is the more forceful of the two, and that it
destroys the subordinate passion. But it would be overstating the case to say
that this is definitely what Hume thought. I suspect that he had no definite
thoughts on the matter one way or the other. And after all, this is perhaps only
to be expected: Hume was pioneering a new science of experimental psychology.
It is unreasonable to suppose that his principles must be as clearly and precisely




In chapter 10, we saw that, as a consequence of the specialisation view of reason
and passion, the passions for Hume cannot be contrary to reason (except in a
trivial sense, when they are founded on some false belief). This naturally prompts
the question of how passions can be evaluated beyond the minimal constraint that
they be based only on true beliefs. In this final pair of chapters, I turn to the
fourth dissertation, Of the Standard of Taste, and to a part of Hume’s reply to
this question, namely the part concerning our emotional responses to works of art.
Since the appreciation of artistic beauty, for Hume, just is an emotional response,
this comes to the question of the value of art quite generally. In reconstructing
Hume’s position, more points will emerge in support of my Unity Thesis. The
differences between this fourth dissertation and Hume’s remarks on beauty in
Book 2 of the Treatise, meanwhile, have already been examined in §5.5.
13.1. The sceptical principle
At the heart of Hume’s anti-rationalism, as we saw in chapter 10, is what I have
called the specialisation view of reason and passion (as opposed to Malebranche’s
and Clarke’s hierarchical view). On this picture, both reason and sentiment have
a role to play in motivation; roughly, the latter to set the goals, and the former
to tell us how to achieve those goals. My focus then was on motivation, but as I
noted at the time Hume held a similar view with regard to approbation, in the
case of morals as well as art:
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Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily
ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood:
The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.
(M App1.21, p. 294)
In his essay The Sceptic, Hume has the title character endorse something
that I will refer to as Hume’s sceptical principle:
If we can depend upon any principle, which we learn from philosophy, this,
I think, may be considered as certain and undoubted, that there is nothing,
in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed;
but that these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric
of human sentiment and affection. What seems the most delicious food to
one animal, appears loathsome to another: What affects the feeling of one
with delight, produces uneasiness in another. This is confessedly the case
with regard to all the bodily senses: But if we examine the matter more
accurately, we shall find, that the same observation holds even where the
mind concurs with the body, and mingles its sentiment with the exterior
appetite. (Sc 8, p. 162; my emphasis)
There is no guarantee, from this passage alone, that Hume himself endorsed this
sceptical principle (for he is not speaking here in his own voice). But the principle
is closely related to the specialisation view of reason and passion, being arguably
just another way of saying the same thing. And in any case, Hume explicitly
endorses the principle himself, at least in the case of art (my present focus), in
Of the Standard of Taste: “it [is] certain, that beauty and deformity, more than
sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment,
internal or external” (ST 16, p. 235).
The obvious worry, for those who are disinclined to agree with this sceptical
principle or the specialisation view of reason and passion, is that it leads to
relativism. When different people find different things desirable, valuable, or
beautiful, on account of their different constitutions (and not because of any
differences of opinion concerning the facts), reason—on this view—is not in a
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position to adjudicate between the rival sets of sentiments. But if not reason, then
what? On what basis can we pronounce one constitution or resulting sentiment
better than another?
Hume himself was keenly aware of this difficulty, and the dissertation Of the
Standard of Taste constitutes his attempt to respond to it in the case of beauty
in works of art. (His parallel attempt in the case of morals and motivation is
of course to be found in the moral Enquiry.) Putting the case forcefully on the
other side, he begins this fourth dissertation as follows:
The difference, it is said, is very wide between judgment and sentiment.
All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond
itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it.[1] But all
determinations of the understanding are not right; because they have a
reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and
are not always conformable to that standard. Among a thousand different
opinions which different men may entertain of the same subject, there is
one, and but one, that is just and true... On the contrary, a thousand
different sentiments, excited by the same object, are all right: Because no
sentiment represents what is really in the object... Beauty is no quality in
things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them;
and each mind perceives a different beauty... [E]very individual ought to
acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of
others. To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry,
as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. (ST 7, p. 229-30)
The starting point for this relativistic argument is precisely the sceptical principle,
which as I have said Hume himself accepts. But he is anxious to resist the
1Hume’s language here is reminiscent of the problematic premise in his representative quality
argument, which states that “[w]hen I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and
in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick,
or more than five foot high” (T 2.3.3.5, p. 415). As I argued in §9.2, Hume’s point there is not
that the passions have no intentional objects, but rather that they are not truth-apt, that they
do not purport to correspond to reality in the way that beliefs do. It should be clear, I trust,
that Hume means exactly the same thing here. This passage may indeed be considered further
confirmation of my earlier claim.
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relativist’s inference from this principle to “the natural equality of tastes” (ST 8,
p. 231). He is anxious, that is to say, to erect a standard of taste, according to
which sentiments can be assessed as either right or wrong.
The essence of Hume’s view, put very simply, is that the right sentiments
are those felt by the right sort of people, namely the “true judges”: “the joint
verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and
beauty” (ST 23, p. 241). This move seems structurally sound, and a coherent
way of resisting the relativist’s conclusion while nevertheless maintaining the
sceptical premise. But of course the two questions now are, who are these true
judges, and—more importantly—why are they the right sort of people? Why is
it that their sentiments are fit to provide the standard for all of us, rather than
the sentiments of some other group of people (or none at all, as the relativist
maintains)? The remainder of this chapter will focus on the first question; in the
next chapter I will attempt to reconstruct Hume’s answer to the second.
13.2. The true judges
The first quality that Hume insists the true judge must possess is a delicacy
of taste or imagination, which is a heightened sensitivity to the causes of the
sentiment of beauty:
Though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and
bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment,
internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities
in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.
Now as these qualities may be found in a small degree, or may be mixed and
confounded with each other, it often happens, that the taste is not affected
with such minute qualities, or is not able to distinguish all the particular
flavours, amidst the disorder, in which they are presented. Where the
organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same
time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: This
we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ these terms in the literal or
metaphorical sense. (ST 16, p. 235)
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Hume illustrates what he has in mind here with a story from Don Quixote, in
which Sancho Panza reports that two of his ancestors were able to discern a slight
taste of iron and leather respectively in an otherwise fine wine. Sure enough, when
the barrel was emptied, an iron key with a leather cord attached was found at
the bottom. Hume’s delicacy of taste is intended to be the mental equivalent of
this refined palate.
Some people, Hume seems to think, will naturally have a more delicate taste
than others. But the skill can be honed with sufficient practice:
But though there be naturally a wide difference in point of delicacy between
one person and another, nothing tends further to encrease and improve
this talent, than practice in a particular art, and the frequent survey or
contemplation of a particular species of beauty. (ST 18, p. 237)
So as to fix the proper degree of beauty or deformity, furthermore, true judges
must also be experienced in a range of works. Otherwise they will be in danger
of rating too highly something that is merely quite good:
A man, who has had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of
beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard
to any object presented to him. By comparison alone we fix the epithets
of praise or blame, and learn how to assign the due degree of each... The
most vulgar ballads are not entirely destitute of harmony or nature; and
none but a person, familiarized to superior beauties, would pronounce their
numbers harsh, or narration uninteresting... One accustomed to see, and
examine, and weigh the several performances, admired in different ages
and nations, can alone rate the merits of a work exhibited to his view, and
assign its proper rank among the productions of genius. (ST 20, p. 238)
It is common to count five characteristics of Hume’s true judge, with those just
mentioned—delicacy of taste, practice, and comparison—being the first three. (I
will come to the last two shortly.) To be precise, however, practice and comparison
are not additional characteristics in their own right; rather, they are ways of
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honing one’s delicacy of taste. As Hume says, the true judge has a “delicate
sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison” (ST 23, p. 241; my
emphases).2 But this is a point of no great significance.
The need for practice and comparison is not, for Hume, something peculiar
to the sentiments of beauty and deformity, or to the appreciation of art. On
the contrary, he maintains that it is a quite general feature of human psychology
that our sentiments require experience and comparison to settle into something
suitably ordered:
[I]f a person full grown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a
sudden transported into our world, he would be much embarrassed with
every object, and would not readily determine what degree of love or ha-
tred, of pride or humility, or of any other passion should be excited by it.
The passions are often varied by very inconsiderable principles; and these
do not always play with perfect regularity, especially on the first trial. But
as custom or practice has brought to light all these principles, and has
settled the just value of every thing; this must certainly contribute to the
easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of general estab-
lished rules, in the proportions, which we ought to observe in preferring
one object to another. (P 2.47, pp. 16-7; cf. T 2.1.6.9, pp. 293-4)
My main case for placing Of the Standard of Taste in the context of Hume’s phi-
losophy of emotion will be given in the next chapter. But the present observation
may serve as a hint of the fuller argument to come. The sentiments of the true
judges determine the standard of taste; but it is the science of the passions that
determines what the true judges must be like.
The next feature of the true judge—either the second or the fourth, depend-
ing on whether practice and comparison count—is a suitable lack of prejudice
(ST 21, pp. 239-40). This impartiality takes two forms. First, one must consider
oneself “as a man in general” (ST 21, p. 239), forgetting any particular relation-
ship that one may have with any of the people involved (notably the author of the
2Cf. Jones (1976, pp. 333-4), Weiand (1984, pp. 135-6).
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artwork). Secondly, one must take account of changing times and customs. Art
is not created in a historical vacuum, but is designed with a particular audience
in mind. If we are not ourselves part of that intended audience, and we wish to
assess the merit of the piece, we must imaginatively enter into their point of view.
For example:
An orator addresses himself to a particular audience, and must have a
regard to their particular genius, interests, opinions, passions, and preju-
dices; otherwise he hopes in vain to govern their resolutions, and inflame
their affections... A critic of a different age or nation, who should pe-
ruse this discourse, must have all these circumstances in his eye, and must
place himself in the same situation as the audience, in order to form a true
judgment of the oration. (ST 21, p. 239)
This second form of impartiality is not so much a lack of prejudice, as an ability
to take on the appropriate prejudices. As Michelle Mason nicely puts it, “Hume’s
judge [is] less an impartial observer than a cultural chameleon”.3
Finally, the true judge must also be suitably intelligent: “reason, if not an
essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of this latter faculty”
(ST 22, p. 240). This parallels Hume’s view in the moral case that “in order to
pave the way for such a sentiment [i.e. moral approbation or disapprobation], and
give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much
reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn,
distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts
fixed and ascertained” (M 1.9, p. 173). Reason’s role in the appreciation of art
includes such things as determining whether a work succeeds in what it is trying
to do, and whether the characters depicted behave in credible ways. Though
Hume doesn’t say this himself, we should surely add that certain background
knowledge is generally required: of the history of the genre, say, of any symbolic
3Mason (2001, p. 60). Mason sees this interpretation of freedom from prejudice as an
alternative to the more literal interpretation according to which the true judge must have
no prejudices. But it seems to me clear that there are two aspects to the impartiality that
Hume has in mind, as described above; and the first aspect is indeed a literal lack of prejudice.
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conventions that the artist might use, or of any recent or current events that
might form the context of the work.
Such, then, is the character of Hume’s true judge. And it is the sentiments of
these people that set the standard for all of us. The pressing question, of course,
is why these people or their sentiments are so special. As I have said, however, I
will save tackling this question for the next chapter. In the meantime, there is a
preliminary matter to set straight.
13.3. The threat of circularity
This preliminary matter is the well-known threat of circularity in Hume’s account:
“whereby”—as Peter Kivy puts it—“good art is defined in terms of the good critic
and the good critic in terms of good art”.4 It may help to illustrate the worry here
with a caricature of Hume’s view. Suppose, for example, that we want to know
whether Scottish poetry is better than English poetry. The matter is particularly
puzzling, because there seems to be no general agreement: the Scottish prefer
Scottish poetry, but the English are convinced that theirs is greatly superior.
Our Humean caricature has a quick way to settle the matter. Scottish poetry is
better, he says, because the Scottish are much better judges. But why, we now
ask, are the Scottish better judges? The answer is surely obvious: because they
prefer the better poetry.
This account is clearly hopeless; such circular reasoning can be applied just
as well—which is to say, just as badly—in support of precisely the opposite con-
clusion. Now this is certainly a caricature of Hume’s position, and it is easy to
see why. Hume is indeed committed to the view that some works are better than
others because they are preferred by the better judges. But he does not say, at
least not explicitly, that these judges are better because they prefer the better
works. He says that they are better because they have a more delicate taste,
more experience, more intelligence, and are free from prejudice.
4Kivy (1967, p. 60).
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The threat of circularity is not so easily avoided, however. For the worry is
that, once we look in detail at the characteristics of the true judge, we will find
some ineliminable reference to the quality of works of art. The difficulty here is
not with intelligence or freedom from prejudice, but with delicacy of taste and the
practice and comparison that is supposed to hone this skill. Roughly, the worry is
that a delicate taste ultimately boils down to an ability to appreciate good works
of art. In which case, the circle is slightly bigger than in the caricature above,
but it is still a circle.
According to Kivy, Hume’s view of practice and comparison falls afoul of
precisely this problem:
Practice Hume thinks of as ‘the frequent survey of a particular species of
beauty’. Use of comparisons requires juxtaposing ‘the several species and
degrees of excellence’. But we must be able to recognize the beautiful before
we are able to determine whether a critic has or has not been engaged in
‘the frequent survey or contemplation of a particular species of beauty’.
We must know what is excellent before we are able to determine whether
or not a critic has compared ‘the several species and degrees of excellence’.5
To put the point another way, there is a problem of familiarity here. Those who
have more experience of Scottish poetry may prefer it to English verse, while
those who have more experience of the latter may have the contrary preference.
Whom then do we trust? On Kivy’s interpretation, Hume answers that we must
trust those who have more experience of the better poetry. But the point is that
we are not yet in a position to know which poetry is better; that is the very
question to be settled.
This particular criticism, it seems to me, can be easily met, for Kivy’s inter-
pretations of practice and comparison are mistaken. The passages that he quotes
do suggest, out of context, that Hume thought the true judges must have more
experience of better works of art. But the more plausible interpretation overall
is that he held, more simply, that the true judges must have more experience of
5Kivy (1967, pp. 60-1).
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works of art in general, both good and bad. In the sentences immediately fol-
lowing the first passage that Kivy quotes, Hume talks of “beauties and defects”
(ST 18, p. 237; my emphasis), indicating that the “species of beauty” in question
is rather a species of attempted or intended beauty, a set that will include bad
instances of the type alongside the good. We must give a similar interpretation
to the “several species and degrees of excellence”, which are said to include “[t]he
coarsest daubing” and “[t]he most vulgar ballads” (ST 20, p. 238) alongside the
genuinely excellent works.
In order to establish who has the better experience in general, it is of course
not necessary to know in advance which works are good and which are bad. And
to return to the question of whom we are to trust—those who have more experi-
ence of Scottish poetry, or those who have more experience of English poetry—
Hume’s answer is neither. Rather, we should seek out someone (intelligent and
unprejudiced) who has a decent experience of both, and erect our standard on the
strength of their opinion.
The main threat of circularity, however, comes not from practice and com-
parison, but from the delicacy of taste that these things are supposed to refine
and perfect. There is a genuine worry here as to whether this characteristic can
be fleshed out independently of any reference to good art. The worry emerges
from Hume’s own claim that “the best way of ascertaining” whether someone has
delicacy of taste, “is to appeal to those models and principles, which have been
established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages” (ST 17,
p. 237). Here Hume is explicitly appealing to good works of art, or principles
linking works with the positive sentiments such as beauty, and the threat of cir-
cularity looms large. It was this passage, indeed, that caused S. G. Brown to pose
the original problem, in the earliest statement of it that I have come across.6
13.4. Getting into the circle
Hume also discusses delicacy of taste in his essay Of the Delicacy of Taste and
Passion, in which—as one may guess from the title—he contrasts it with delicacy
6Brown (1938).
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of passion. Where delicacy of taste, as we have seen, is a heightened sensitivity
to (the causes of) the sentiments of beauty and deformity, delicacy of passion is
a corresponding sensitivity to the general ups and downs of life: it makes those
suffering from it “extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, and gives them
a lively joy upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief, when they
meet with misfortunes and adversity” (DT 1, pp. 3-4).
Kivy, although he thinks that practice and comparison do give rise to a vi-
cious circle in Hume’s account, argues that delicacy of taste itself is not thus
problematic. His proposed solution in this case, however, is both philosophically
and textually dubious. His claim is that delicacy of taste is an invariable con-
comitant of delicacy of passion, and that delicacy of passion can be identified
without reference to art works at all (let alone exclusively good ones). Thus
to spot someone with a delicate taste we need only look out for someone with
delicacy of passion, which we can do without any knowledge of art at all.
Kivy’s proposal is certainly structurally sound, and it is also true that del-
icacy of passion is identifiable without reference to works of art. But his first
claim—that delicacy of passion invariably goes along with delicacy of taste—
seems in itself highly implausible.7 In any case, this is not a way out of the circle
that is available to Hume, for he explicitly rejects the claim. The point of his
essay Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion is precisely to recommend cultivating
the former but steering clear of the latter. This advice would hardly count for
much if Hume thought that, as a matter of fact, you couldn’t have one without
the other. Thus the threat of circularity still remains.
I believe, however, that the criticism is ultimately unfounded. The first point
to make in responding to it is that there are potentially two different kinds of
circle here, a metaphysical one and an epistemic one. On the metaphysical circle,
being approved of by good critics is what makes something a good work of art,
while approving of good works of art is (at least a part of) what makes someone
a good critic. On the epistemic circle, by contrast, being approved of by good
critics is evidence that something is a good work of art, while approving of good
7For a criticism, see Carroll (1984).
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works of art is evidence that someone is a good critic. The metaphysical circle
would certainly be a problem; but, I will argue, Hume is not committed to it.
Hume may well be committed to the epistemic circle, meanwhile. But that, I will
argue, is not a problem.
Being approved of by the good critics is indeed what makes something a good
work of art for Hume. But approving of good works of art is not what makes
someone a good critic. What makes someone a good critic are the qualities
examined in §13.2: good sense, freedom from prejudice, and delicacy of taste.
And what constitutes delicacy of taste, in particular, is that “the organs are so
fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to
perceive every ingredient in the composition” (ST 16, p. 235). There is nothing
circular here.
The passage that troubled Brown, and was among those that started the
original worry, merely states that established models and principles are the best
way of ascertaining whether someone has delicacy of taste. This is an evidential
or epistemic claim, and not one that can be in any danger of landing Hume in
a metaphysical circle. And indeed, the problem seems to have persisted in an
epistemic form, albeit not always explicitly so. Kivy, for example, initially sets
up the difficulty in terms of two things being defined with circular reference to
each other, suggesting a metaphysical circle; but when he gets into the details, his
discussion is clearly epistemic: “we know a good critic to possess these qualities
because he approves of good art”; “How are we to determine whether or not
a critic possesses delicacy of taste in the aesthetic sense?”; “Here again is a
quality of good critics that can be recognised prior to any knowledge of the critic’s
aesthetic performance”.8 Nor is Kivy by any means unusual in this regard; for
Jeffrey Weiand, for example, the key question is: “how do we know that someone
has the five characteristics?”9
We can take it as read that approving of good art is evidence that someone
is a good critic, and, in particular, evidence that they have delicacy of taste. We
8Kivy (1967, pp. 60, 61, 63; my emphases).
9Weiand (1984, p. 138; my emphasis).
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can also take it as read that being approved of by good critics is evidence that
something is a good work of art. It would be absurd for Hume to deny either
of these claims. The existence of an evidential circle here is not problematic in
itself. The trouble would be if this was the only evidence that we had on either
side, so that there was no way into the circle from the outside.
But why suppose that this is the only evidence that we have on either side?
For Hume, at least, it is not. As Kivy himself points out, there are various
ways of establishing whether someone has good sense and is free from prejudice,
independently of their artistic judgements.10 But to go straight to the heart of the
matter: we don’t necessarily need good critics even to establish the established
models. These can be established, for example, by their ability to stand the test
of time (as with Homer; ST 11, p. 233). Alternatively, find someone with good
sense, who is free from prejudice (you may be such a person yourself), and then
see how they (you) feel about works that don’t require a great deal of delicacy to
appreciate; the ones whose features are presented “singly and in a high degree”
(ST 16, p. 235). However you do it, gather some evidence that such-and-such
is a good feature of works of art. If you then find yourself enjoying works that
possess that quality “in a smaller degree” (ibid.), you have grounds for thinking
that your taste is delicate.
13.5. Passing the buck
Kivy follows up his treatment of the circle with the challenge of an infinite regress.
All Hume’s account does, he maintains, is pass the evaluative buck:
The phrase good sense describes; it also approves. What has happened
is that in his attempt to reduce disagreements about aesthetic values to
disagreements about facts, Hume has simply pushed the value judgement
a step back: the question Is x a good poem? has become: Does y have
good sense? And both are evaluative questions, questions of ‘sentiment’,
not (solely) questions of fact. (p. 64)
10Kivy (1967, pp. 62-3).
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Kivy focuses his complaint here on the characteristic of good sense (i.e. intelli-
gence), and he was perhaps misled by the the mere presence of the word “good”.
Reason has a definite purpose for Hume, namely to discern truth from falsehood,
and it is an objective matter whether or not it is successful in this task. Thus
the question of whether or not someone has good sense is indeed a factual one,
not a matter of sentiment. Good sense is not the ability to reason in a pleasing
way, but in an accurate way.
That being said, there is nevertheless a legitimate question in this area, and
it is the one that I have already raised and postponed. Let us grant that the
question of whether or not someone possesses the qualities of the true judge is
a factual question, rather than a matter of sentiment. It is not dependent on
a certain sentimental response to works of art (as in the problem of the circle),
and nor is it dependent on a certain sentimental response to the judges’ qualities
themselves (as in this new problem of Kivy’s). Even so, the judgment that
these people—however impartially characterised—are the right sort of people,
the people whose opinions we ought to erect as our standard, would still seem
to be a matter of sentiment. In any case, whether it is a matter of sentiment or
not, the pressing question for Hume’s account is why the people thus identified
set the standard for the rest of us.
Hume has recently been charged, by Brian Ribeiro, of failing to have an
answer to this question.11 Ribeiro characterises Hume’s true judges, not as those
people with the specific qualities that Hume singles out, but rather as the people
who emerge after a certain “programme of aesthetic education”.12 As far as I
can tell nothing hangs on this characterisation; I mention it simply so that the
following quotation will make sense out of context. For here is the objection
forcefully stated:
I am not simply raising the complaint that Hume is trapped in circularity:
we identify the good art by identifying the good judges and identify the
11Ribeiro (2007).
12Ribeiro (2007, p. 21).
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good judges by their ability to identify the good art. Hume could break
that circle on either side if doing so would not leave him sitting on top of his
educative programme... My argument is that whether he plumps for the
programme directly, or indirectly by plumping for judges that exemplify
that programme’s details, he ultimately plumps for his programme. And
he has no argument—no argument—for his programme over against other
competing programmes. So the problem is not circularity (or regress).
The problem is that Hume is committed to the arbitrary, foot-stomping
horn of Agrippa’s Trilemma. The question that expresses this horn is
this: why should we accept Hume’s method... of producing consensus
about matters of taste and not some other method, given that each would
produce comparable degrees of consensus? Hume has no answer to that
question as far as I can see. (Because there is no answer to that question
as far as I can see.)13
The objection is certainly worrying, but I believe that it can be met. In order
to meet it fully, however, it is necessary to place Hume’s account within his
philosophy of emotion, by examining Of the Standard of Taste in the context of
the Four Dissertations. It is to this task that I turn in the next and final chapter.
13Ribeiro (2007, p. 25).

Chapter 14
The Science of Criticism
In the previous chapter, we stated the problem: how can there be a standard
of taste, which pronounces some sentiments right and others wrong, given the
sceptical principle that beauty (value, desirability) is not a quality of objects
themselves? We saw the basic structure of Hume’s reply. The right sentiments,
he says, are those felt by the true judges; and the true judges are those with
a delicate taste, sufficient experience, requisite knowledge and intelligence, and
freedom from prejudice. I argued that there was no threat of circularity here,
and that Hume’s account was structurally sound. But from what we have seen so
far, it remains incomplete. Some answer must be given to the crucial question of
why the true judges thus defined set the standard for the rest of us: why are their
sentiments the right ones? To answer this question, as I have already said, we
must place Hume’s account in the broader context of his philosophy of emotion.
This is the final piece of my Unity Thesis, to be defended in this chapter.
14.1. Relevant virtues
Jerrold Levinson claims to have uncovered “the real problem” with Hume’s pro-
posed account of the standard of taste. “Why,” he asks, “are the works enjoyed
and preferred by ideal critics1 characterized as Hume characterizes them ones that
1I prefer to call them “true” rather than “ideal” myself, both because that is the term that
Hume himself uses, and because it is controversial whether or to what extent Hume’s true
judges are ideal. See Ross (2008).
261
262 CHAPTER 14. THE SCIENCE OF CRITICISM
I should, all things being equal, aesthetically pursue? Why not, say, the objects
enjoyed and preferred by izeal critics—who are introverted, zany, endomorphic,
arrogant, and left-handed?”2 I am doubtful that zaniness is an objectively iden-
tifiable property, and that left-handedness has any systematic bearing on one’s
artistic sentiments; but setting these issues aside, the structural problem remains.
Levinson intimates that Hume failed to give any answer to this question.
The way in which Levinson sets up the problem may allow for an easy re-
sponse. Hume is concerned to establish that the sentiments of the true judges are
right (thereby silencing the relativist). It is a further question whether anyone
wants to acquire the character of the true judge so as to experience the right
sentiments: perhaps some of us quite legitimately have better things to do; life
is short. Levinson is unmoved by this line of objection (it was already raised by
Jeffrey Weiand); in a subsequent paper he emphasised that he did not mean to
raise a problem specifically for Hume, but merely a difficulty that strikes people
of a certain turn of mind upon encountering Hume’s essay.3
This response is somewhat puzzling, however. For once the question is clari-
fied in this way, it becomes apparent, not only that this isn’t a problem for Hume,
but that it isn’t even a problem that has anything in particular to do with the
sceptical principle or the Humean attempt to erect a standard of taste that is
consistent with that principle. It is a perfectly general problem that might arise
in the philosophy of art, regardless of one’s views on the nature of value. For sup-
pose that beauty is in fact an objective quality of things in themselves; it would
still be a further question why anyone should want to learn how to appreciate
it. They might be quite happy enjoying objectively ugly things, or at least suffi-
ciently content not to want to put in the requisite hours to correct their critical
responses. If we are wrong about what sort of food is good for us, we have an
obvious pragmatic reason for correcting the mistake. But if we are wrong about
what sort of art is beautiful, it is not thus immediately clear why this should
trouble us.
2Levinson (2002, p. 229).
3Weiand (2003), Levinson (2003).
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If anything, indeed, it seems to me that Hume is better placed to answer
this question than the objectivist. For if the question is why we should acquire
the character of the true judge, rather than why we should enjoy the objectively
good things, it is more readily apparent what one might say. Good sense, first of
all, is obviously a useful quality to possess, for all sorts of reasons (by no means
limited to the appreciation of art). And Hume makes a point of saying, secondly,
that delicacy of taste is agreeable:
A very delicate palate, on many occasions, may be a great inconvenience
both to a man himself and to his friends: But a delicate taste of wit or
beauty must always be a desirable quality; because it is the source of all the
finest and most innocent enjoyments, of which human nature is susceptible.
(ST 17, p. 236)
In Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion, Hume argues at length for the agree-
ableness of this quality (and disagreeableness of the parallel delicacy of passion,
a heightened sensitivity to the general ups and downs of life).
Perhaps scepticism is appropriate, finally, about the extent to which we
should free ourselves from prejudice (at least of the morally blameless and cog-
nitively harmless kind). Hume after all considers some degree of prejudice to be
quite acceptable in the appreciation of art: “it is almost impossible not to feel a
predilection for that which suits our particular turn and disposition. Such pref-
erences are innocent and unavoidable, and can never reasonably be the object of
dispute” (ST 30, p. 244). But in general, the character of the true judge is surely
a desirable one, quite independently of that character’s emotional responses to
works of art.
However that may be, there is a closely related question here that needs to be
addressed, namely, why Hume supposes that the three characteristics he chooses
will ensure that someone has the right sentiments. Why should these characteris-
tics ensure consistency in sentiments, and why should they be preferred to other
(possibly zany) characteristics? We can go some way to answering this question
by noting that the three characteristics are relevant virtues in the appreciation of
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art. That they are virtues ought to be uncontroversial. At any rate Hume takes
it to be so: “that such a character is valuable and estimable will be agreed in by
all mankind” (ST 25, p. 242). As to their relevance, meanwhile, Hume has a few
things to say. For example, prejudice may cause us to overestimate the work of a
friend, or to underestimate that of an enemy (ST 21, p. 239); good sense is nec-
essary to judge whether characters in a drama behave in accordance with their
nature and circumstances (ST 22, p. 240); and without delicacy of sentiment,
various features of a work of art will simply pass us by (ST 17, p. 236).
From what we have seen so far, it is plausible to read Hume’s answer to the
relativist about taste as what we might call a buck-passing response. The question
of the value of art is shifted onto the question of the value of certain character
traits: good art is the art appreciated by (relevantly) virtuous people. This may
be a satisfactory answer to those subjectivists or sceptics who are predisposed to
reject relativism. But hard-line relativists—who maintain that the sentiments of
insensitive, partial, and unintelligent people, with comparatively little experience
or knowledge of art, are just as valid as the sentiments of the contrary sort of
people—will find nothing to trouble themselves in this interpretation of Hume’s
argument.
It seems to me that Hume does in fact have something to say even against
these hard-line relativists. I do not quite want to say that the buck-passing
version of Hume’s answer is mistaken. It is faulty, but more because of what it
leaves out than because of what it says. Once these omissions are made plain, we
will have more Humean tools at our disposal with which to answer the present
question.
14.2. A textual problem
What the buck-passing interpretation is missing, from a textual point of view, is
an account of what Hume variously terms the “rules of composition”, “rules of
art”, “rules of criticism”, and “rules of beauty” (ST 9, 10, 16; pp. 231, 232, 235).
The textual problem for this interpretation, then, is just this: why does Hume
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spend so much time talking about these things, if they play no role in his answer
to the relativist?
Before filling in this blank, a slight digression may be useful, if only to bring
the issue into clearer focus. Consider the following passages from Hume’s essay:
It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the
various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision afforded,
confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. (ST 6, p. 229)
In each creature, there is a sound and a defective state [of the organ]; and
the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and
sentiment. (ST 12, pp. 233-4)
Thus, though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely
the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work
of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty. (ST 23,
p. 241)
[T]he joint verdict of such [true judges], wherever they are to be found, is
the true standard of taste and beauty. (ST 23, p. 241)
In these four passages, Hume is seen to describe the standard of taste or beauty as,
variously, (i) a rule for reconciling differing sentiments, (ii) a decision confirming
one sentiment and condemning another, (iii) a sound state of mind (at least, such
a thing “affords us” a standard), (iv) a sentiment of someone suitably qualified,
and (v) a joint verdict of suitably qualified people.
This apparent variety poses an interpretative puzzle. Is there only a super-
ficial difference here, so that all of Hume’s characterisations of the standard can
be seen as getting at essentially the same thing, just in a slightly different way
or from a slightly different angle? In which case, what is this common core? Or
is there some substantial difference here? In which case, which of the varieties
should we take to be Hume’s official or considered position?
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This puzzle, or something like it, was first drawn to our attention by Weiand,
and later emphasised by James Shelley.4 Both Shelley and Weiand somewhat mis-
represent the issue, however. Most importantly, they introduce a new contender
for the prize of Hume’s standard, namely the rules of art or criticism mentioned a
moment ago: “Shortly after giving his definition [of the standard of taste], Hume
identifies the standard with what he variously calls ‘rules of composition’, ‘laws
of criticism,’ and ‘rules of art’ ”.5 Interesting though this suggestion is, I can find
no support for it in the text; at no point in the essay, this is to say, does Hume
identify the standard of taste with these rules of art. That standard may be many
things, but I can discover no evidence that this is one of the candidates.
As well as adding an unwarranted candidate, both Shelley and Weiand ignore
several of the others, by presenting the joint verdict of the true judges—number
(v) above—as the chief or only rival to the rules of art. Weiand apparently equates
the rules of art with the rule for reconciling sentiments (i), and the joint verdict
of the judges (v) with the decision confirming one sentiment and condemning
another (ii). Shelley explicitly asks the question whether these identifications
are right.6 What concerns him, however, is the switch from the singular to
the plural (a rule versus the rules ; confirmation of one sentiment versus a joint
verdict);7 the overall framework seems not to be in doubt. The sound state of
the internal organs (iii) and the sentiments themselves (iv), meanwhile, are never
even considered.
I will return to the problem of Hume’s possibly different accounts of the
standard when I have said more about the rules of art, after which the issue will
be easier to address, since we will see that there is an account of the standard
that renders all of these definitions consistent. For now, the point to note is that
the textual problem for the buck-passing interpretation of Hume’s answer—that
4Weiand (1984), Shelley (1994).
5Shelley (1994, p. 437).
6Shelley (1994, p. 437).
7Shelley (1994, p. 443).
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it fails to say anything about the rules of art—is not that it fails to say anything
about Hume’s other definitions of the standard of taste. Certainly it does focus
on the joint verdict of the true judges, at the expense of the other definitions,
and perhaps that could turn out to be a significant lack. But the more immediate
problem, or at least the one that I wish to tackle first, is that it focuses on the
standard of taste (however defined) at the expense of the rules of art.
To understand these rules of art and their place in Hume’s response to the
relativist, we must situate Of the Standard of Taste in its proper context, as part
of Hume’s philosophy of emotion. If, in doing so, we are able to make better
sense of this fourth dissertation, I will take this final aspect of my Unity Thesis
to be well established. This will be the task of the next two sections.
14.3. Art and the passions
The immediate purpose of Hume’s fourth dissertation is, obviously enough, to
justify a standard of taste with which to silence the relativist. But Hume also
has a wider purpose in this work, one that emerges more clearly when we see it in
the context of his philosophy of emotion. Of the Standard of Taste is a manifesto
for an experimental science of criticism, a science that Hume barely began, but
which he considered to be both possible and desirable.
Work on the science of criticism was first promised in the advertisement to
the Treatise:
The subjects of the understanding and passions make a compleat chain
of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this
natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good
fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of morals,
politics, and criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of human nature.
(Ad 1739, p. xii)
As is well known, Hume did not have the good fortune to meet with success.
Nevertheless, a third book on morals was published, as well as the two Enquiries
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and a number of essays on political subjects. Regarding criticism, however, we
have only scraps; though Hume continued to be conscious of the need for more,
as we learn from this comment in the essay Of Civil Liberty :
Men, in this country, have been so much occupied in the great disputes of
Religion, Politics, and Philosophy, that they had no relish for the seemingly
minute observations of grammar and criticism. And though this turn of
thinking must have considerably improved our sense and our talent of rea-
soning; it must be confessed, that, even in those sciences above-mentioned,
we have not any standard-book, which we can transmit to posterity: And
the utmost we have to boast of, are a few essays towards a more just phi-
losophy; which, indeed, promise well, but have not, as yet, reached any
degree of perfection. (CL 8, p. 92)
This is from an essay first published in 1741, sixteen years before Of Tragedy and
Of the Standard of Taste appeared. Which essays Hume had in mind as moving
“towards a more just philosophy” I do not know, but presumably Addison and
Shaftesbury (to whom he had referred four paragraphs earlier) cannot have been
far from his mind.8
In understanding Hume’s conception of the science of criticism, it is impor-
tant to appreciate how closely related it is to the science of the passions. One of
the main purposes of art, for Hume, is to excite our passions; thus those familiar
with the laws governing the interplay of the passions will be well placed to create
good art (or to theorise about the merits of existing art). Consider Hume’s praise
of his friend John Home’s tragedy Douglas, given in the dedication of the Four
Dissertations :
8Hugh Blair, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (first published in 1783, but given
to students at Edinburgh at least fifteen years earlier), echoes Hume’s lament in Of Civil Liberty
that “[w]e are far from having yet attained to any system concerning this subject” (volume 1,
p. 52), but mentions Addison’s Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination (Spectator, volume 6)
as the first attempt at systematisation (ibid.). The lectures also refer to Hume’s Of the Standard
of Taste (volume 1, p. 20), and Blair’s response to relativism is very much in the same spirit
as Hume’s.
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[T]he unfeigned tears which flowed from every eye, in the numerous rep-
resentations which were made of it on this theatre; the unparalleled com-
mand, which you appeared to have over every affection of the human breast:
These are incontestible proofs, that you possess the true theatric genius of
Shakespear and Otway, refined from the unhappy barbarism of the one,
and licentiousness of the other. (Ded 5)
Thus, though Hume never pursued the science of criticism fully or in detail, his
work on the passions may be taken to provide much of its foundations. The
dissertation Of Tragedy is of course clearly in the overlap between these two
sciences.
The view that command of the passions was high among the artist’s skills
was by no means uncommon in the eighteenth century. Alexander Gerard, for
example, in his Edinburgh Society prize-winning Essay on Taste, states that “[a]
very great part of the merit of most works of genius arises from their fitness to
agitate the heart with a variety of passions” (1759, p. 87). Furthermore, in a
passage that strikes an obvious note of agreement with Hume’s essay, Gerard
writes:
Genuine criticism... investigates those qualities in its objects which, from
the invariable principles of human nature, must always please or displease;
describes and distinguishes the sentiments which they in fact produce;
and impartially regulates its most general conclusions according to real
phaenomena. (p. 181)
Or consider also this passage from chapter 2 of Henry Home’s (Lord Kames’)
Elements of Criticism (the second longest chapter in the work by a long way, and
devoted exclusively to the passions):
The design... of this chapter is to delineate that connection [between pas-
sions and the fine arts], with the view chiefly to ascertain what power the
fine arts have to raise emotions and passions. To those who would excel in
the fine arts, that branch of knowledge is indispensable; for without it the
critic, as well as the undertaker, ignorant of any rule, have nothing left but
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to abandon themselves to chance. Destitute of that branch of knowledge,
in vain will either pretend to foretell what effect his work will have upon
the heart. (1762, p. 32)
It should thus come as no surprise that Hume first published Of the Standard of
Taste alongside his Dissertation on the Passions. This juxtaposition would not
have seemed remotely unusual to his readers at the time.
Another thing to note about Hume’s conception of the science of criticism
is that it primarily concerns, not art in general, but only those arts involving
words, such as poetry and theatre. (Notice how, in the quotation given above
from Of Civil Liberty, criticism and grammar go so closely together.) It is not,
I am sure, that Hume explicitly discounted music and the visual arts from its
remit—certainly he never did so in print, and I doubt that he did in his own
mind either—but more that he simply showed no interest in them, and tended to
ignore them or unconsciously set them aside. This focus on poetry adds weight
to the claim that understanding the passions was crucial to Hume’s science of
criticism, especially when we consider that, for Hume, “[t]he object... of poetry
[is] to please by means of the passions and the imagination” (ST 22, p. 240).
Thus the hunt was on for the “rules of composition”, “rules of art”, “rules
of criticism”, or “rules of beauty” (ST 9, 10, 16; pp. 231, 232, 235): general
causal laws governing what features give rise to which passions, and in particular
which properties give rise to the positive sentimental responses, thus rendering the
works that possess these features good or beautiful.9 Hume does not venture any
of these rules in Of the Standard of Taste, but he does not doubt their existence.
Our question now is, how do these rules of art relate to the standard of taste,
and to Hume’s attempt to refute the relativist?
9Sometimes the prompting of negative sentiments, for Hume, can be valuable in a work (as
in the case of tragedy), but only because they increase the predominant pleasurable sentiments.
This hedonistic view of the value of art is presumably too simplistic to be very convincing, but
it is Hume’s view (as it was many other people’s at the time). I suspect that it can, however,
be divorced from his general framework, while still leaving that framework intact. Perhaps for
example we could say that the sentiments invoked in us by good works of art are ones that we
somehow value or want to experience; even when they are painful, or not even best characterised
in terms of pleasure and pain at all.
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14.4. The rules of art
There is no a priori guarantee that a science of criticism, of the sort that Hume
envisaged, will be possible. A science of this sort is concerned with uncovering
general principles, but what if the relevant phenomena are simply too diverse to
admit of any substantial generalisations? What if individual tastes are simply too
different to be accounted for by any general rules of art or criticism? This is the
thesis of (let us say) particularism, and Hume’s science of criticism is premised
on its falsehood.
Particularism about art these days typically means a particularism about
properties, the view that no general rules exist conferring value on properties of
works of art: the most we can say is that a property makes this particular work
of art valuable, not that it renders valuable, to a degree, any work possessing
that feature. This is not the view that I have in mind here (though I take it that
Hume was opposed to this view as well).10 The view that I have in mind here
is rather a particularism about people; particularists of this sort may allow that
a certain property is always valuable in any work of art relative to a particular
person or group of people. What they deny is that there are any general rules of
this nature governing all people (or all groups of people). Some people like this
sort of thing, and other people like that sort of thing, and that is all we can say
at the general level.
It will be apparent, I trust, how close the relationship is between particu-
larism (in my sense) and relativism. But the two are not the same. Crucially,
particularism is a purely descriptive doctrine. It claims that different people
are, in matters of taste, too different to allow for any general science of taste or
criticism that makes substantial claims about all of them. Perhaps we can do
a general science of these people’s taste, or those people’s taste; but a general
science of human taste will not be possible. The relativist, by contrast, makes an
10See the exchange between Dickie (2003), a generalist, and Shelley (2002, 2004), a partic-
ularist (in the modern sense). Shelley argues, convincingly to my mind, that Hume was a
generalist in the sense that he himself rejects.
272 CHAPTER 14. THE SCIENCE OF CRITICISM
evaluative claim: that different people have different tastes, and that we cannot
legitimately criticise others for having a taste that is different from our own, or
pronounce any one taste superior to any other.
Hume is firm in his conviction of the possibility of uncovering general rules
of art. He acknowledges, of course, the great variety of taste in the world, but
he urges that these differences are not simply brute, inexplicable facts, as the
particularist maintains. Rather, there are general principles of human nature
governing everyone’s sentimental responses, with the divergent sentiments that
we actually experience being the result of causal “noise” from other principles
which operate in different people to different degrees:
But though all the general rules of art are founded only on experience
and on the observation of the common sentiments of human nature, we
must not imagine, that, on every occasion, the feelings of men will be
conformable to these rules. Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very
tender and delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favourable
circumstances to make them play with facility and exactness, according to
their general and established principles. The least exterior hindrance to
such small springs, or the least internal disorder, disturbs their motion,
and confounds the operation of the whole machine. (ST 10, p. 232)
As I said in §14.1 above, Hume holds that the defining characteristics of his true
judges are virtues, i.e. qualities that we all agree are valuable. They are moreover
relevant virtues in the appreciation of art. I have given some motivation for this
claim already, but we are now in a position to see Hume’s main justification for
it, or at least the general backdrop of his particular justifications. The central
idea is that these virtues enable us to remove the causal “noise” that prevents us
from experiencing the “catholic and universal beauty” (ST 10, p. 233), i.e. from
experiencing the sentiments that arise in accordance with the general principles
of taste that (Hume believes) lie in each and every one of us.
We must of course ask the very important question of why Hume thinks
he is entitled to assert that there are these general principles in all of us, or
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on what basis he concludes that a general experimental science of criticism is
indeed possible. This question is all the more urgent given his failure to pursue
this science in very much detail (and indeed his acknowledgement, in Of Civil
Liberty, that he and his predecessors had yet to get very far in this task). And
the answer, I fear, is somewhat disappointing. Hume’s discussion of the virtuous
features of his true judges, and of the ways in which the lack of these virtues can
interfere with the sentiments that we feel, certainly provides the basis for a reply
to the particularist, by offering a general method for accounting for the diversity,
consistently with the view that there are general rules. But much more would
need to be done to establish, not only that it is possible there are such general
rules, but that there in fact are. The only clear piece of evidence that I can find
Hume offering in this regard is the example of Homer, for whom “[a]ll the changes
of climate, government, religion, and language, have not been able to obscure his
glory” (ST 11, p. 233). This, I allow, is evidence in the right direction; but if this
is all that Hume can muster, it seems a fairly unconvincing case.11
But however weak Hume’s argument may be at this point, we must return
to the issue of his reply to the relativist. Suppose, then, that there are general
rules of art or criticism, governing the sentiments of all human beings. If this is
indeed true, it does seem quite legitimate to erect a standard of taste on the back
of these rules. There can be no suspicion of arbitrariness in choosing to fix on the
sentiments of the true judges rather than those of any other group, since there will
be an important sense in which these are the sentiments of all of us (although
in many cases various external factors prevent us from feeling them when and
where we otherwise would). It might be, I hasten to add, that the particular
characteristics Hume picks out as defining the true judges are the wrong ones, or
at least form an incomplete set; but any complete science of criticism will include,
not only the general rules, but also all the various factors that prevent them from
operating. Assuming that we have such a complete science, we will then simply
be able to read off the relevant virtues.
11The poor quality of Hume’s argument here should not be particularly surprising. His belief
in determinism quite generally was more optimistic than well-reasoned; see Millican (2010,
pp. 635-7).
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14.5. Many standards
One loose end remains to be tied up: the problem of Hume’s several characteri-
sations of the standard of taste (introduced in §14.2 above). With a little care,
we can see that Hume’s various statements are not really in conflict, and that we
can find in this essay a clear definition of the standard of taste. Let us begin with
the first potentially problematic statement, the one that Shelley homes in on as
the main source of the trouble:
It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the
various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision afforded,
confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. (ST 6, p. 229)
The simple point to make here is that the main purpose of a standard of taste is
to settle the question of which sentiments are right and which are wrong. If we
had some such standard, therefore, it would by definition enable us to reconcile
conflicting sentiments; if, that is, all parties to the dispute were aware of the
standard, were unbiased, and were determined to find the right sentiment. Failing
that, it would at least enable those familiar with the standard to decide who is
right and who is wrong in any such dispute.
This is how I read Hume’s supposed “two definitions” of the standard of taste;
which is to say, I do not read them as definitions at all, but simply as a (pretty
trivial) statement of why we might want such a standard (whatever it is), and
of what use we might put it to. On this innocuous reading of the passage, there
is no danger that Hume might be offering two potentially conflicting definitions
of the standard. Nor is there any danger of this passage conflicting with any
subsequent definitions that Hume might give.
Shelley picks out this paragraph as “perhaps... the most important and least
understood” in Hume’s essay. He laments that, “in all that has been written on
Hume’s aesthetics, almost nothing has been said” about it, mentioning Weiand
as the only exception to this rule.12 If I am right, however, the lack of attention
12Shelley (1994, p. 437).
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that this paragraph has received is entirely understandable, indeed appropriate.
Obviously this is what we want a standard of taste for: to reconcile conflicting
sentiments, or at least (if the relevant party won’t budge) to decide who is right
and who is wrong. Hume is here saying nothing substantial or controversial, and
the paragraph in question is perhaps one of the least important and (Shelley and
Weiand excepted) the best understood.
That still leaves three potentially conflicting statements in Hume’s essay
about the nature or essence of the standard of taste, which for ease I will repeat
here:
In each creature, there is a sound and a defective state [of the organ]; and
the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and
sentiment. (ST 12, pp. 233-4)
Thus, though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely
the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work
of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty. (ST 23,
p. 241)
[T]he joint verdict of such [true judges], wherever they are to be found, is
the true standard of taste and beauty. (ST 23, p. 241)
There is a consistent reading of all of these passages available, however, a reading
that also closely parallels Hume’s account of the standard of judgment. The
standard of taste, on this reading, is a sentiment (or the sentiments) felt by
someone suitably qualified, i.e. someone with the defining characteristics of the
true judge, i.e. someone whose mental “organs” are in a sound state. Judgments,
recall, “have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of
fact” (ST 7, p. 230), and real matter of fact affords us the standard of judgment.
Sentiments, by contrast, do not have a reference to anything beyond themselves
(in that same sense), and so the only things that can afford us a standard of taste
are other sentiments. Which sentiments, then? Hume answers: the natural ones,
the ones felt in the sound state of the organ, or equivalently those felt by the true
judges.
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This still leaves one thing that Hume says unaccounted for, namely the sud-
den and unexplained introduction of a joint verdict of several (all?) true judges.
Perhaps Hume intended, with this move, to deal with the limited degree of rela-
tivism that he later mentions, towards the end of the essay: true judges will all
still have their own favourite authors and genres, and be subject to a handful
of blameless differences of temperament or even prejudices, resulting in some-
what different sentiments (ST 28-31, pp. 243-5). Perhaps, then, Hume thought
that a joint verdict of enough of these judges would help to settle these disputes.
Difficult questions arise here, however, about how exactly we are to “join” the
conflicting sentiments. Do we take some sort of average? Do we combine all the
positive ones, and delete the conflicting negative ones? Or what?
It seems to me quite unlikely that this is what Hume had in mind. If it was,
we would expect some answers to these questions, which he nowhere attempts to
give. Furthermore, such answers would conflict with Hume’s acknowledgement
that the appropriate response in these cases of disagreement is in fact relativism:
“we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary senti-
ments” (ST 28, p. 224). Much more likely, then, is that, when Hume spoke of a
joint verdict of several judges, his point was merely to emphasise the agreement
between all such people; for without this agreement, his proposed standard of
taste would not work: “If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a
considerable uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea
of the perfect beauty” (ST 12, p. 234). If not, however, there is nothing more that
we can say against the relativist. The joint verdict, then, is precisely the degree
to which the true judges agree. Whatever differences there are in the sentiments
of the true judges—and Hume thinks there certainly will be some—must remain
blameless and irreconcilable.
Conclusion
The philosophy of emotion naturally commands less mainstream attention than
epistemology, metaphysics, or moral philosophy. This was as true in the eigh-
teenth century as it is today, and it is no surprise that Book 2 was the last of
the Treatise volumes that Hume revisited in his mature work. This topic nev-
ertheless continued to be very important to him, with clear connections to his
philosophy of religion and philosophy of art, not to mention his moral philosophy.
Though the Four Dissertations will probably always be overshadowed by the two
Enquiries, I hope to have shown that they hang together very nicely as a set, and
contain much of interest to the philosopher and the student of Hume.
The current scholarly emphasis on the Treatise, at the expense of Hume’s
later works, has become so familiar that it now scarcely raises an eyebrow. In
truth, however, it ought to be very puzzling. Not only does common sense suggest
that Hume’s thought would have got better over time, but we also know that
Hume himself deeply regretted publishing the Treatise, and in later life had a
clear preference for the Enquiries and Dissertations.
In October 1775, most notably, he wrote to William Strahan asking that
an advertisement be prefixed to any remaining copies of volume 2 of his Essays
and Treatises (in the event it was prefixed to volume 2 of the posthumous 1777
edition). I already quoted some of this advertisement at the end of Part 1, but
here it is in full:
Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, were pub-
lished in a work in three volumes, called A Treatise of Human Nature: A
work which the Author had projected before he left College, and which
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he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it successful, he
was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the
whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligences in his former
reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. Yet several
writers, who have honoured the Author’s Philosophy with answers, have
taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work, which
the Author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any ad-
vantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it: A practice very
contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of
those polemical artifices, which a bigoted zeal thinks itself authorised to
employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces [the two
Enquiries, the Dissertation on the Passions, and the Natural History of
Religion] may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments
and principles. (Ad 1777, p. 2)
Hume had in mind here the criticisms of him by Thomas Reid (1764) and James
Beattie (1770); in the letter he writes that the advertisement “is a compleat An-
swer to Dr Reid and to that bigoted silly Fellow, Beattie” (HL 2, p. 301). But his
dissatisfaction with the Treatise goes back much further. In the published Letter
from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh (1745), for example, written in re-
sponse to a pamphlet accusing the Treatise of endorsing “Universal Scepticism”
(L 14, p. 425), “Principles leading to downright Atheism” (L 15, p. 425), and
“With sapping the Foundations of Morality”(L 19, p. 425), Hume admitted, after
denying the charges, “that the Author had better delayed the publishing of that
Book; not on account of any dangerous Principles contained in it, but because
on more mature Consideration he might have rendered it much less imperfect by
further Corrections and Revisals” (L 41, p. 431).
The same attitude emerges from his private correspondence. In March 1740,
even before Book 3 had been published, Hume was already writing thus to Hutch-
eson: “I wait with some impatience for a second Edition principally on Account
of Alterations I intend to make in my Performance” (HL 1, p. 38). Of course he
never did produce a second edition, but wrote instead the Enquiries and Disser-
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tations. Indeed, in a letter to John Stewart some time later, he wrote that the
“positive Air” of the Treatise “so much displeases me, that I have not Patience
to review it” (HL 1,p. 187). Once the first Enquiry was in print, moreover, he
expressed a clear preference for this work in a letter to Gilbert Elliot:
I believe the philosophical Essays contain every thing of consequence re-
lating to the Understanding, which you would meet with in the Treatise;
& I give you my Advice against reading the latter. ... The Philosophical
Principles are the same in both: But I was carry’d away by the Heat of
Youth & Invention to publish too precipitately. So vast an Undertaking,
plan’d before I was one and twenty, & compos’d before twenty five, must
necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a
hundred times. (HL 1, p. 158)
The evidence is unambiguous, and there is no doubt that Hume came to dislike
his own Treatise almost immediately after publishing it.
While this much is uncontroversial, however, the more difficult question is
why Hume was so unhappy with his first performance. There are two possible
answers. The less interesting one holds that the basis of Hume’s attitude was
solely or at least predominantly stylistic. There is certainly some prima facie
evidence in support of this view. In the Letter from a Gentleman, Hume admits
that he had better delayed the publishing of the Treatise, but not because of its
“dangerous Principles”. In the 1777 advertisement, he tells us that “[m]ost of the
principles, and reasonings” from his later work were already to be found in the
Treatise, and while he acknowledges “some negligences in his former reasoning”,
it appears that he is more unhappy with the “expression”. Again, the letter to
Elliot states, at least of Book 1 and the first Enquiry, that “[t]he Philosophical
Principles are the same in both”. And in his autobiographical My Own Life,
Hume said he felt that the failure of the Treatise “proceeded more from the
manner than the matter” (MOL 8, p. xxxv) of the work.
This answer, I take it, is the one that most scholars today favour; a view
that goes some way to explaining the general preference for the Treatise over
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Hume’s later works. But the evidence of Hume’s explicit remarks on the matter
is also consistent with a more intriguing possibility: that his dissatisfaction with
the Treatise was not merely stylistic, but also grounded in some of its substantial
content. Most of the principles are not all of the principles, after all; negligences
in reasoning, however reticently acknowledged, are certainly matters of substance;
and Hume can hardly have thought that he answered Reid’s and Beattie’s philo-
sophical criticisms merely by improving his writing style.13 Needless to say, it is
this latter answer that I favour: as I have argued throughout this thesis, there
are several substantial differences between Treatise Book 2 and the Four Disser-
tations. I have also noted along the way some differences between Book 3 and
the moral Enquiry.
The official statement of my Difference Thesis in the introduction was given
in neutral terms, but I needn’t be coy. It has no doubt been apparent from
very early on that I believe the philosophy of emotion that we find in the Four
Dissertations to be not only different from that of Treatise Book 2, but also
significantly better. It used to be thought that the Treatise was Hume’s principal
philosophical work, and that, prompted by its lack of immediate success, Hume
dumbed down his ideas in the later Enquiries so as to reach a wider audience
(while throwing in some provocative irreligious arguments for good measure). No
one today, I take it, holds this uncharitable interpretation of Hume’s literary and
intellectual motives.14 Old habits die hard, however, and the Treatise is still
considered by most scholars to be the “heavyweight” of Hume’s philosophical
texts. Success for my argument would entail nothing less than the relegation of
Book 2 from its current exalted position as the pinnacle of Hume’s thought on the
passions, to the more humble but philosophically and historically more plausible
status of a first draft.
13This last point is made by John Nelson (1972), who may also have been the first person
(I haven’t done a thorough search) to ask the present question clearly in these terms. For a
detailed attempt to explain how Hume’s first Enquiry “answers” Reid’s criticisms, see Millican
(2006).
14The classic refutations of it are Kemp Smith (1941/2005, pp. 526-30) and Mossner (1950).
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